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INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 1933, Hitler became the chancellor of Germany, and with
him the reign of the National Socialist regime began.

Very few people sus-

pected at that time that this date would mark the beginning of a new era, not
only for Germany, but for all mankind.
turbing omens as:

Only the pessimists stressed such dis-

the renewal of the 1926 Treaty of Berl in between Germany

and the Soviet Union; German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, as
well as from the League of Nations in October; rumors of German economic designs concerning Central Europe; 1 secret negotiations between Germany and Poland;2 and, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

The optimists,

however, were able to point out that France was still the most powerful continental power, the Little Entente was strong, Mussolini was in a cooperative
mood, Germany was seemingly quiet, and the new regime was not in a position
to challenge the status quo drafted by the Versailles Peace Treaty.
Three years later, however, the situation was different.

Hitler's moves

were so spectacular and unexpected that very few Western statesmen had the
time or the nerve to pay attention to anything but the German problem.

Cen-

tral Europe and its problems came to the foreground again only during the Czech
crisis and at the time of the Munich Agreement.
and developments led to World

War~

They came too late, however,

I I.

le. A. Macartney and A. w. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London:
MacMillan, 1962), pp. 314-17.

2 1bid., p. 320.
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It is understandable, therefore, that modern historians describe the history of Central Europe from 1933 to 1938 only when they write about the history of Central Europe or of a specific Central European country.

In books

which narrate the history of Western Europe, only a few pages or footnotes are
devoted to the Central European events and their relations with Western Europe
in the crucial period from Hitler's rise to the Munich crisis.
To exclude possible misunderstanding and for the sake of easier definitions, I shall use the expression "Central Europe" when I refer collectively
to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.
Keeping this in mind, we may and should ask some questions from the historians' point of view.

Did the events of Central Europe develop separately,

without influencing Western European affairs?

Had the Western European states

no reason to pay more attention to Central Europe before 1938?
events related at all?

Were not the

Or did the historians and those contemporary Western

statesmen make a great mistake when they neglected and still neglect the history of Central Europe?

Is it not possible that back in 1934-1936 they could

have prevented the future annexation of Austria, the destruction of the unity
of the Little Entente, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and even the outbreak of World War I 17
All these questions, if they were asked at all, were asked from the point
of view of the Great Powers, and this is the second interesting characteristic
of that period.

Only a few nationalist writers have attempted to understand

and interpret the pol icy of the

s~all

Central European states from their re-

spective nationalist points of view. However, these interpretations have been
,.· ..
dismissed by our Western academic authorities as biased, chauvinistic, and
narrow-minded.

Are these authorities right?

Can we really pass judgment on

the Central European statesmen according to our own standards--praising them

' """'""'
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if they were useful for the Western Powers, and condemning them if they were
not?

Should we not try to understand them as they

small nations?

were-~representatives

Do we have the right to downgrade them?

of

Should we blame the

Austrian, Hungarian, or Yugoslavian leaders, who after experienceing the unconcern of the Western democracies, tried to save and serve the interests of
their respective peoples by accepting an anti-Entente and pro-Nazi foreign
po 1 i ti ca 1 1 i ne?
Furthermore, the basic question of whether the small states ever had a
chance to make a real independent decision in their foreign policy, or whether
they were always pressured to fall in 1 ine with the foreign policy of their
respective Great Power patrons has not been decided.
It is impossible to make a thorough analysis of all the small states of
Central Europe within the framework of this dissertation.

Such an analysis

should cover Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Albania, and their relationships with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

Consequently, I have

·1 imited my study to dealing with only Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and
shall try to answer the foregoing questions from my study of the foreign relations of these three pivotal states.
The reasons for selecting these three countries are manifold.

Austria

has the same language, a Jong similar past, a cultural tradition, and other
experiences in common with Germany.

Hungary, unique in her language, had a

long anti-Habsburg and anti-Germa~ tradition.

Yugoslavia was the successor of

the Serbian kingdom, and for a long time a strong follower of the French political designs.

Based on their past histories, one might expect that Austria

would, by all means, work for a unification with Germany, and yet just the opposite happened. One might expect that Hungary would be the firmest enemy of

4

Germany and Austria, and yet just the opposite happened.

Also, one might ex-

pect that Yugoslavia would follow the old sentimentalist, panslavic political·
plans, and again just the

oppos~te

happened.

Au~tria

was created by the vic-

tors of World War I, and naturally one might expect that the victors would defend her most vigorously.
patron.

Instead, her traditional foe, Italy, became her best

Hungary and Yugoslavia became friends after a Jong, agonizing period

of double-dealing statesmanship in the camp of their greatest enemy, Germany.
There are as many puzzles as there are countries.

The oversimplified answers

of the historians writing from the Great Powers' point of view are partly misleading, and partly unsatisfactory.
The reasons for analyzing the relationship of these countries with France
are also many!

Up to 1934, France seemed to be the unchallenged leader of the

European continent.

All of Central Eruope, with the exception of Austria and

Hungary, was firmly allied with her, and even within these two countries there
were influential political groups who would have welcomed stronger ties with
her.

France's attempts to utilize these conditions for her own benefit were

less than fortunate.

She displayed almost complete unconcern toward Hungary,

she was hesitant toward Austria, and she was bossy and aggressive toward Yugoslavia.

This French indecisiveness and aggressiveness equally influenced the

political decisions of these three states.

It was not Germany, but France who

created the opportunities for the German penetration of Central Europe.

It was

the incomprehension of the interests of small states (among them the special
nationalist interests of Austria, ttungary, and Yugoslavia) on France's part
that started the chain-reaction ending with the complete dissolution of the
French security system.
shall try to analyze and interpret, therefore, the actions and passivity
ot the three states from their own particular points of view.

The basis for

5
judging these states will not be their usefulness or uselessness to the Allied
powers.

Rather, the judgment will be based on how the Austrian, Hungarian, and

Yugoslavian statesmen served the interests of their respective countries.
With this approach, the study will hopefully make some worthy conclusions,
which will help to explain the seemingly very complicated history of Central
Europe in the years 1934-1936.

It will also hopefully serve to help the

statesmen and diplomats of the present to avoid mistakes that are usually committed because of the misunderstanding of the Central European politics, and
because of the disregard of the special Central European interests.

CHAPTER I
FRENCH RETREAT FROM CENTRAL EUROPE
France's Situation Up to 1934
The economic crisis that struck Europe in 1930 had avoided France for a
while.

Curiously enough, among the French statesmen, only Andr~ Tardieu (prim

minister, November 2, 1929-February 17, 1930; March 2, 1930-December 5, 1930;
and February 20, 1932-May 10, 1932; and foreign minister, February 20, 1932May 10, 1932) understood the world-wide scope of the crisis, and he alone
tried to warn his country of the possibility of a crisis in France also.
Chamber of Deputies, though, disregarded his warnings and

11

The

con ti nued in their

customarily irresponsible attitude toward economics and finance. 111
however, too harsh of a judgment to call the deputies irresponsible.

It is,
Since

1929 there had been an oversupply of raw materials, especially of wheat.

The

financial crisis had effected, first of all, the producers of agricultural
products.

,

Albrecht Carrie describes the possible consequences of such a situ-

ation in the following words:

11

agricultural interests will clamor for

•••

subsidies and tariffs, which least appeal especially to industrial interests,
while industrial workers will equally resist a diminuation of their wages and,
if wholly deprived of employment, will turn to the state for assistance. 112
l

H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe, a History (Englewood, New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 207.
2Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress
of Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 449.
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The government, as well as the deputies, were equally pressured and
caught in the middle in this situation.

Not so much the political principles

of the different parties, but their ability or inability to deal with the
crisis caused the fall of many French governments in a rapid succession between the years 1930-1934.
International Trade
The frequent change of leadership undoubtedly weakened France's international authority, hindered the cooperation with other nations, and very decisively influenced and promoted the decline of the French pre-eminence in Central Europe.

However, it was perhaps more important that France lost her im-

portance economically in the trade-transactions of these states, and with her
declining role in economics, she also lost political influence.

A short re-

view of the foreign trade will explain this statement.
The economic relationship with Austria showed a steady decline from 1929
to 1932.

The amount of French export to Austria fell from 94 mill ion schil-

lings to an al I-time low of 31 million schillings, while the import from Austria declined from 79 mill ion schillings to 29 mill ion schillings. 3

The fol-

lowing two years brought some improvements, and the French export reached 36.9
million schillings, while the imports climbed back to 33.9 million schillings~
Still, France ranked only tenth among the most important business partners of
3Jean Morini-Comby, Les tchanges Commerciaux entre la France et les ttats
Successeurs de 1 'Empire Austro-Hongrois (Paris: Centre d 1 ttudes de Politique
d 1·ittrangere, No. 2, 1936), p. 91.'
4 rbid., p. 13.

8
Austria, and was even surpassed by the U.S., which imported 61.9 million schil
lings of merchandise.5
Nor did France do much better in Rumania.

She imported the greatest

amount of goods in 1931, buying 565.6 million francs worth of Rumanian products, and at the same time selling an amount of 115.1 million francs of merchandise.6

In 1934, however, the Rumanian imports fell to 246.7 million

francs, while France increased her exports to 167.1 million francs.7

With

these amounts, Rumania ranked fifteenth as a client in the French trade and
ranked twenty-third as supplier among the forty most important business partners of France. 8

Rumania was most sensitively hit because of the decline of

Rumanian oil exports to France, which was due to the Soviet-French and I raquiFrench commercial treaties signed in 1934.9
Czechoslovakia also imported the greatest amount of merchandise in 1931.
It was close to 220 mill ion francs, while France, on the other hand, bought
more than 330 million francs of Czechoslovakian products. lO

In 1934 the ex-

port to Czechoslovakia had risen to 225 mill ion francs worth of goods, though
the imports declined to 190 mil lion francs. 11
5Morini-Comby, Les {changes Commerciaux, p. 13.
6 I b i d • , p • 94 •
71bid.
8 1bid., p. 92.
91bid., p. 62.
101bid., p. 101.
ll1bid.

9
Yugoslavia exported to France 74.3 million dinars worth of merchandise in
1933, but only 51.4 million dinars in 1934; 12 and France sold to Yugoslavia
120.6 million dinars worth of merchandise in 1933 and 177.6 million dinars in
1934.13

By 1934 France had slid to a rank of sixth as supplier and to a rank

of eleventh as a customer of Yugoslavia. 14
Interestingly enough, during the period 1930-1934 France's share in the
import business of Hungary grew, although, the amounts showed a decline from
24.7 mill ion pengos to 10 mill ion pengos. l5

France remained the fifth most

important business partner of Hungary, holding only 3.2 per cent 16 of the Hungarian foreign trade.17
The general picture that can be drawn from these statistics shows a
steady decline of the dominant role of France in the economic life of the Central European states. 18

The successor states searched desperately for new

markets to sell their wheat, oil, and timber (to mention only the most important ones), and found ready buyers in Germany and Italy.
12 M. Vugl ijenovic, Die Stellung Engl ands und Frankreichs am Yugoslawishen
Markte in Verhaltniss zu der Ital iens und des Deutschen Reiches (Wien: Hollnek, 1940), p. 17.
13

1bid. Though the full amount of Yugoslavian trade declined only $9
mill ion~e trade balance became strongly unfavorable. See Table I.
14

Morini-Comby, Les Echanges Commerciaux, p. 46.

l51bid., p. 36. The reason for the decline in amounts was the changes of
values in the relationship of the franc and the pengo.
16
17
18

Calculated on the basis of:
1bid.

see Table I.

Ibid., p. 36.
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This decline of French-Central European trade increased during the first
half of 1935, and drastically changed the position of France by allowing German economic penetration of these areas. 19
The roots of this disastrous French foreign trade policy can be found in
the even more disastrous domestic economic policy of the consecutive French
governments aad the methods they applied to fight the economic crisis.

In-

stead of cooperating with England and the U.S. in their efforts to stabilize
the world financial situation, France remained stubbornly faithful to the gold
standard.

She alone of the Great Powers refused to devalue her currency and

in this way priced herself out of the foreign markets. 20

At home they fol-

lowed a deflation pol icy, and as a result the prices sank at least 15 per cent
during the year of 1934.21

The closing of the gap between the agricultural

and industrial prices was intended to regain the competitive capacity of the
French products on foreign markets.
great hardship in France:
tion lowered.

However, this deflation policy created

salaries were cut back, wages declined, and produc-

The conditions of the French workers (in offices, factories,

and on the farms) deteriorated. 22
It is small wonder that the dissatisfaction with the economic situation
took the form of political protest.

It is also natural that this political

protest was directed not only against the government, but also against the political parties, groups, and ideologies, as well as against the system.

The

19see Table I I.
20 Elisabeth Haag, Die Franzosische Aushandelspolitik, 1931-1938 (Lachen:
A. Kessler, 1942), p. 24.
21 Revue de la Situation Economigue Mondiale, 1934-1935 (Geneva:
Nat ions , 19 3 5) , p. 9.
22Haag, Aushandelspol itik, p. 25.
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president of the Chamber of Deputies was correct when he said, "(All) peoples
are alienated from parliamentarianism without anyone knowing what one can use
to replace it. 1123

The irony of this situation was that not only the Communists

but also the moderate Marxist-Socialists (under the leadership of Leon Blum)
frequently joined forces with the Right in their effort to undermine and defeat the existing bourgeois-radical governments.
These efforts were too successful; clubs, leagues, and organizations
sprang up in France looking at the economic and political successes of Nazi
Germany with admiration.

At first these leagues were only advocating, but by

the beginning of 1934 they were already demanding the overthrow, not only of
the respective governments of France, but also the whole parliamentary republican system.
It is necessary to analyze in a few sentences the French domestic political affairs during the year of 1934, in order to fully understand the foreign
policy of France during the same year.
Domestic Pol icy
The history of the Third Republic is rich in scandals.

The most impor-

tant and the best known in the 1930 1 s was the Stavisky affair, not so much because of its preponderation and size, but mostly because it triggered political
events of great consequences.
Serge A. Stavisky was an adventurer.
with his Russian-Jewish parents in 1900.

'

he was brought to trial for frau.d.

Born in Kiev, he migrated to Paris
As early as 1912, at the age of 26,

In 1926 he was arrested again, but his

23Reports of the Austrian ambassador, Lothar Egger-Moellwald to Chancellor
Dollfuss, RAA, Jeanneney to Egger-Moellwald, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12,
19 34 ' p. 480 •
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trial was postponed, and in 1927 he was released from prison due to the intervention of his mysterious patrons.

He continued his fraudulent activities,

floating worthless bonds in different French cities.

In January 1934 the

French newspapers discovered these new frauds and demanded his and his patrons'
punishment.

Among his patrons were high government officials, and possibly

the chief of police.
the L 1 Action

Fran~aise

Stavisky committed suicide, but the papers, especially
kept the issue alive and demanded the resignation of

the government. 24
The political Right found a common cause in the Stavisky affair.

They

united, not only to discredit the government circles, but also to stage mass
demonstrations and street fights, and if necessary, by means of revolution in
order to force the direction of French politics toward the Right.

A concerted

effort of the Rightist groups produced a mass demonstration and street fights.
on February 6, 1934, between the Rightist groups, ironically joined by many
Communists 25 and the pol ice, who were supported by units of the mobile guard.
Though the pol ice gained the upper hand, and the Chamber of Deputies voted con
· fidence for the Daladier government, Daladier submitted his resignation.

On

February 9, 1934 Gaston Doumergue (a former president who was thought to be
above parties) formed a new coalition government in which all the other political parties held positions, with the exception of the Socialists and Communists, who refused to participate.
servatives.

The government was dominated by the con-

The general workers• strike indicated that the February days pro-

duced a negative effect from the R,ghtist point of view:

it called the

24 L'Action Fran1aise (Paris), January 9, 1934.
25wi11iam L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1969), p. 214. Shirer's book is quoted here as an eye witness
account.
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attention of the Left to its dangers and urged them to unite against these
dangers.

Only the Corrmunists continued to oppose every action of the

11

bour-

geoi s 11 government.
The danger of a Rightist revolution was over for the time being, but the
self-confidence of the Republican leaders was badly shaken.

On March 12,

1934, one month after the riots, the president of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney,
addressed the following words to the visiting Austrian ambassador·

"In every

country, energetic authoritarian government chiefs should take over the leader·
ship, as was the case in France during the time of Clemenceau, in order to
surmount the general political difficulties all over Europe. 1126
At the end of May 1934 the Human it~ republished in its May 31 issue the
article of the Pravda.

The article called for the cooperation of Socialists

and Communists against Fascism.

Perhaps it is only a coincidence, but cer-

tainly an interesting one, that the Pravda published that article shortly
after the meeting in Geneva (May 18, 1934) of Maxim H. Litvinov, the Soviet
people's commissar for foreign affairs, and Louis Barthou, French foreign
· ministe~ for the discussion of Barthou 1 s plan of an Eastern Pact.
Doumergue aroused high hopes in the country concerning the possibility of
curtailing inflation and creating, with the use of constitutional reforms, a
more stable government.

The political party interests, however, proved to be

stronger than the patriotic appeals of Ooumergue.

He was forced to resign in

November 1934, and was followed by Pierre Etienne Flandin, and then by Pierre
Laval on June 7, 1935.

French ecohomic conditions remained in distress, and

the domestic political situation was in turmoil for one more year when the
26

RAA, Jeanneney to Egger-Moellwald, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934.

po
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general elections again put the Socialists in control, and the Popular Front
government was organized by Leon Blum.
Military Situation
From the end of World War I_, France's main concern had been the possible
revival of Germany's power, and the possible turn of German foreign pol icy
toward revisionist 1 ines.

To be ready to deal successfully with such a situa-

tion, France had al ready created a network of alliance with the Little Entente
states in the 1920 1 s. 27

Although these treaties looked impressive on paper,

their application actually depended on the military capacity of France, and on
the will of the French governments to use that military might in case of necessity.

However, the French army became the victim of its own victory of 1918.
The French military and political leaders had made two basic mistakes.

The first mistake was the evaluation of the events of the world war and its
conclusion, which stressed the superiority of defensive tactics and strategy
over the offensives.

As a result, they spent millions of francs on the build-

ing of the Maginot line, while they neglected the development of mobile units.
The second mistake was their unilateral disarmament following the peace treaties.

They gradually reduced the number of their army between 1921 and 1933

from 857,000 men to 560,000, with almost 40 per cent of them not serving on
the continent, which left only 224,000 men for the defenses of France proper; 28
and the fifty-two infantry divisions were reduced to twenty. 29
27Treaty with Poland, Februa~y 19, 1920; with Clechoslovakia, January 25,
1924; with Rumariia, June 10, 1926; and with Yugoslavia, November l I, 1927.
28speech of Colonel Jean Fabry on February 20, 1933, at the "Conference
on International Cooperation" organized by the "Old Students" and the "Students
of the Free School of the Political Sciences in Algir" (Paris: Edition of the
Conference, 1933), p. 131.
291bid.

P···
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According to the plans of the French general staff, for the modernization
of equipment, retraining of personnel, and completion of the Maginot 1 ine, the
army needed 5,040 million france in eight annual amounts of 630 million

f~ancs.30 From 1927 until the end of 1934 the French government appropriated
only 2,097 million francs for the military budget,3 1 less than half of the
amount the general staff originally requested.

The army leaders were alarmed

when they learned at the end of 1933 that the military budget proposed for
1934 would force them to further reduce the size of the army to less than
100,000 men.3 2

This reduction sounded terrifying in the light of the reports

of the Deuxieme Bureau, which estimated the strength of the German army to be
twenty-one combat divisions, backed by thirty to fifty reserve divisions.33
Yet, the new, lower army budget bill was not altered; it was passed by the depu
ties against the protest of the Army Council.

Why did the deputies close their

eyes to the threatening signals produced by Germany when Hitler withdrew from
the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933, and then five days later left
the League of Nations?
The reasons for this behavior of the deputies are numerous.

The first

and most widely accepted reason refers to the effects of World War I.
the French army had al ready displayed strong signs of war weariness.

In 1917
11

The

thirty-two months of hardship that many soldiers had experienced, the repeated
promises of swift victories that seemed forever to go unfulfilled, the lack of
30Maurice Gamel in, Servi r (3 vols.; Paris:

Pion, 1946), 11, 20.

f

31 1bid.
3 2Paul-Marie de la Goree, The French Army (New York:
1963), p. 254.
331bid.

George Braziller,

16
confidence in their leaders and a growing feeling of the pointlessness of so
much carnage had led to a number of mutinies . . . . . 34
The memories of this hardship and frustration were not erased from the
minds of the former soldiers by the victorious end of the war.

Howeve·r, while

this hardship left its imprint only in the minds of the soldiers, the Joss of
human life influenced the thinking of the civilian population also.

France

Jost a million and a half soldiers,35 which was slightly less than German's
Josses, but Germany had a population of 65 million while France's population
was only 41 million, with tendencies toward further decl ine.3 6

The psychologi-

cal effects of these conditions prevailed in the sinking popularity of the
army, in the spreading of pacifist convictions, especially among the Socialists, and in the mood of the consecutive governments and deputies, who hesitated to vote for the appropriations for the army.
This reasoning is only part of the picture since the losses suffered in
World War I "left no permanent scar. 1 i37

Paul-Marie de la Goree argues con-

vincingly that the French army, after the victorious end of World War I, found
no new mission for herself, since "Alsace Lorraine was French once again and
the deepest source of inspiration for patriotism or nationalism, in pre-war
days, no longer existed. 1 .3 8

The economic consequences of the war, such as the

34Herbert Tint, The Decline of French Patriotism (London:
Ni co 1son, 1964) , p. 156.

Weidenfeld and

35The exact figures were: 895,000 died in action; 245,000 died of wounds;
175,000 died of illness. 16.5% of tpe French soldiers died during the war; 27%
of all the losses were 18-27 years old. See: Jacques Chastenet, Jours San,9lants (Paris: Hachette, 1964), pp. 190-91.
36Tint, Ibid., p. 195.
37A. J. P. Taylor,~ History of the First World War (New York:
Publ. Corp., 1963), p. 178.
381a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 181.
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devastation of northern France, the termination of the German indemnity payments, and the great depression forced the French political leaders to be more
concerned with the imminent social and economic problems than with the questions of national security.

The declining army budgets and the declining pay

forced more and more army officers
service.

11

to look for an opportunity to leave the

The youthful elite turns away from out military schools."39

This decline of patriotic spirit and the bad financial conditions within
the army were not the only reasons for the deteriorating military conditions
and for the disconcern of the deputies.· Patriotism and the respect for the
army had not declined so catastrophically as one might suppose after studying
the actions of the deputies.

The growing membership of the patriotic Right

wing organizations proved that national ism was not dead in France.
the Croix de Feu, for example, boasted two mill ion members. 1140

11 ln 1936

Even the So-

cial ists and Leon Blum agreed on the importance of the defense of France.
Their opposition to the army was rooted in the Socialist dogma, which put po1 itical consciousness of a soldier ahead of military skill, equipment, and
training.
•

''The working class, 11 Blum said, 11 would rise as one man if ever ther
•

were an 1nvas1on.

II

4]

Finally, Maurice Baumont expresses the conviction that the overriding
issues in the eyes of the respective governments and in the minds of the deputies were centered more on party strifes and struggles than on the questions
1 security.
.
42
.
o f nat1ona

The recognition of this short-sighted policy led to

•

39de la Goree, The French Army, pp. 191-192.
40
41
42

Tint, The Deel ine, p. 201.
1bid., p. 203.
Baumont, Les Origins, pp. 98-101.
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the formation of the Government of National Unity under Doumergue in February
This idea of national unity was not yet dominant in the last months of

1934.
1933·

In 1 ight of these arguments (each of them has a certain amount of merit),
we may more easily understand the actions of the deputies, yet we cannot absolve them from their responsibility.
On December 18, 1933, (while the new budget was discussed in the Army
Council and in the Chamber of Deputies) Hitler sent an official proposal for a
disarmament agreement.

In this proposal he put forth a plan that decided the

strength of the German army in half of the French. 43

Germany was ready to re-

nounce the use of offensive weapons (tanks, airplanes).
a reciprocal control system.

Hitler also suggested

He asked for the return of the Saar Valley to

Germany and recommended the conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact.

44

French do-

mestic problems delayed the answer to this proposal until April 1934 when it
was rejected against the wish of Barthou. 45

In other words, after the further

reduction of the size of her army, France closed the doors to diplomatic negotiations.

In February 1934, newspaper reporters already had begun to send

alarming reports about the speed of the German rearmament, thus corroborating
the information of the Deuxieme Bureau:
her army in case of mobilization.

''Germany may have 3 million men in

The German air force, according to Goring,

will already equal the French air force in May 1933. 1146
43

Georges Bonnet, Quai

d 1 0rsa~

(New York:

Times Press, 1965), p. 112.

44 1bid.
45

~.,

p. 113.

46Le Temps (Paris), Sundy Referee, February 5, 1934.
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After the February riots, Marshall Philippe Petain, the hero of Verdun,
took over the defense ministry.

The conditions of the army continued to de-

teriorate; the military leaders, now had to fight even their own minister,
since Petain felt that the M3ginot line provided satisfactory defense and op. 47
posed the modernization of the army.
They sent desperate appeals to the
government stating:

"In its present state, the French Army will be in no situ-

ation to face a threat without grave risks. 1148

The government, however, was

not moved.
The political conseguences of the weakening of the army were far more important for the time being than the military consequences.

The weakening of

the French army alarmed her allies and created doubts in the allied governments as to whether or not France could fulfill her obligations, of which she
had many.
signed as

Although the alliances with Poland and the Little Entente were de11

mutual assistance" treaties, the secret military clauses provided

actual assistance only for the small states, and not for France. 49
Poland was to be helped with war material and technical personnel.
France's duty was to secure the communication 1 ines and the maritime transportation routes to Poland in case of war, and the control of the "Sound" between Denmark and Sweden was the key to the success of that plan.

However,

the French navy was far too weak to accomplish such a great task, although
among the branches of the armed forces, the navy was in the best condition.
47

Gamelin, Servir, II, 112-29. Pierre Cot, Triumph of Treason (Chicago:
Ziff-Davis, 1944), pp. 181-84. Cot~s testimony is the more significant since
he was an admirerer of Leon Blum, and also a Socialist.
48 la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 255.
4

9For the text of the treaties see:

Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 465•75.
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The army had not even prepared plans to fulfill this obligation.

The treaty,

therefore, was a military absurdity.
The treaty with Rumania envisaged a military cooperation "in case of
necessity," but no exchange of views ever took place between the two general
staffs.

51

The Czech treaty projected the creation of a coordinated military operation against a ''common enemy, 11 but no such plan was ever worked out.5 2
The security treaty with Yugoslavia did not envisage any military conventions.

When the Yugoslavian general staff proposed a "conversation" between

the two staffs in 1928, the French government found the time to be "inopportune," and with that answer the subject was dropped forever. 53
Naturally, for France the most important question was her own defenses
against Germany.

Mutual assistance treaties especially with Belgium, Poland,

and C7-echoslovakia, were of utmost importance to her.

Yet, the building of

the Maginot 1 ine, the openly accepted principle concerning the superiority of
defense, and the drastic reduction of her army brought home the point even to
her most faithful allies that France was concerned only with her own security.
11

To maintain the Versailles treaties, it would have been necessary to organize

an 'offensive' army," wrote General Gamel in.
rightly evaluated by her allies:

54

This mistake of France was

Poland negotiated and signed a Non-Aggression

Pact with Germany on January 26, 1934.

Benes began to look for security in

50The speedy occupation of Denmark in case of war.
~

5 1Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 465-75.
52
1nterview with General Julien Fl ipo (chief of staff of the French Military Mission in Prague, 1931-1938), Paris, June 15, 1971.
53

Gamelin,

~-

54~., p. 25.

p
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the soviet Union, and Yugoslavia sought an understanding with Italy.

On the

scene of the Great Power politics, Britain continued negotiations with Germany
for an agreement on the proportion of German rearmament, and the U.S. refused
to participate in European politics.
The security system, designed for France by Clemenceau was near total collapse.

French domestic conditions remained fluid under the influence of the

economic crisis.

Her allies became the business partners of Germany and Italy.

Their economic interests demanded rapprochement with these two states, even at
the expense of possible French rancour.
of her former strong past.

The French army was only a weak shado

It was Barthou's task to rebuild France's security

system or to provide a new one, negotiating from a position of weakness and
not of strength.

It was quite a task!

French Foreign Pol icy under Barthou's Direction
Louis Barthou (1862-1934) began his career as a politician in 1889.

He

served in several governments during the years 1894-1922, was a member of the
Senate, and was chairman of the Reparation Commission until 1926.
lected as foreign minister by Doumergue.

He was se-

Basically a conservative, his foreign

political conceptions generally followed Clemenceau's "hard line" policy, ineluding the desire of his own predecessors to have Russia as an ally against
Germany.
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, Barthou had to start almost
from the beginning in order to rebuild a security system for France.

While

the governments changed frequently, the aim of the foreign pol icy--to by all
means defend the status guo created by the Versailles treaties-- had never
changed.

However, while the predecessors of Barthou could believe that the

status quo could be defended by using the existing system of international
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treaties, Barthou had to realize (and he did), especially after the Germanpolish Non-Aggression Pact, that the system, itself, was in a stage of dissolution.

He found himself in a situation in which he could more or less freely

decide the formula that would serve France's interest the best.

Taking into

consideration the existing situation as I see it, he had the following options
from which to choose:
to continue the old pol icy based on the idea of international
cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations (under
French domination) and revitalize the alliance systems of France
with Poland and the Little Entente;
to start a completely new foreign pol icy concerning allies and
methods, but leaving unchanged the aims, that is, the containment
of Germany; or
to give up the idea of French domination and start a rapprochement pol icy with Germany based on equality and reconciliation.
Which of these options promised the most benefits for France?

On the fol-

lowing pages we may attempt to evaluate the above-mentioned alternatives and
decide which one promised the greatest advantages for France. Then, by comparing the best one with the pol icy of Barthou, we shall be able to judge his
activities more objectively.
Alternatives for France in February 1934
Continuation of the Old Foreign Policy
The basis of this foreign policy was the idea of international cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations, and at the same time, a
system of alliances of the pro-status quo nations, that is, Poland and the
Little Entente states with France.
The advantages of this foreign pol icy seemed to be well-proven in the
1920's.

The League of Nations was more or less under French domination and

devoted its activities to the preservation of the status quo.

At the same
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time, it represented a supra-national moral authority which commanded the respect of the world's public opinion.
Poland and Czechoslovakia represented a second front against Germany in
case of a possible armed conflict.

The Little Entente states firmly con-

trolled the Danube Basin and their alliance successfully restrained the Hungarian revisionism, prevented a rapprochement between Germany and Austria, and
blocked the Habsburg restoration attempts.

In the Balkans, Bulgarian revision-

ism was held in check by Rumania and Yugoslavia.
Conditions changed greatly in the first few years of the 1930 1 s.

The

League of Nations lost a certain degree of international respect, due to the
Japanese withdrawal from membership on February 24, 1933, as a result of the
hopeless deadlock of the disarmament negotiations from February 2, 1932 to
April 17, 1934, and due to the withdrawal of Germany from the League on October 14, 1933.

The League of Nations could not enforce its resolution against

the will of a Great Power.

It was futile and senseless to seek soiutions and

resolutions within the framework of the League of Nations on the part of
France if the power that France wanted to check most was no longer a member.
It became clear that the League had lost importance which suggested to France
that she also seek solutions outside of the League.
Ironically enough, instead of strengthening their already existing alliances, the predecessors of Barthou began to look for a new ally, and found
it in the Soviet Union; with this step they, themselves, began to destroy the
already existing alliances.

Later~

the signing of the French-Soviet Non-

Aggression Pact (November 29, 1932), its ratification in the French Chamber the
following year (May 18, 1933), the visit and friendly reception of Litvinov in
France in July 1933, the French Radical Socialist Party leader, Edouard Herriot1s visit to the Soviet Union in August 1933, and the trip of the French
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air minister, Pierre Cot, escorted by an air squadron to Moscow in September

193355 all alarmed Rumania, as well as Poland, and speeded up the new foreign
policy of Pilsudsky.

Pilsudsky tried to disengage his country from the French

alliance and secure for Poland some kind of neutral status between France,
Germany, and the Soviet Union.

French politicians and diplomats denied that

any reasons had existed for this new Polish foreign policy.

Yet Poland's dis-

trust in French diplomacy appeared to the Poles to be well-founded.

While

"both Germany and Soviet Russia had shown the desire to revise their frontiers
with Poland to their own

advantag~• 56 since the peace treaties of Versailles

and Riga were signed, the French-Polish Guarantee Pact (October 15, 1925) was
not strong enough to counter-balance the Rapallo Treaty.

"Poland could not be

too sure of French support, as was shown by Locarno and deficiencies in French
deliveries of arms. 11 57

Pilsudsky was confronted with this situation as soon

as he assumed power, and it forced him to pursue a pol icy of non-engagement.5 8
This pol icy led to the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in July 1932 and to
the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in January 1934, which frightened
55Frederick L. Schuman, Europe on the Eve.
1939 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), p. 96.

The Crisis of Diplomacy, 1933-

56Hans Roos, A History of Modern Poland (London:
1958), p. 126.

Eyre & Spottiswoode,

571bid., p. 127.
58For more detailed discussions of Poland's problems concerning French
diplomacy, the reader may consult the following works: Colonel Josef Beck,
Final Report (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp. 2-15; Roman Debicki, Foreign Pol icy of Poland, 1919-1939 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1962), Chapters I I I and IV; Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1956), pp. 2-4; S. Konovalov, RussoPolish Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 37-43;
William Evans Scott, Alliance Against Hitler (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1962), Chapters Ill and IV.
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'Czechoslovakia even more than France, although some French political experts
had already arrived at the conclusion that
more.

11

one cannot count on Poland any-

1159
To make the traditional French policy work again, it was absolutely neces-

sary to bring Poland back into the French camp.

The price that France would

probably have had to pay was the dropping of the Soviet friendship.
more value?

Which had

This is what was Barthou•s duty to decide.

A new shock which weakened the confidence of the Little Entente in France
was caused by the French participation in the Four Power Pact negotiations.
The basic idea of the pact came from Mussolini, who seeing the impotence of the
League of Nations, wanted to place the preservation of the peace in the care
of only the Four Great Powers--Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. 60

The

cooperation was to be based on mutual understanding and satisfaction and,
therefore, the basic text indicated the necessity of the revision of the peace
treaties.

This one sentence alone was enough to mobilize the foreign ministers

of the Little Entente against the pact.

They protested against it and con-

fronted France with the dilemma of choosing between the cooperation with the
Great Four and her alliance with Poland and the Little Entente.
way to her allies• wishes.

France gave

Although the pact was signed in June 1933, due to

the French counter-proposals, it resembled very 1 ittle the original draft, and
finally was not ratified by the Chamber.
Yet, there were other consequences of the Four Power Pact negotiations.
The Little Entente states and the

B~lkan

states began to look after their own

59~, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, ZI, 34/Pol., May 4, 1934, p. 524.
60

Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, p. 467. Carrie compares the Four
Power Pact's idea to the idea of the Concert of Europe.
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security instead of relying completely on France.

Already by February 16,

19 33, CY.echoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania had signed a pact of organization; and on February 9, 1934, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed
a new treaty called the Balkan Entente.
These treaties signalled to

F~ance

a certain amount of distrust on the

part of her allies and presented her with a new problem, because although the
treaties served the idea of

11

collective security, 11 they did not interpret it

anymore from the French point of view.

To make the old French policy prevail,

it was necessary to convince these states to incorporate their new pacts into
the broader French security system.
In light of the diminishing French economic relations with these states,
the weakened French military power, and the new political developments, the
policy, which was aimed at the restoration of the old French alliance system,
promised a very dim success.
The Start of a New Anti-German Foreign Policy
It had to be clear for Barthou that the only way to stop the growing Germany was to create new, stronger anti-German alliances.

He had prospective

allies for such a design--the Soviet Union, Italy, Austria, and Hungary on the
European continent, and Britain outside the continent.
The

Sovi~t

Union

An alliance with the Soviet Union was already the goal of the preceding
French governments.
war

Yet, this all

i~nce

promised real is tic benefits in case of

.£!l!.x if the Soviet Union would have had a common frontier with Germany.

Not having that, it would have been necessary to secure the permission of the
Polish and the Rumanian governments for Russian troop crossings, but neither
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""the poles, nor the Rumanians were willing to see Bolshevik troops pass through
their territories.

In the absence of Polish and Rumanian cooperation, the

alliance with the Soviet Union had only a theoretical value, and it did not
provide any security for France.

The pushing of such an alliance would pos-

sibly deteriorate the French-Polish relationship without any results; the pursuit of the Soviet alliance simply meant the chasing of utopian dreams.

Under the leadership of Mussel ini, Italy was an unpreferred ally in the
eyes of the French political Left.

At the same time, France and Italy had a

common interest in the prevention of the Anschluss and in the blocking of German penetration in Central Europe.

The pursuit of a rapprochement with Italy

was of primary interest to France, but the question of Italian friendship had
other aspects, which made the realization of it harder.

France and Italy had

their differences in colonial questions, but these were unimportant. 61

A more

sensitive problem was the fact that Mussolini was the champion of revisionism.
Furthermore, he advocated the revisions

of~

the peace treaties.

His thesis,

if accepted, would have led to the mutilation of Czechoslovakia for the benefit of Germany,

~ungary,

and Poland; of Rumania for the benefit of Bulgaria,

Hungary, and the Soviet Union; and of Yugoslavia for the benefit of Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Italy.

In the final analysis, it would have produced the com-

plete collapse of the French alliance system by weakening ad absurdum the
capacity of the Little Entente to survive.

A rapprochement with Italy seemed

feasible only if it was restricted to French-Italian cooperation for the mutual guarantee of Austria's independence.

Yet, at the same time an Italian

61 la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 257.
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~pprochement

was an absolute necessity for France in order to prevent, in

case of armed conflict with Germany, the formation of a second (Italian) front
at her back.

So, Barthou had to find an acceptable basis for cooperation with

I ta I Y·

fil!S t ri a
Austria represented a difficult problem, too.

It was France's interest

to preserve Austria as an independent state, but the political Left in France
and the government of Czechoslovakia were extremely unhappy with the autocratic
rule of Dollfuss.

After the February events in Vienna,

62

there seemed to be

no chance to secure very much understanding between Czechoslovakia and Austria. 63

It was Barthou's. problem to find some basis for their agreement, and

if possible, an alliance between them, and in this way strengthen the antiGerman front.
Hungary
Hungary played no important role in the eyes of the French government.
French foreign policy was directed toward Hungary according to the interests
of the Little Entente states, and any special agreement reached without their
consent would alienate them from France.

On the other hand, a modus vivendi

6 2The Socialist uprrsrng was crushed by Doll fuss and the following investigation proved that Czech Social is ts were actively involved in the preparation
of the revo 1t.
63

RAA, Paris, ZI, 19/Pol., Marfh 12, 1934, p. 480. Bouisson, president
of the Chamber of Deputies said to Egger-Moellwald on March 11, 1934 (speaking
o~ the February 17, 1934, uprising in Vienna):
"On the sixth of February Mr.
Leon Blum was informed through a phone ~all from Prague what was in preparation
f21: the next days in Austria. If Mr. Leon Blum would have informed Mr. Daladier about that phone call, he could have warned through the French ambassador
the Bundeschancellor not to irritate the Social Democratic Party. 11 (italics
mine)
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_...... ched in a common agreement with the Little Entente would release the presrea
sure, especially on Czechoslovakia, and would enable her to concentrate her
efforts according to France's interest in the containment of Germany.

It was

up t o Barthou to find such a formula.

-

Bri tal.!l
A cooperation with Britain in Central Europe was very uni ikely because of

the basic differences between the political views of Britain and France concerning Germany and concerning the question of a possible revision of the
peace treaties.

However, there was one agreement Barthou needed to seek and

reach with Britain:

to remain absolutely neutral and, if possible, renew the

agreement of Anglo-French cooperation declared on July 13, 1933.
After this short review we may draw the following conclusions concerning
the feasibility of new allies:
Alliance with the Soviet Union had no practical value without
the cooperation of Poland and Rumania. Negotiations toward that
goal should proceed only with their complete agreement and participation.
Alliance with Italy was of primary interest to France.
Alliance with Austria was not a necessity, but Austria's
independence was a basic interest of France.
Alliance with Hungary was not feasible, yet it was important.
Alliance with Britain was preferable, but not a vital question.
Rapprochement with Germany
A step toward a rapprochement

~ith

reversion of the French foreign policy.

Germany would have demanded a complete
In light of the February events, it

could have triggered a renewal of demonstrations, possibly a revolution, and
most certainly a further split in the national unity.

Yet, there were many

reasons why this pol icy could have won the support of the majority.

The
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"";verage Frenchman was

11

a social reactionary, tending altogether toward conser-

vat ion and resistance to change, a man who fears revolution. 11

The political

organizations of the Right counted some 70,000 active members, and their numbers were growing rapidly, while the Left (Communists) commanded about 30,000.
65
Even if we add to it the hesitant Socialists with their 130,000 members,
the
Left still represented only a small minority of the population.

Because of the

fear of revolution, and because of the disappointment in the whole parl iamentary system, many Frenchmen believed that
to be increased. 1166

11

the power of the Executive will have

This conviction was widely held not only among the politi-

cally less-educated people, but also among the politically most-influential
personalities of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies. 6 7

It was natural

that people with such convictions were more or less ready to accept rapprochement with an authoritarian Germany.
A similar conclusion was reached on the basis of practical reasons.
French industrial production sharply declined and had no hope to catch up with
. l y expan d"1ng German economy. 68
aggressive

Certain French capitalist circles

worked for the creation of a German-French economic block 69 as a way out
from the decline.

Furthermore, French military weakness, a rapidly declining

population, and an aging society 70 were good enough reasons for the
~

64Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., The European Right, A Historical Pro(Berkeley: University of California, 1966), p. 118.
6S1bid., p. 106.
66

Doran

&

Phillip Gibbs, European Journey (Garden City, New York:
Co., 1934), p. 28.
'

Doubleday,

67 RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934, p. 480.
68Rogger and \.feber, Ibid., p. 120.
69RAA, Moellwald to Doll fuss, Par.is, Zl, 11/Pol., February 3, 1934, p. 461.
70Rogger and Weber, Ibid., p. 122.
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discontinuation of the alienation from Germany and for the change of basic
foreign political principles.
Finally, there was the genuine pacifist argument against any confrontawhich could lead to war.

Even the "Ancien Combattants de Guerre" believed tha

"if a vote were taken (what is called a plebiscite)
class would be against war for any reason.
first •

11

the whole French working

There would be a revolution

71 (italics mine)

We may say that there were three reasons:

a fear of Communism and disap-

pointment in parl iamentarianism, realistic economic and military conditions,
and finally, pacifism that presented the rapprochement with Germany from the
domestic political point of view as a feasible foreign pol icy.
France also needed a rapprochement with Germany because of her present
weakness.

Only a mutual understanding with Germany could stop a complete Ger-

man rearmament; only a mutal understanding on the economic field could stop
the German penetration into Central Europe and could perhaps produce a divisio
of spheres of interests; and only a rapprochement pol icy with Germany could
secure time for France.

Time was needed to stabilize the domestic political

scene; time was needed to reorganize the crisis-ridden economic life; time was
needed to rebuild and modernize the army; and time was needed to restore the
confidence of old allies.

These considerations demanded a rapprochement polic

with Germany.
On the other hand, there were several disadvantages of that policy, too.
(

First of all, a German-French understanding outside of the League of Nations
could cause the complete collapse of that institution.

If the rapprochement

policy were to be initiated on the part of France, then Germany and all of
7 1 G i b b s , Jou rn e y , p . 24 .
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Europe would interpret it as a sure sign of France's weakness, thus producing

a complete loss of confidence in France.

It could bring the complete al iena-

tion of the Soviet Union; it could endanger a complete break with Italy; it
could strengthen the revisionist movement; it could lead to a complete collapse of the existing alliance system; and it could lead to a situation in
which, like in the time of Bismarck, France would live in complete isolation,
depending on the goodwill of Germany.

The disadvantages and the risks in-

valved were undoubtedly much, much greater than the advantages.

However, the

consideration of the time factor, alone, suggests that in case of a German
proposal, France should not reject it flatly, but should start negotiations in
accord with her allies, and secure time for herself to put her household in
order.
The results of the above analysis clearly show that Barthou could have
done a successful job by flexibly selecting one of the options which could dernand--as conditions changed with the passing of time--a possible switch to
another option, or even using different details of the different options if
the use of them were to promise the most advantages for France.

The most ac-

ceptable pol icy could be built on the following axioms:
not to flatly reject any German proposal to gain time;
secure the friendship of Italy;
guarantee the independence of Austria;
try to bring Poland back to the side of France; and
(

restore the confidence of the Little Entente.
The simplest and most promising solution of all these problems could be
reached if all the states concerned would agree and sign a new pact, which
would guarantee and protect the basic interests of al 1 the signatories.
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The Course of Events
11

Barthou wanted to recreate European balance of the collective security.

For him, Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia were representing two master cards,
two trump cards against Hitler.

He would have 1 iked to organize a common

front against Nazism
Most historians agree with Baumont in his definitions of Barthou's foreign political aims.

However, his methods, as we shall see below, sometimes

caused confusion.
Barthou, himself, stated in his speech in the Chamber of Oeputies on
May 25, 1934, that his policy was the continuation of the foreign pol icy of
the preceding French governments.7 3
taken at face value.

However, such statements should not be

Because his actions seemed to be the continuation of

the "unchanging" French foreign pol icy, it does not necessarily mean that his
~and

methods were the same.

One example of this is the French rejection

of Hitler's rearmament proposal, an action which was decided in the cabinet by
majority vote against the vigorous objections of Barthou.7 4
It is, therefore, advisable to take into consideration in the following
analysis, not only the actions,but also his

plan~

and only then can one pass

judgment on his foreign pol icy concerning Central Europe.
2
7 Maurice Baumont, Les Origines de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (Paris:
Payot, 1969), p. 103
f

73chambres des Deputes, Journal Officiel de la Republigue Fran~aise,
"Debats Parlementai res, 11 Paris, 1934, pp. 1254-55.
74 Bonnet, Ouai d 1 0rsay, p. 112.
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The Eastern Pact ·
Barthou had only about a week's time to get acqua.inted with the foreign
political conditions of France when the events began to speed up.
had already meddled in Austria's domestic affairs in 1933.

Germany

Though the Paul-

Boncour government protested against it, Hitler renewed the German-supported
Nazi activities in Austria in 1934.

Austria submitted her complaints to

France, Britain, and Italy, and the Three Powers signed a communiqu~ on February 17, 1934.

In this declaration the Three Powers expressed "their common

views concerning the necessity to maintain the independence and integrity of
Austria in accordance with the existing treaties. 1 .7 5 There was no question
in Barthou 1 s mind that Austria's independence was a primary interest of
France.

Because of this he continued the foreign pol icy of Paul-Boncour, who

had already stated on November 14, 1933, in his speech in the Chamber that

11

an

independent Austria is an essential element of Central Europe's stability and
equil ibrium. 11 76
The first signs of a new French foreign policy can be traced in the comments on the Balkan Pact that had been recently signed.

In the view of the

former governments, Bulgaria· was a revisionist state, and therefore an enemy.
Circles near the foreign ministry of Barthou, on the other hand, expressed
their conviction that

11

the Bulgarian claim for territorial revision has mainly

a theoretical and sentimental character, 11 77 and emphasized that everybody
should give time to the

11

Bulgarian(publ ic opinion to bury the long existing

75Le Temps (Paris), February 18, 1934.
76Journal Officiel, 1934, p. 4103.

77 '?-A.A, Moelhvald to Doll fuss, Paris, Zl, 13/Pol., February 12, 1934,

p, 467.-
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These statements indicated that Barthou better un-

derstood France's real situation (economic, military, and political) and
changed the method from the enforcement of the peace treaty to a reconciliation.
The Rome Protocols
A month later, Italy, Austria, and Hungary signed the Rome Protocols
(March 17, 1934). 79

It caused alarm among the members of the Little Entente.

The French Left interpreted it as the alliance of Fascist, Revisionist states.
Barthou, on the other hand, expressed sympathy:

II

France has to co-

operate with Italy in the rebuilding of the Danube Basin and welcomes the
protocols. 1180

However, he went one step further and expressed his hope that

"the members of the Little Entente will find out that the Rome Protocol will
be beneficial for them, as well as for Europe. 11 8 1

Le Temps, which had

78 RAA, Moellwald to Doll fuss, Paris, ZI, 13/Pol., February 12, 1934,
p. 467.
79 The Rome Protocols consisted of one political and two economic agreements. The political agreement stressed the importance of the political cooperation of the three states. They agreed that in case of foreign political
problems, they would consult each other if anyone of the three states should
desire to do so.
The first economic agreement projected the widening of the AustrianHungarian-Ital ian trade relations, and the second agreement planned a new
Austrian-Italian commercial exchange.
The economic clauses of the protocol were realized in May 1934 when the
three states signed new commercial treaties.
In I ight of the economic crisis, of the discriminating custom policy of
the Little Entente states, and of the deteriorating French foreign trade, it
could be interpreted as a defensive(economic policy which, if it hindered the
commercial plans of any state, then it hindered the German economic penetration of Austria and Hungary.
67

RAA, Ibid,, 26/Pol., April 2, 1934, p. 496.

681bid.
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"';Xcellent connections with the French foreign ministry, had already begun to
publish sympathetic articles about Austria in February 1934, giving Dollfuss'
side of the history of the Social Democratic uprising of Vienna.

The foreign

ministry, in response to a reporter who had asked about the Leftist intellectual efforts to organize a committee for the investigation of the Austrian
"massacre, 11 expressed the view that "from the practical political point of
view, the effect of the activity of that committee up to this time is insign if i cant.

1182

These articles and comments indicated that Barthou had taken the decision
of the Three Great Powers seriously and sought some kind of friendly understanding with Italy on a more 11 direct 11 nation-to-nation basis.

However, be-

fore starting out on this scheme, realism demanded of him to try to salvage
the old alliances of France with Poland and the Little Entente.
His visit to Poland was carefully monitored by the French press, and it
certainly did not help him to create a friendly atmosphere, repeating the old
charges of treason by referring to and even republishing the article from the
Yzvesti ja, which was pub! ished on February 5, 1934.

It said,

11

The German-

Polish Non-Aggression Pact is a denial of the French-Polish Alliance of 1921;
it reduces the quality of Poland as a member of the League of Nations;
it gives a free hand to Germany in Austria and gives the freedom of action to
Germany against the Balkan states. 1183
The main reasons for Barthou 1 s failure to reconcile Poland, however, were
not the hostile French public

opini~n

and press.

The reasons already existed

82 RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, Zl, 32/Pol., April 30, 1934, p. 513.
8 3Le Temps (Paris), February 28, 1934.
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and after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, Poland reached
the point of no return.

Barthou could conclude after his trip that "France

cannot count on Poland anymore, and it is, therefore, urgent and necessary to
85
befriend Italy."
The visit to Czechoslovakia was refreshing after the Warsaw experiment.
The Czechs displayed their friendly feelings toward France; their policy was
a strict pro-status quo policy.

Benes was sympathetic toward the Rome Proto-

col and agreed with Barthou that it was a further assurance against the Anschluss.

86

The Czech army was the best equipped and strongest army in Central

Europe, 87 and Edouard Benes, the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, was
vising his former judgment concerning the main enemy of his country.

re~

He ac-

cepted the French position, that is, that the main enemy was not Hungary anymore, but Hitler's Germany.

88

The news from Rumania also seemed to be reassuring.

Though Nicolai Titu-

Jescu, the Rumanian foreign minister, still refused to consider the possibility
of Russian military aid, he became more flexible toward Italy and expressed
his conviction to a French news reporter that

11

only an entente with Italy can

84

1 intend to devote a whole chapter to the Polish view in a book, which
will also incorporate my whole dissertation. To explain the origins of PolishFrench disagreement is out of the frame of this study.
85

RAA, Moellwald reported this to Dollfuss. He based this conclusion on
the rep-;;-;::t of one of his informers planted in the French Foreign Ministry.
Paris, ZI, 34/Pol., May 4, 1934, p. 524.

86
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/

Magda Adam, Magyarorszag es a K1santant a Harm1ncas Evekben, 11 Hungary
and the Little Entente in the Thirties" (Budapest: Akademia Pub!., 1968),
p. 62.
87

1nterview with General Flipo.

88!£.!_£.

38
bring the necessary relaxation which is needed to solve the problems of Central Europe.

1189

The creation of a corrvnon front with Italy seemed to be the best solution.
Not the French-Italian differences, but the differences between the clients of
the two governments hindered the French-Italian rapprochement.
states considered their clients as
assuring statements to them.

indispensable~

Because both

both governments made re-

During his visit to Hungary, Fulvio Suvich, the

assistant secretary of Italian foreign affairs, expressed his feeling that "my
joy would be greater only if I could have stepped on the soil of Great Hungary,
instead of the present, mutilated Hungary. 1190

This declaration alarmed the

Little Entente, which demanded reassurance from Barthou against a revisionist
attempt.

The creation of a common understanding with Italy seemed to be dis-

tant because of the conditions in Central Europe.
In the absence of an

imme~iate

better solution, Barthou renewed the plans

of the Paul-Boncour government concerning the creation of an Eastern Locarno.
Barthou, himself, regarded the participation of the Soviet Union in the Eas·tern Locarno as the most important condition for the security of France.

He

could not create a simple French-Soviet al 1 iance, because "he could neither
challenge the Locarno Pact, nor appear to turn away from the spirit of the
League of Nations. 1191
problem.

The idea of an Eastern Locarno seemed to solve this

The Soviet willingness to take part in such a plan was already

S9Le Temps (Paris), February 23, 1934.
90

1bid., February 22, 1934.

9lde la Goree, The French Army, pp. 233-234.
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"';ignalled in the speech of Stal in during the XVI I Congress of the Soviet Communist (b) Party.

92

He said:

Certain German politicians say that the Soviet Union is now oriented
toward France and Poland, that she changed from being an enemy of the
Versailles Treaty to being a supporter of it • • • if the interest
of the Soviet Union demands to make rapprochement to one or another
country which does n~t want to disturb the peace, we shall do so
without hesitation.9
The undisguised admiration of the French military experts for the Soviet
armed forces also urged the rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

On May 18,

1934, Barthou met with Litvinov to discuss the Eastern Pact; he was accompanied by General Gamel in as military advisor.

Gamel in advocated a French-Soviet

rapprochement from the military point of view because "Russia represented the
only really great Eastern counter-weight needed against Germany. 11

94

He stated

that the French military leaders attached great importance to a French-Soviet
military collaboration, and he hoped to obtain from this collaboration not so
much of an actual Russian military aid, but rather the intensification of the
French military build-up.95
Litvinov responded positively to the French suggestions.

Barthou, since

on April 11, 1934, he was already able to secure the consent of England 96 to
the Soviet Union's entrance as a member of the League of Nations, began to
make the necessary preparations, and at the same time, announced his great
plan for the Eastern Locarno.
92January 26, 1934.
93Quoted in M~ria Ormos, Franc4aorszag es a Keleti Biztonsag, 1931-1936,
France and the Eastern Security, 1931-1936 11 (Budapest: Akademia Publ., 1969),
p. 297.

11

94 Gamel in, Servi r 11, 132.
9 51bid., p. 133.
96ormos, Eastern Security, p. 305.
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The Barthou-Litvinov discussions represent a turning point in the foreign
policy of Barthou.

Up to that point, he had rightly evaluated the realistic

political conditions.

He had tried to bring Poland back to the French all i-

ance, but failed; he tried to reassure the Little Entente and--especially in
the case of Czechoslovakia--he was successful.

He tried to initiate a rap-

prochement with Italy, and as far as Austria's independence was concerned, he
was 100 per cent successful.

Then after so much success, he suddenly gave in

to the pressure of the French Left, and to the pressure of the French general
staff, and he began a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.97

It was a fatal

mistake, not only because a Soviet alliance did not promise any positive
security for France, 98 and therefore, it was not a question of first importtance, but rather it was a fatal mistake because of its consequences.
It indicated to Germany that France arrived in her decline to the point
where, instead of enforcing the peace through unilateral actions based on her
. h t, 99 s he was f rrg
. h tene d to act a I one.
mr· I ·rtary mrg

It proved not only to Ger-

many, but to the whole world as well, that France 1 s mil.itary power was in such
an inferior and handicapped position that her hope no longer lay in the
strength of her army, but in international agreements that would provide security for France without forcing her to rebuild her own army.

In other words,

France wanted to maintain her superiority in Europe by asking others to make
the necessary sacrifices, JOO and the Eastern Pact did not conceal this hidden
9 7For a more detailed discussion of this domestic power play see de la
Goree, The French Army pp. 233-34. '
9 8see Chapter I, p. 26 of this study.
99Like the Ruhr Occupation in 1923.
IOOwaclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berl in, 1933-1939 (New York: Columbia University, 1'3fi8), Lipski to 8c'C:<. Gerl in, June 22, 1934, Doc. ~Jo. 23.
(Hereinafter referred to as Lipski Papers.)
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goal.

The former obi igations and alliances of France became unimportant in

the basic idea of the Eastern Pact:

-

without French participation.

to gain guarantees for the Rhine Frontier

The Soviet Union, being the only Great Power

t o express her willingness to participate in the Eastern Pact, was designated

by France to control Central Europe.

The German accusation was not unfounded

when it had stated that the Eastern Pact would only increase the Soviet influence in Central Europe.
The consequences of such an arrangement were even greater.

Britain dis-

liked the idea of a French-Soviet all iance; 101 and Poland, on whose cooperation
the Soviet help really depended, stubbornly refused to grant the passage right
102
to Soviet troops,
and made her joining conditional on the German acceptance. I03

Also, Italy was skeptical and prepared counter-proposals.

In conclusion, we may say that the idea of the Eastern Pact did more
damage for France than good.

It did not increase the security of France; it

did not restore the Polish-French al 1 iance; it did not bring the English government out of isolation; it did not dismiss the Yugoslavian suspicion concerning a French-Italian rapprochement; it did not gain the unconditional approval of the Rumanians; and it did not obi ige even the Soviet Union to subscribe unconditionally to the French designs.

However, most important of all,

it did not help the Central European states to solve their immediate economic
problems of not having any commerical clauses.

It did, on the other hand,

create a greater host ii ity toward France in Hungary; it did create a suspicion
in Italy; it did leave the door wide open from the French point of view for the
IOlsaumont, Les Origins, p. 112.

102 1bid., p. 114.
103.J...1?..!.i., p. 150.
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continuous German economic penetration in Central Europe, and it did help pave
the road for a Hitler-Mussolini meeting, which took place in Venice, June

14-1~

1934.
The negativism was overwhelming; the positivism was almost nil.

One may

wonder what made Barthou, who was such a strong realist, follow this utopian
1 ine.

One explanation is that the whole idea of the pact was picked up and

aired for tactical reasons:

11

Though France knows that among others, neither

England, Italy, nor Poland will accept the pact, she offers it so that in case
of a refusal, she may put the responsibility for the failure of the disarmament
and peace on these powers. 11

104

Even if this

the value of it was questionable.

- ff ect1ve.
.
l 05
were une

tactical 11 success was achieved,

More acceptable were the reasons that were

a result of the French domestic situation.
solved nor stopped.

11

The political scandals were neither

The financial reform was a flop, and the work programs
11

The unhappy cond i ti ons in the Chambe r 111 06 indicated dis-

unity among the deputies.

The Socialists and Communists formed a block against

the government and decided to strengthen their attacks on the government. l07
Foreign observers did not see too much of a chance for the Doumergue government
to survive the Autumn. lOB

However, following the Barthou-Litvinov meeting in

Geneva, this situation suddenly changed.

109

The question of survival justified,

104Report of the Italian and (with similar wording) of the Hungarian ambassadors from Paris. Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, pp. 506-07.
l05RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 57/Pol., July 30, 1934, p. 581.
l06RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss,~Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934, p. 480.
l07ormos, Ibid., p. 300.
l0 8 RAA, Ibid.
109see p.

of this study.
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from the government's point of view, the tactical step expressed in the proposal for the Eastern Pact.

Did the French government submit the national in-

terest to its own party interest?

No!

If the Doumergue government would have·

fallen, the "anti-Fascist" block would have followed a stronger pro-Soviet
pol icy.

By making these concessions, Barthou secured the government's position

and kept the door open for a possible and vital French-Italian rapprochement,
. h he a d vocate d f rom t he beg1nn1ng.
. .
llO
a p 1an wh 1c
For the time being, this rapprochement did not promise too much success.
Barthou delayed his visit to Italy, and the government indicated that such a
meeting could take place only if Musso] ini should ask for it. 111

Hitler was

not so proud, and he realized that this was the right moment to approach Mussolini.

On June 14-15, 1934, the two dictators met in Venice, an occasion

which came as a surprise to the French government.

During the meeting, while

Musso] ini shared Hitler's negative views concerning the Eastern Pact, he was
completely hostile to Hitler's plans concerning Austria. 112

From the French

point of view, it meant that Musso] ini proved to be a trustworthy ally for the
containment of Germany, and Hitler's visit did not present any obstacles in
the way of a rapprochement.

However, the French public opinion became sus-

picious of Italy and 11 in the light of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting • • • they
did not value the possibility of an entente with ltaly. 1111 3

The opposing poli-

ticians explained that Italy was a Great Power with a population equal to that
11OGame1 in, Servi r, I I , 131 •
111

RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, ZI, 36/Pol., May 8, 1934, p. 526.

112

Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck about the Hitler-Musso! ini meeting, Berlin, June 22, 1934, p. 145.
113

RAA, Ibid., 50/Pol., July 5, 1934, p. 566.
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-of France, and that alone was reason enough to be discontent. 1 14

French gov-

ernment circles, on the other hand, stressed the necessity of a Barthou•
Mussolini meeting, but added that "it would make sense only after all the differences have been settled between France and ltaly. 111 13

(italics mine)

It

indicated unwillingness to accept compromise,and so it meant the postponement
of the Italian visit--forever.
While Barthou visited England to enlist her support of the Eastern Pact,
he tried to obtain not only the British support, but also British pressure to
make Mussolini more agreeable in his attitude toward the pact.

France be-

Jieved that because of Italy's long seashores, she could not resist an English
d • 116
deman

Also, the slow moving French diplomacy was then surprised by the

Austrian Nazi Putsch and by Mussolini's reaction to it.
The Nazi Putsch in Vienna (July 25, 1934)
The Nazi Putsch in Vienna created a c,·isis for Barthou.

He probably won-

dered whether or not he should act immediately with energy and decisiveness?
It would have demanded some military demonstrations alone or in harmony with
Italy and Czechoslovakia, but they were and had to be cautious!

The French

army was organized for defense; only a few divisions were motorized, and their
provisions would be sufficient for only six months. ll7

No commercial or mil i-

tary agreement took care of further provisions, especially of motor fuels.
To chance a possible prolonged armed conflict with Germany, or even a war
114 RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss,~Paris, Zl, 50/Pol., July 5, 1934, p. 566.
ll5RAA, Ibid., 51/Pol., July 8, 1934, p. 568.
116

RAA, Ibid. ,

11 ?G ame 1.1n, Serv1r,
.
I I, 129.
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would have been risky!

It was necessary to secure England's consent and help,

but England's attitude was characterized by the absence of their ambassadors
from Berl in and from Rome at that time.

They spent their vactions in London

and did not intend to interrupt their vactions because of the Austrian cri118
sis.
The Czech army, though superior in strength to the German army, was completely trained for defense purposes and had no strategic plans prepared for
.
.
119
sue h a s1tuat1on.
Only Italy acted with swiftness, moving four divisions to Brenner Pass.
However, instead of relief, it caused even greater
. I omat1c
. c1rc
. I es. 120
drp

11

nervousness 11 in the French

The English diplomacy's attitude may be best summed up

in the words of Sir Eric Campbell, Charge d 1 Affaires in Paris:
fonvard and that would mean a general war. 11 121

11

0ne more step

Barthou warned Musso] ini about

the prompt and unforeseeable consequences of further isolated steps on the part
of I ta I y.

122

The French nervousness was understandable.

A good part of the Czech

press and the whole Yugoslavian press openly raised the matter that "France
has to get out from the anti-German front of the Great Powers 12 3 or has to
118 Le Temps (Paris), July 1934.
ll91 nterv1ew
.
"hG enera lFI.1po.
wit
120

RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 11, 1934,

p. 609.

121, bid.
122
123

1bid.
Reference made to the Three Power Declaration (February 17, 1934).

46
deny her political and military solidarity with Yugoslavia. 1 ilLL+

If France did

not give up her solidarity with Yugoslavia, it would mean--as the Austrian am.
ha t s he wou Id b e
bassa dor put 1t--t

•
•
t.1ng 11 ·A ustr1a.
• 125
1ncr1m1na

11.

France tried to avoid an open stand, though she recognized that

11

the

price she has to pay for the preservation of Austria is cheaper than what she
would have to pay in case of Austria's collapse. 11126
their conclusions, though.

The only

step~

No actions followed up

the French took was a great press

campaign, in which they proved beyond a doubt the responsibility of Hitler for
the Austrian Nazi Putsch. 12 7
Barthou suggested two alternatives to avoid the possible repetition of
the crisis. 128

According to the first one, Austria should secure the promise

of Germany through direct negotiations to discontinue the Nazi propaganda in
Austria.

The second alternative was the signing of a general pact, which

would obi ige the contracting parties to respect the principle of nonintervention, demand them to refrain from interferring in the domestic affairs
of other states, and demand them not to tolerate any subversive activity on
their own soil directed against a foreign state.
None of these was satisfactory for Austria.

She, on the other hand,

readily accepted the suggestions of Mussolini, who suggested that

__
__,

11

the Three

124RAA , Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 11, 1934,
p. 609.
l25RAA

Ibid., p. 610

126 1bid.
12

7An illustrated report of the Excelsior showed that the official German
press service prepared the news release concerning the Nazi Putsch three days
before it actually happened. Excelsior (Paris), August II, 1934, p. 1.
128
RAA, Ibid., 62/Pol., August 8, 1934, p. 604.
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Great Powers who are interested in the preservation of Austria's independence
should announce with the greatest firmness and clearness that they will not
tolerate either an Anschluss nor a Gleichschaltung under any circumstances. 1112
He thought that this declaration "should be worded so categorically and
brutely (italics mine) that not only Berlin, but also her sympathizers in
Austria would understand it and would give up every hope of realization of
their goals. 11130

The French answer was negative to these suggestions. 13 1

In the eyes of Austria, Italy remained to be the only sure champion.
the eyes of the Little Entente, the insecure feeling grew stronger.

In

It was

time, especially for Austria, to review her foreign relations and if necessary,
change them according to her basic interests.
12 9RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 62/Pol., August 8, 1934,
p. 604. l30lbid.
l 3 I Ibid,

CHAPTER 11
THE FIRST. CRISIS: THE MURDER
OF CHANCELLOR DOLLFUSS
Conditions in Austria
The first half of 1934 continued to be a time of great tension and of
temporary diplomatic successes and setbacks for Austria.

Although the rowdy

propaganda campaign of Germany was softened to a certain degree, Hitler had
not given up his plans for the Gleichschaltung of Austria.

He had kept the

economic pressure on, 1 while diplomatically trying to isolate Doll fuss from
the rest of Europe. 2

Austria, however, was a member of the League of Nations,

and Dollfuss considered the support of this international organization to be
of primary importance.

He was prepared to present the Austrian grievances

against Germany in the League of Nations session.3

At the same time, he sue-

cessfully tried to secure the assi.stance of Britain, France, and Italy and
received their support in the "Three Power Declaration" (February 17, 1934).
IThe German government imposed upon the German tourists visiting Austria
a 1,000 mark 11 visa-fee 11 in May 1933. This regulation brought German tourism
to a standstill and increased the economic problems. United States Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Pol icy, 1918-1945, Series C, I I I,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Doc. No. 262.
(Hereinafter referred to as DGFP.)
2

Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, saw the possible annexation of Austria
by Germany as a "natural development" and expressed his views to the German
Minister, von Machensen, in Hungary. Magyar Tudomanyos Akad~mia Tort~nettu
dom~nyi lntezete,
("Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Science")
A Wilhelmstrasse ~s Magyarorsz~g. N~met DiplomJciai lratok, 1933-1944 (''The
Wilhelmstreet and Hungary. German Diplomatic Documents Concerning Hungary,
1933-194411 ) , (Budapest: Kossuth Pub I., 1968), Doc. No. 21.
3Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 93
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f.

49

Ironically enough, this support was lost the very same day, as it was
published because of the Social Democratic revolt in Vienna.

It was crushed

mercilessly, and the Social Democratic Party itself was outlawed--actions
which alienated the. Western Democracies, as well as the Little Entente states.4
so the isolation came about, not by German diplomatic steps, but by the domestic events of Austria.

The following month the declaration of the Rome Pro-

tocols (March 17, 1934) seemed to compensate for the lost Western support.
Even more favorable for Austria was the outcome of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting (June 14-15, 1934), in which Mussolini warned Hitler that Austria's independence was a main concern of Italy. Dollfuss seemed to have secured for Austria the time to introduce the 1 'corporative state•• system step by step.
Then, on July 25, 1934, the Austrian Nazis made an attempt to overthrow
the government.

Though the attempt was unsuccessful, Dollfuss was murdered

during the attack •. His successor, Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, was convinced that in order to save Austrian independence, he
course of appeasement.

11

had to embark on a

This meant that everything had to be avoided, which

·would give Germany a pretext for intervention, and that everything had to be
done to secure some way for Hitler's toleration of the status quo. 11 5

This

statement creates the impression that Schuschnigg had made up his mind concerning the possible alternatives for Austrian foreign policy and found the
solution in the good grace of Hitler, which if kept, meant that Austrian
4see p. 28, footnote 63 of this study. Also, the Czech minister to Austria, Dr. Zdencky Fierl inger, dee~ed it necessary to intervene, 11 since certain members of the Czech minority in Vienna had become implicated in the Socialist movement. Felix J. Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia,
1918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 380.
11

5Kurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem (London:
I 94 7) , p. 14- I 5.

Victor Gollanz Ltd.,

50
independence wou1d stand forever.

Yet, the events following the misfired

Naxi coup--such as the Italian troop movements, Husso1ini 1 s declaration, 6 and
the sudden decrease of German militancy7--indicated that he could have chosen
another course for Austria, possibly even anti-German.

He however, did not.

What were the conditions in Europe, and what were the factors in Austria that
forced him to follow Oo11fuss' unchanged policy?

Was he right or did he make

mistakes, and could he have selected other alternatives that would have been
more beneficia1, not only for Austria, but for all of East-Central Europe?
These are the questions which, if answered objectively, create a basis to pass
judgment on the foreign po1icy of Austria after 1934.
Hitler had hoped to rea1ize the G1eichscha1tung of Austria without using
force.

The Austrian economic conditions were deteriorating, and he thought

that by speeding up the economic dec1ine through the app1 ication of pressures
(such as the restriction of German tourist traffic), he would cause the downfall of the Austrian government and would prepare the way for a Nazi takeover.
To understand the po1itica1 developments, it is necessary to know a few detai1s of the economic conditions of Austria.
Economic Conditions
Since the end of World War I, Austria had always had acute economic prob1ems.

These prob1ems were caused partly by the consequences of the St. Ger-

main Treaty ( 11 head without an empire••), and partly by the Nationalist Protectionist Economic Po1icy,

8 which was practiced all over Europe in the late

'

6DGFP, C, Ill, Hitler to Papen, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 165.
71bid.
BThe expression tried to cover the real meaning: strong protectionist
trade policy in imports and state-subsidized exports to prevent a Joss of the
foreign markets. For example, Hungary sold sugar to Austria for half the
home consumer price.
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1920 1 s.

A custom union with Germany could have helped, but it was prohibited

by the victorious powers.

The Tardieu Plan (custom union of the Central Eur-

opean states under French patronage) was blocked by England and Italy.

Being

alone and not having fertile plains and great material resources, Austria was
hit by the depression and the economic crisis more than any other country of
Central Europe.
Between the years of 1922-1934, the Austrian

~opulation

decreased by 1-2

per cent,. which amounts to 107,680 in a country of 5,384,000 people.9
active population

10

numbered 3,134,000 (58.2 per cent).

The

The unemployment

rate reached its peak (480,000) during the winter of 1933 and remained high
in 1934 (440,000).

11

Of the unemployed, the number of the industrial workers
12
was the greatest (44.5 per cent).
More than half of Austria's import and export business was transacted in
13
1933 with Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
The volume of
her exports was also highest with these countries.
However, in order to draw val id conclusions concerning the influence of
the political situation on the economic conditions and vice versa, it is
necessary to group the different countries into friendly, neutral, and unfriendly blocks.

The friendly ones in 1933 were Germany, Hungary, and Italy

and in 1934, only Hungary and Italy.

York:

Those outspokenly hostile in 1933 were

9Frederick Hertz, The Economic Conditions of the Danubian States (New
Howard Fertig, 1970), p. 93.

IOThe actual working populatibn.
11 Hertz, Danubian States, p. 98.
12 I b i d. , p. 49.
l3See Table 111.
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Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and France; but in 1934, Germany also
entered this group, while France moved into the neutral group.

The neutral

group consisted of Poland, the U.S., Switzerland, and England in 1933, and
14
.
was joined by France 1n 1934.
The following statistics, grouped in the above described fashion, reveals
some interesting facts.

While in 1933 Austria's foreign trade was fairly dis-

tributed in the friendly block (34.3 per cent import and 30.2 per cent export), the hostile block (28.7 per cent import and 22 per cent export), and
the neutral block (23.3 per cent import and 29.1 per cent export}; in 1934
the situation changed for the worse.

Austria's foreign trade altered so that

45 per cent of its import and 34 per cent of its export depended on the hostile nations, 22.9 per cent import and 31 per cent export on the neutral nations, and only 15.2 per cent import and 14.2 per cent export on the friendly
nations.
Austrian economic interests demanded a good political relationship with
all of her trading partners, because even the smallest economic malfunction
of the export-import trade would have created a grave crisis.

The German

tourist restrictions were intended to do just that.
Political Conditions
On March 9, 1933, Chancellor Doi I fuss assumed "emergency power'' and began to rule by decrees. l5

He was thereby freed from a possible parliamentary

14see Table IV.
ISThe emergency power was granted by a law passed during World War I and
had not been repealed since.
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defeat,

but he was still short of a mass support.

The Nazi movement, due

to the vigorous support of Hitler's Germany, became stronger and attracted
many Pan-Germans, who formerly supported the government's policy.

Receiving

encouragement from Mussolini, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party in Austria on
June 19, 1933.

The next year, in February, after receiving encouragement from

Mussolini, he organized a show-down with the Social Democrats, who had received help from Czechoslovakia in the form of secret armshipments.17

On

March 17, 1934, Austria, Hungary, and Italy together signed the Rome Protocol,
which announced not only new commercial agreements between the three countries, but was designed to give some kind of guarantee against a German attempt of annexation.

On May l, 1934, Dollfuss announced a new constitution,

fashioned after the Italian corporate state system.

The ground work was laid

down for a relatively sound course of Austrian consolidation.
The murder of Dollfuss and the unsuccessful Nazi coup created some unrest, but the government held firm and defeated the Nazi attempt.

Mussolini's

reaction proved to Hitler that it was more profitable for him to not continue
the support of Austrian Nazis, and thereby avoid creating more disturbances.
When Schuschnigg took over the chancellorship after the murder of Dollfuss, Austria was dependent on the economic cooperation of the Little Entente
state~

of Italy, Hungary, and Germany.

On the other hand, the Little Entente

and Germany were sharp opponents of Austria on the political field, both fearing a possible restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy.

This could have blocked

Hitler's plans for the annexation(of Austria, and could also have meant an
16He had only a slight majority if the Pan-Germans voted on his side.
The Pan-Germans advocated a custom union and, if possible, a political union
with G~rmany.

Ile. A. M3cartney and A. W. Palmer, Elstern Euro~e, p. 310.
Chicago Daily News, February 13, 1934, p. 2.

;lso ~cc
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end for Czechoslovakia by drawing away the different national minorities from
the support of the Czech state.
On the field of domestic policy, the two most aggressive opponents of
the Austrian government, the Social Democrats and the Nazis,. were defeated.
The murder of Dollfuss spiritually united the Austrians so that Schuschnigg
was in a unique position to select and pursue a foreign policy that would
best serve the interest of Austria.
Alternatives for Austrian Foreign Policy
As I see it, the following main alternatives could have been pursued by
Schuschnigg:
continuation of Doll fuss' pol :cy, that is, the further strengthening
of the relationship with Hungary and Italy; and maintaining friendly
relations with Germany, though, firmly standing up against the Nazi
Gleichschaltung plans. Also, at the same time, maintaining 11 cool 11
but correct economic connections with France, as well as with the
Little Entente states;
start a new pol icy of appeasement with Germany and place Austria's
independence at the grace of Hitler more than at the grace of the
Rome Protocols;
completely change the traditional 1 ine and start a rapprochement
and a closer cooperation with France, as wel 1 as with the Little Entente states, at the price of loosing the support of Hungary and
possibly of Italy.
Continuation of Doi lfuss' Pol icy
Relations with Hungary
Relations with Hungary had been most cordial since the signing of the
new commercial treaty and the Rome Protocols.

However, Hungary alone did not

offer too much of a security for Austria against the German danger.

On his

first visit to Hungary, Schuschnigg saw Horthy who said to him about the future political outlook of Austria:

"For poor Austria, which I love and know
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almost 1 ike my own fatherland, there is nothing left but to seek ·unification
with the German Reich.

1118

Strangely enough, Schuschnigg did not record his own reaction to this
statement.

If there was a substantial number of people who thought along

Horthy 1 s 1 ine of thinking

(and there was), then Hungary certainly did not

represent a country of special value for Austrian independence.
There were other opinions in Hungary concerning the future of Austria,
too, such as the conviction of Prime Minister Julius Gombos.

He had tried to

introduce a Hungarian authoritarian system similar to Hitler's Germany, but
considered a great Germany to be a dangerous neighbor, and therefore, had
. II y asserte d h"1s .interest .1n Austr1a
. I s 1n
• d epen d ence. 19
emp hat1ca

At t he same

time, he did not believe that the Anschluss could be prolonged forever.
A constant

fea~

20

of an Austrian Habsburg restoration was noticeable not

only in the Little Entente states, but also in Hungary.

The Habsburg restora-

tion question was the first that Schuschnigg had to explain during his visit
in Hungary.

There was a small Legitimist group in Hungary, not too great in

number, but powerful and influential--the Catholic higher clergy, a good number of the aristocracy, and higher ranking army officers who in the past had
served in the Kaiser] iche und Konig] iche (KUK)

21

Army.

Horthy, himself, was

an admirer of the Old Monarchy, and he had said to Schuschnigg,

11

lf the old

Empire were to be re-established, I would walk on my two feet, no matter how

18

schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 88.

'
190 ur1ng
•
h 1s
· v1s1t
. . .1n Germany .1n J une 1933 • C. A. Macartney, October
Fifteenth (2 vols.; Edinburgh: University Press, 1961 ) , I , 3 I 2 •
20 wilhelmstrasse, Professor Bleyer 1 s report to the German Embassy in
Budapest, August 11, 1933, Doc. No. 13.
21

imperial and Royal
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great the distance, to offer my services again. 1122

This kind of nostalgic

statement, however, did not influence his realistic actions.

Horthy was anx-

ious not to violate the respective clauses of the peace treaty and the earlier
decision of the victorious powers, because it could endanger the very independence of Hungary.

As early as 1922, Horthy, himself, blocked the way of a

Habsburg restoration in Hungary, 2 3 and in 1934 he believed a restoration was
''no longer within the range of possibility.

One cannot bring the dead to life

. ,,24
again.
The new generation of Hungarian politicians and Prime Minister G'0mbos
were strongly anti-restorationists.

They wanted to modernize Hungary, and

they saw the embodiment of a modern state in the Fascist and Nazi systems.
Thus, a monarchist restoration would have blocked the realization of their
plan.

The German

11

solution 11 to the Austrian problem would efficiently forever

block any Habsburg restoration attempt. 25
Schuschnigg declared to Gombos that "an active monarchist pol icy was
nothing but romantic nonsense. 1126

However, he also remarked that, privately

and personally, he was a monarchist.

27

This statement seemingly satisfied

Gombo·s--at least that was Schuschnigg 1 s impression, although actually Gombos
worked more diligently from then on for the "German solution," and especially
22schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 88.

£i.!2.

2 3For Horthy's description of these attempts see The Admiral Horthy Mem(New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp.116-127.
24 schuschnigg, Austrian Regu~em, p. 88.

2 5wilhelmstrasse, MacKensen to Neurath, Budapest, May 10, 1934, Doc.
No. 24.
26schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 90.
2 71bid.
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when the German diplomacy obtained its first success in Yugoslavia and Rumania28 in August 1934.
Hungary, therefore, represented a very weak ally for Austria as far as
the independence of Austria was concerned.

One reason for this was that the

Hungarian fear of a Habsburg restoration in Austria also directed Hungary to
Germany 1 s side.

Although Hungary would not have welcomed a strong Germany as

her next door neighbor, it was, in Horthy 1 s and Gombos' eyes, less dangerous
than a restoration.

When Germany took a successful step in the Rumanian and

Yugoslavian market, Hungary became frightened that she would Jose Germany 1 s
support for Hungarian revisionism 29 and was willing to servilely fol low Hitler's designs for Austria.
For Schuschnigg to follow Doll fuss' pol icy concerning Hungary would have
been a naive and unrealistic pol icy.

Although it was in Austria's interest

to maintain friendly relations with Hungary in 1934, he had to realize that
this friendship was a temporary one, and the most that could be expected from
Hungary in case of a German-Austrian open conflict was neutrality.

Even this

neutrality was questionable, because Austria included (since the peace treaties) Burgenland--the former Hungarian territory, which was excluded from the
Hungarian revisionist demands only temporarily.30

Schuschnigg had to seek

28wilhelmstrasse, Conversation of K~nya with Hitler, Berl in, August 6,
1934, Doc. No. 25.
291bid., Doc. No. 26, 27, 28, 83.
30ln this study I am using tfie words 11 revision 11 and 11 revisionism 11 in the
following manner: 11 Revision 11 refers to the peace treaties that followed World
War I. According to Article XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the
decisions of the peace treaties concerning the newly drawn borders could have
been revised by the unanimous vote of the Assembly to correct possible injustices. The revisionist states that demanded the application of that article
were Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Bulgaria. 1 'Revisionism" 1r1as the
,
name of the movement pursuing the aim of revisions in each rrc~D<_:ctivrc: u .inc:-,1. j
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security for Austria in other countries and had to change Dollfuss 1 pol icy.
lielations with Italy
Schuschnigg visited Musso! ini in August 1934.

Mussolini's reaction to

the murder of Dollfuss and to the unsuccessful Nazi coup in Vienna seemed to
be the best assurance for Austria's independence.

However, Schuschnigg 1 s

11frank11 answers to Mussolini's questions probably did not help to improve
Austrian-Italian relations.
The first thing that Mussel ini learned from Schuschnigg was the undesirability of Italian armed intervention in case of any Anschluss attempts of
Hitler.

"Actual military assistance within our borders would have been, quite

frankly, out of the question.

The presence of Italian troops on our soil

would have rendered the position of the Austrian government unattainable. 1i3 1
He also explained that in case of Italian intervention, the Czechs, as wel I as
the Yugoslavians, would mobilize and possibly enter Austria.

32

Therefore,

11 a demonstration of Italian military might 1133 would be satisfactory, even in
the future.

What he particul iarly asked of Mussolini was to intervene with

Hitler in order to curtail Nazi propaganda in Austria.

However, his dislike

of the Italian military aid most probably forced Mussolini to think twice before taking any step against the Anschluss, especially since in July the
French and British reactions were far weaker than the Italians•.
3 1schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 99. Italian-Austrian antagonism
existed in 1934 because of the Italian oppression of the Austrians in the
former Austrian provinces awarded•to Italy in the St. Germain Treaty.
32see p. 74 of this study.
33schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 99.
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Mussolini, on the other hand, expressed his belief that the strengthening
of the Austrian and Hungarian armies, and the expansion of the commercial
preference treaties (which would create almost a custom union between the
three nations) would create a united block of 60-70 million people, which
would undoubtedly have great political weight in Europe.
Just as in Hungary, so too in Italy the question of restoration arose.
Mussolini declared that he was a monarchist, because "monarchy, as a stabil izing factor, was of the greatest value. 1134

Schuschnigg explained his personal

convictions and then went on to say that a restoration would endanger Austria's existence.

Mussolini understood the problem, but was pushing ques-

tions in the same direction and even declared that Italy "would certainly not
object 1135 to a restoration.
In the remainder of the conversation, Schuschnigg rejected Musso] ini 's
idea that in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, Austria might incorporate southern Moravia and stressed the importance of peace for Austria.
Musso] ini, on the other hand, urged the speedy build-up of the Austrian armed
forces and offered his help in it.
Having had this conversation after his Budapest visit, Schuschnigg
needed to clearly see the following:
Musso] ini whole-heartedly supported the ideas of the Rome Protocols
and wanted to go even farther by creating a de facto custom-union
between Italy, Austria, and Hungary, without 11 alarming 11 36 everybody by open talks about it;
34schuschnigg, Austrian Reguifem, p. IOI.
351bid.
36 1bid., p. JOO.
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Mussolini and G0mbos were far apart in their judgment concerning
the Habsburg restoration, as well as the necessity of an Anschluss;
Mussolini had doubted, and Schuschnigg enforced his doubt about the
feasibility of using Italian troops in defense of Austria within
Austria's borders;
Musso! ini 1 s support of Aus~rian independence was firm, but depended
on the possible changes of Italian-German relations in the future.
Logically, the conclusion that Schuschnigg ought to have drawn from his
negotiations in Florence was that for the present, Mussolini was Austria's
best friend, but that this friendship would last only if a rapprochement would
not develop between Italy and Germany.

The best guarantee against such a

rapprochement would be a French-Italian understanding.

It was Austria's in-

terest, therefore, to prepare the way for such an understanding by normalizing
her own relations with France, with France's allies, and especially with
Czechoslovakia.

However, Austrian negotiations and negotiations with Czecho-

slovakia should not endanger the unity of the Rome Protocol and, therefore,
should be led in harmony with the Italian and Hungarian foreign political designs.

Due to the hard revisionist line of the Hungarian government, this

seemed to be an impossible task, yet worth trying.

These facts again sug-

gested a change for the foreign pol icy of Austria.
Relations with the Little Entente
Austria had common borders with two Little Entente states--Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia--and while Yugoslavia was more concerned with Italy, Czechoslovakia's main interest focused on Germany.

Of course, both states were

equally cautious, first of all toward Hungary, and then toward Austria.
Czechoslovakia recognized the danger that Hitler's Germany represented,
and Benes made every effort to also enlist the support of powers other than
France for Czechoslovakia.

He whole-heartedly supported Barthou's

E~st~rn
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pact, and with less enthusiasm, the Balkan Pact; and at the same time, he prepared the way for the Czech-Soviet Assistance Treaty, which was finally signed
in May 1935.
The greatest menace in the eyes of most Czech statesmen was Germany.

It

was their basic desire to lessen the German threat with these treaties.
Therefore, they considered the independence of Austria to be in their own interest.

The Rome Protocols, which created an uproar in Rumania and Yugosla-

via, were interpreted in Czechoslovakia as a counter balance to the Anschluss,
and therefore, was received with calm and even approva1. 37

A real rapproche-

ment, however, between Czechoslovakia and Austria was blocked because of several other reasons.

Namely, Benes,

11

up to the time of the Second World War,

was very much concerned with the danger--represented by Austria and Hungary-for Czechoslovakia.
ther.

The ideological problems complicated matters even fur-

Benes seemed to detect something too rightist to his taste in the re-

gime of Dollfuss. 1138

Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, on the

other hand, was more concerned with reality and expressed his conviction on
September 27, 1933, to Ferdinand Marek, the Austrian ambassador to Prague,
that a confederation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would give the
necessary security for all three states.

11 lf the three of us would unite

again, it would be best for the whole of Central Europe.

To put it concisely,

it was necessary to create something 1 ike a new Austria-Hungary. 1) 9

Even if

Benes would have been willing to accept Masaryk's plan, Austria certainly
could not have changed her

foreig~

policy so radically without consulting her

37Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 62.
38 1nterview with Dr. Francis Schwarzenberg, Chicago, May 10, 1971.
39Quoted in Adam, Hunqary ~nd the Little Entente,

r. 57.

,.-
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allies (Italy and Hungary}.

Both countries, and especially Hungary, repre-

sented further obstacles in the way of such plans.

First of al I, there was

the Hungarian revisionist pol icy, which was considered a real threat to the
integrity of Czechoslovakia. Benes was very much afraid that Hungary could
gain sufficient support from pub! ic opinion in England and France for a major
40
revision of the peace treaty arrangements.
Because of the rigid conviction
of Benes and Hungary, Austria would have to choose between Czechoslovakia's
and Hungary's friendship.

Since the signing of the Rome Protocols, Italy and

Hungary represented the real friends for Austria.
to give up this already-existing friendship for a

It would have been naive
11

possible 11 Czech friendship.

What the new Austrian government could have done was to assure the Czech
leadership about the harmless character of the Hungarian revisionist aims,
which were propagandized more for domestic purposes 41 than for real foreign
. . 1
po 1 1t1ca
purposes. 42

The second obstacle in the way of the Austrian-Czech understanding was
the question of the Habsburg restoration.

In Hungary, as wel 1 as in Rumania

and Yugoslavia, the governments were very much opposed to the possibility of
a Habsburg restoration in Austria and would have welcomed a declaration on the
part of the Austrian government.

This would have blocked Otto von Habsburg's

chances to the Austrian throne forever.

Interestingly enough, while the Aus-

trian leaders never considered the restoration possible, they refused to make
43
such a declaration.
40

1nterview with Gustav

Henn~ey,

Munich, July 17, 1969.

41 1bid.
42

wilhelmstrasse, Hassel to Neurath, Roma, June 30, 1933, Doc. No. 9.

43G. E. R. Gedye, Betrayal in Central Europe (New York:
p. 146.

Harper, 1939),
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The third obstacle was the question of Austrian Socialist emigrees~ who
enjoyed political asylum in Czechoslovakia and directed a strong propaganda
campaign against Austria, not only on Czech soil, but also in Austria proper.
They printed and smuggled in the Arbeiterzeitung, which was outlawed in Aus. 44
tr1a.
Czechoslovakia considered the independent Austria to be an important link
in her own security.

For Austria to have closer cooperation with Czechoslo-

vakia was a risk that might have involved losing the support of Hungary and
possibly Italy, unless an Italian-French rapprochement would pressure Czechoslovakia to remove some obstacles standing in the way of more friendly
Austrian-Czech relationship, and unless Italy would pressure Hungary to change
her revisionist foreign policy.

Without an Italian-French and a Czech-

Hungarian rapprochement, the continuation of Dollfuss' policy as a cold and
correct political relationship seemed to be the best course, not only with
Czechoslovakia, but also with the other members of the Little Entente in order
to at least secure their economic cooperation.
Relations with France
A friendly relationship with France was a vital matter for Austria.
France had a commanding role in the League of Nations, and Austria badly
needed the help of this organization, riot only politically (as a safeguard
for Austria's independence by the virtue of its Covenant), but also finan. 11 y. On June 9 , 1932 , t he Lea~ue o f Nations
.
I
comm1ss1on
. . 45 recommen de d
c1a
that a loan of 300 million schillings be granted to Austria, and on June 30,
44

Gedye, Betrayal, p. 153.

4 5set up to deal with the economic problems of the Danube Basin.

1932, the Powers agreed.

However, because of technical difficulties, it was
47
not put into effect until the summer of 1933.
During the following period, Doll fuss established his authoritarian regime, outlawed the Nazi Party, destroyed the Social Democratic Party, 48 and
in 1934 attached Austria to the Rome Protocols.

The first actions, naturally,

did not improve Austria's image in France, and she was considered to be a member of the opposing group, which caused the failure of the Tardieu plan.
In February 1934, due to the changes in the French government, 4 9 Austria
could hope for the sympathy of the French government, and the Three Power
Declaration (February 17, 1934) was a positive sign of the improving relationship.

However, it was clear that from the French point of view, the Lit-

tie Entente was much more important than Austria.

The French indignation

during the Nazi Putsch (July 25, 1934), compared with the vehement reaction
of Musso] ini, indicated the reliability and value of a possible French patronage.
The rapprochement of Austria with France was a desirable goal, but only
in concord with the Italian foreign policy.

Continuing Doll fuss' foreign

policy seemed to be a good solution.
46 J. D. Gregory, Dollfuss and His Times (London:
p. 181.
4

Hutchinson & Co., 193~,

7England assuming one-third of the amount.

48For a strong pro-Social Democratic description of these events see:
Charles A. Gulich, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1948), 2 vols.' More objective, but still pro-Socialist is
Gedye, Betrayal.
49ooumergue, with Barthou as foreign minister.
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-

~Relations

with Germany

continuation of the Old Policy
The Nazi Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss changed the situation to the
advantage of the Austrian government.
out in his report from Vienna,

11

As the Gennan military attache pointed

The moral setback suffered by the aggressor

is considerable, the initiative has passed to the other side. 11 50

The Euro-

pean reaction to the Nazi Putsch, and especially Mussolini's troop movements
toward the Austrian frontiers, 51 forced Hitler to abandon his annexation plans
(at least for the time being).

Hitler assured Schuschnigg through the newly

appointed German ambassador, Franz von Papen, that he was "determined, for the
sake of a detente in Europe, to respect Austria's formal independence
he also recognized Austria's right to settle her own internal affairs independently.1152

In order to support these intentions with tangible proof, Hit-

ler ordered the re-organization of some Nazi paramilitary groups in Austria
(such as the Kampfring) as Relief Societies, and ordered them to be "concerned only with the cultural, social, and economic care of its members. 11 53
Austria could cooperate in the future with Germany, if the relations were to
remain in good standing.

As far as the Austrian economic grievances (tourist

traffic) were concerned, it seemed wiser not to open the German-Austrian frontier for a while.5 4

On the other hand, Papen asked Schuschnigg to allow ex-

change of ideas (newspapers), but Schuschnigg's reply was vague and emphasized
50DGFP, C, 111, legation in Austria to Neurath, Vienna, July 26, 1934,
Doc. No. 125.
t
51

Ibid., memorandum of Kordt, Berlin, July 27, 1934, Doc. No. 128.

52_1_1_.,
b"d
Papen to Bulov, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 167.
531bid., Hitler to Papen, Berl in, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 165.
541bid., Papen to Bulov, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 167.
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that he would not a11ow Austria to become a colony or province of the German
Reich.
Oo11fuss 1 policy seemed to be successful, and a good relationship with
Germany seemed to appear on the horizon.

The cornerstone of this relationship

was not an Austrian-German mutual understanding, but rather an Italian-German
disagreement.
A review of the international situation at the time of Do11fuss 1 death,
as well as during the remaining months of 1934, did not indicate any reason
for a drastic change in Austria's foreign policy.

Italy stood firmly behind

the Rome Protocol and unconditionally supported Austria's independence.

His

rapprochement with France was in the initial stage; his disagreement with Hitter seemed to be unbridgeable.

Mussolini gave 100 per cent approval of the

Austrian governmental system which was strong enough to repel the attacks of
the opposition from the Left, as well as from the Right.

Nothing suggested

that Schuschnigg should start a new policy concerning Austrian-Italian relationships.
Germany suffered a moral defeat.

The world reaction to the Nazi Putsch

forced Hitler to give up his plans for the annexation of Austria.

All his

actions indicated that for the time being, he would respect Austria's independence.

It was clear, however, that he did not abandon his plans

altogethe~

and that he had enough sympathizers in Austria to stir up new dissatisfaction
so as to try to overthrow the anti-Nazi government again in the future.

A

strong anti-Nazi domestic policy,•coupled with a cautious foreign policy
seemed to be the best solution to prevent the success of future Nazi attempts.
Hungary represented a friend of doubtful value.

Though the Hungarian

government was anxious to have Austria as a buffer state between Gennany

a~d
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Hungary, the remarks of the regent, Horthy, indicated that in case of a new
conf1ict, they wou1d not be the strongest supporters of Austria.
strong1y dependent on

M~sso1ini

1

Hungary was

s support for the revisionist pol icy.

If

lta1y would give up this support, Hungary very like1y wou1d have been willing
to seek support in Germany, which wou)d have endangered Austria's rear in a
new German conflict.

The key to the right Austrian-Hungarian re1ationship was

in the hands of Mussolini.

Yet, another possibility existed, and that was to

pave the way for a possible Czech-Hungarian understanding.

It could have come

about if the Czech government would have been willing to agree to a partia1
revision of the Czech-Hungarian border.

55

However, with Benes in control, it

was not feasible, even though a change in the Czech government could have made
this solution acceptable to both parties.

This combination (suggested by

Masaryk) of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would offer the greatest
security against a German aggression.

A modification of Dollfuss

1

policy

seemed to be justified along these 1 ines.
Among the two Little Entente states, Yugoslavia did not represent a great
problem until Italy was on Austria's side.

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand,

was equally concerned with the German expansion, as was Austria.
this question was concerned, she was Austria's natural ally.

As far as

However, a

rapprochement with Czechoslovakia would have necessitated too great a sacrifice:

the abandonment of Hungary, the denunciation of the possibility for a

Habsburg restoration, and the permission for the Social Democratic Party to
function again.

Two of the demands were not negotiable from the Austrian

point of view, but the Habsburg restoration question was.

It would not demand

55Hungary demanded as a m1n1mum the application of the National Selfdetermination principle on the Magyar-inhabited territories. See Map I.
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too much sacrifice from Austria, and the gesture would prove a basis for a
rapprochement.

The basic condition was the better relationship between Czech-

oslovakia and Austria.

The modification of Do11fuss 1 strong anti-Czech

pol icy seemed to be justified.
The Western Democracies and the League of Nations were necessary friends
for Austria, not only financially (loans), but also politically.

The reaf-

firmation of the Three Power Declaration on September 27, 1933, concerning
the independence of Austria, greatly improved her security.
friendly policy was in the interest of Austria.

To continue a

Nothing indicated that a

great change was necessary, but improvement of these relations could not have
been pursued without the consent of Italy.
It seemed to be a good pol icy to continue along Dollfuss

1

foreign pol iti-

cal I ines, and slight modification of his pol icy was advisable only in the
case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Appeasement of Germany
There were many well-founded reasons why Austria should appease Germany.
The economic interests of Austria demanded the normalization of trade rel ations; since Hitler still "kept the German borders closed for any Austrian
export. 1156

A great number of Austrians (those supporting the government and,

even more so, the Nazis) agreed with Schuschnigg that

the'~ustrians

were not

only a German-speaking people, but actually a German people and as such, they
could never accept an anti-German combine. 11 57

This romantic idealization of

German loyalty never influenced Germany, neither in the times of Bismarck,
6
5 schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 107.
571bid., p. JOO.
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nor in the period of Hitler; but astonishingly enough, it seemed to be the
right attitude for the Austrians to have.

It is also true that a great num58
ber of Austrians were opposed to the Anschluss idea.
Strangely enough, the
Nazis found allies in the disappointed Austrian socialist workers, who could
never forgive the government for the February days.

They sought revenge

11

in

overalls or in brown shirts 11 against the regime .that brought horror to
them.5 9

The Schuschnigg government 1 s survival at home depended on the con-

dition to find a modus vivendi with Germany, and thus eliminate the German
interference in the domestic affairs of Austria.
Austrian aim was very controversial.

Hitler's response to this

On August 6, 1934, he explained to the

Hungarian foreign minister, Kalma'n Kanya that ''if the Austrian government was
able and wil I ing to prove that they constituted the absolute majority of the
German people in Austria, then German resistance to cooperation with Austria
would automatically wane. 1160

It sounded 1 ike a threat to Austria, although

in the same conversation he stated that "Germany did not aspire to the acquisition of territory through the Anschluss of Austria.

Moreover, Austria's

Anschluss with Germany would mean that Germany would have to take over al I
economic and financial commitments which today, as a
not be in a position to do."6l

1

poor Reich', she would

It sounded 1 ike a renunciation of the pas-

sibil ity of the Anschluss, but it did not eliminate the future interferences
in Austrian domestic affairs.

Two weeks later Franz Papen, Hitler's special

envoy to Austria said to Schuschnigg that Hitler was "not only determined to
53schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 100.
59Gedye, Betrayal, p. 84.
60 oGFP, C, Ill, Lammers to Neurath, Berlin, August 7, 1934, Doc. No. 150.
61 1bid.
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respect Austria's formal independence, but he also recognized Austria's right
to settle her own internal affairs independently."

62

It sounded reassuring,

although in the same speech Papen emphasized that the National Socialist
ideological revolution "must, naturally, also have repercussions beyond the
frontiers of Germany, especially in a country with the same culture, customs,
language, and tradition.

One could not hope to dam the ebb and flow of

spiritual struggles by barricading the frontiers with police posts. 116 3
sounded ambiguous.

It

However, later Papen made himself absolutely clear with

the following sentence:

"If the present policy (of the Schuschnigg govern-

ment) and the severe persecutions and sentences continued, fresh revolts
might perhaps result.''

64

This was a clear statement which left no doubt that

Germany did not give up her idea of the Gleichschaltung.

She wanted to con-

tinue to work for it, not necessarily through 3 forceful annexation, but
rather through the ''ideological revolution" a-,d its "repercussions."
Schuschnigg knew the role of the Germ3n government and party organs in
the Nazi Putsch from the results of the investigation of the murder of Dollfuss.

After he had received this and other inform3tion about the real in-

tent ions of Hitler, he certainly had to realize that an appeasement policy
toward Germany would not satisfy Hitler while Austria remained independent.
Instead of an appeasement he, by all means, had to prepare to block the possible future attempts of Germany directed against the integrity of Austria.
It was clear that to trust the independency of Austria entirely to the Italian
goodwill would have been a gamble!
62

The natural choice in the selection of

DGFP, C, 111, Papen to Bulow, Berl in, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 167.

6 31bid.
64 1bid.
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other guarantors had to fall on France and Britain.

From the beginning of

the Fall of 1934, Schuschnigg tried to enlist the support of these two great
powers by trying to pave the way for a French-Italian understanding. 65
A rapprochement with Germany would have only endangered Austria's independence.

To acquire greater security, Schuschnigg had to enlist Britain

and France among the guarantors of Austrian independence.

This probably

would demand from Austria the creation of a better relationship with the Littie Entente, which could lead to the alienation of Hungary and Italy, but
which nevertheless was a possibility to be explored.

If a common understand-

ing were to be created between Italy and France, Austria would profit even
more greatly.
Complete Change in Foreign Pol icy by Exchanging
Italy's and Hungary's Support for the Patronage
of France and the Little Entente
The Social Democratic Party, as wel I as the Communist Party of Austria,
continued to work underground against the Austrian
after the February days.

11

total itarian 11 regime

They enjoyed, if not the support of the majority of

the Austrian workers, then at least the support of their sister parties in
the free world.
munist Rothe
tria.

With their help, the

Fahn~,

Arbeiterzeitu~,

as well as the Com-

was printed in foreign countries and smuggled into Aus-

The Social Democrats and Communist underground, with the help of sym-

pathetic foreign newspapermen, tried to undermine the authority of the Dollfuss regime and used every occasion to discredit it in the eyes of foreign
governments.

It is no wonder that after the murder of Dollfuss, the British

government recommended reconciliation for Schuschnigg (hoping that the French
6 5ulrich Eichstadt, Von Doll fuss zu Hitler (Wiesbaden:
Verlag, 1955), p. 82.

Franz Steiner
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and Italian governments would do likewise) with the responsible elements of

1~1sts an d t he Soc1a
. 1.1sts. 66
.
pan-German Nat1ona

Th"1s step wou ld have wea kene d

Schuschnigg's power in that neither the Nazis not the Socialists wanted a simpie cooperation with the government.
and establish their own power.

67

What they wanted was to oust Schuschnigg

Therefore, to even try a reconciliatory

policy would have demanded Schuschnigg to take a great risk.

If for this

price the great powers were willing to guarantee the independence of Austria,
however, it certainly would have been worth trying.
other hand, did not offer anything other than

11

The Great Powers, on the

all possible moral support,

should Germany make demands during Herr von Papen 1 s negotiations or at other
times. 1168

The cooperation and support of the Little Entente states were con-

nected with the same condition.

It seemed that the Western democracies were

demanding the right to interfere 1n the internal affairs of Austria.

Schusch-

nigg had to choose between the danger of German and Western cooperation, because both demanded the same condition--the establishment of a regime to their
own 1 iking.

At that point the government crisis was avoided successfully,

thanks to the support of Italy.
and France were willing to give

Without Italy, it was clear, both Britain
2!!.l_y_..J]lQ.~~~

and only at a very high

price.
The possibility remained that Schuschnigg could have resigned, handing
over the government to a Social Democratic-Communist coalition, and it is
worth analyzing how things would have changed in that case.
(

66 Her Majesty 1 s Stationery Office, Documents on British Forei9!!...._f~,
1919-1939, Second Series (Oxford: Her Majesty 1 s Stationery Office, 1958), VI,
Sir~./. Selley to Sir J. Simon, Vienna, August 3, 1934, Doc. No. 563. (Hereinafter referred to as DBFP.)
67Gedye, Betra~~. p. 167.
68 0 BFP, Ibid.
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As far as the domestic political situation is concerned, most probably
a bloody civil war would have erupted with the terror directed especially
against the former supporters of the government, the clerics, and the Nazis.
The reaction of foreign governments to these internal situations is
easily predictable.

The Little Entente would have applauded the turn of

events; Italy and Hungary would have turned hostile; Germany most probably
would have taken more aggressive measures, and possibly an annexation attempt;
while France and Britain would have morally supported the Austrian regime.
In other words, the annexation of Austria, which did not happen until 1938,
would have al ready occurred in 1935.
To follow such a drastic political change was an impossible task for
Austria, because the end product of events promised the same tragic end any1vay.

A complete turn-around of the Austrian foreign pol icy was not feasible,
and it seemed best to follow Dol I fuss' pol icy toward France and the Little
Entente.
Effects of the Austrian Crisis on
Barthou 1 s Foreign Pol icy
The attitude and actions of the Little Entente states during and after
the Austrian crisis revealed the

serious gaps of opinions within the French
69
Alliance system concerning Austria 1 s independence.
Austria's neighbors
11

closed their borders to her with the exception of Germany and Yugoslavia.
Hungary strengthened her border
arrived from Austria. 11

70

g~ards

to carefully filter out the refugees who

Czechoslovakia alarmed her troops along the Austrian

69RAA, Moel lwald to \./aldenegg, Paris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 11, 1934,
p. 610. -

?Ole Temos (Paris), July 27, 1934.
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border, as well as along the Hungarian border,7 1 artd ordered the arrest of
Austrian Nazi refugees.7
border,
them,

74

73

2

Yugoslavia moved seven battalions to the Austrian

.
gave asylum to the fleeing Austrian Nazis without even disarming

and declared that ''they will act in accord with the Great Powers if

the Austrian situation should become more serious. 1175
The marching up of the seven Yugoslavian battalions was not, however, in
accord with the desire of the Great Powers, nor was the Czech mobilization
along the Hungarian frontier.
portant lessons:

Both events brought home to Barthou some im-

Austria's independence was not considered to be a vital in-

terest of Yugoslavia if it meant the strengthening of Italy's influence in
Central Europe.

The asylum given to the Nazi refugees indicated that Yugo-

slavia was more concerned about this growing Italian influence than about a
possible Anschluss.

The Czechoslovakian reaction suggested that the Czechs

were more afraid of a possible Italian-Hungarian occupation of Austria than of
an Anschluss.

Barthou's foreign political designs lay in ruins; France's

security system proved to be practically worthless.

Her al lies simply re-

jected French leadership when their immediate interests demanded a different
solution.
The French politicians in government circles, as well as in the camp of
the opposition, did not fully understand these implication of the Austrian
71ormos, Eastern Security, p. 323.
7 2 Le Temps (Paris), July 27f 1934.
73ormos, Eastern Security, p. 322.
74Jbid.; John F. Montgomery, Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite (New York:
Devin Adair Co., 1947), p. 66.
75 Le Temps (Paris), July 27, 1934.
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11

They were shocked by the painful and disappointing experiences that

france had had with Yugoslavia. 11 76

However, Barthou realized that a complete

re-examination of his foreign policy was necessary along the following 1 ines:77
Was the Eastern Pact still a promising combination?
Was the independence of Austria more important for France than
the unc?nditional support of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia?
Was it possible to find a compromise in this question with Czechoslovakia and, or with Yugoslavia?
Was Mussolini's support worth more than that of Yugoslavia?
Was there any possibility for a compromise between Italy and Yugoslavia?
First of all, Barthou again found the reply to all these problems in the
Eastern Pact.

The French diplomacy renewed its efforts to convince the Polish

government that it would be in their favor to accept the French designs. The
strong French pressure on Poland resulted not in a reconciliation, but rather
in further alienation.

In August the Austrian ambassador reported that the

French-Polish relation was

11

spoiled. 11 78

Incidents in Poland and in France,

such as the arrest of the French directors of the Polish Textile Trust in
Jirardow,79 and the expulsion of sixty alleged Communist mineworkers from
France 80 helped to deteriorate the relationship.

The French ambassador, Jean

Laroche, presented a strongly worded demarche in Warsaw demanding the release
76 RAA, Moellwald 1 s report to Waldenegg based on the evaluation of his informer,--r;ris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 1, 1934, p. 610.
771bid.
78 1bid., 67/Pol., August 20, 1934, p. 621.
79 ormos, Eastern Security, p. 326; also RAA, Ibid.
80 RAA, I bid.
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of the French directors of the Textile Trust.

The Polish government re-

fused to intervene in the interest of the French directors and stated that
they could not influence the juridicial procedure.

82

The Polish reply was so

offensively worded that Laroche wanted to leave Warsaw, and stayed only be.
83
cause of the strong advice of the French government.
Barthou threatened
Alfred Chlapowski, the Polish ambassador, that he would stop supporting Poland
economically, as well as politically, if Poland continued a German rapprochement pol icy.

At the same time, Chlapowski declared that France "cannot free

herself 11 from the mistakes of the previous French governments, which treated
their allies as 11 vassals. 1184
The situation ended in a hopeless deadlock, and the final break came
soon after.

Germany (on September 5, 1934) and then Poland (on September 27,

1934) refused to participate in the Eastern Pact. 8 5
Barthou had rescued what he could, but in the Little Entente, only
Czechoslovakia paid divided attention to the German menace.
concern was Italy.

Yugoslavia's main

Loosing the Polish support, and realistically evaluating

the weight of the possible Soviet help, Barthou had to realize that the only
rescue for France was represented in a stronger British support and a closer
relationship with Italy.

The British support was looked upon as being of

doubtful value, and it is true that Baldwin openly stated in the House of
81

RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 67/Pol., August 20, 1934,

p. 621.
8 2ormos, Eastern Security, ~. 326.

8 3 RAA , I b i d •
841bid.
8 5A more detailed description and analysis of the Polish-French disagre~
ment lies beyond the frame of this study.
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commons,

11

When you think of the defense of England, you no longer think of the

chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine--that is where our frontier
lies. 11 86

However, this statement did not mean that Britain was backing

France's pol icy.

She opposed Barthou's Eastern Pact designs; she reconmended

reconciliation with Germany; she did not prepare herself to live up to her
promises.

The British government had rejected the proposals for strengthening

the British air force. 8 7

Logically, Barthou interpreted the Baldwin declara-

tion, not as a guarantee of French security, but as a British design to use
France's Rhine Frontier for the security of Britain.

When the reaffirmation

of the Three Power Declaration was published (September 27, 1934) concerning
the independence of Austria, Barthou was already preparing a visit with Mussol ini, first of all, to settle the problems existing between Yugoslavia and
Italy.

88

The time was ripe as Mussolini, himself, wanted to have an under-

standing with France.

In order to show his goodwill, he supported the French

proposal to invite the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, while the
.
.
Germany. 89
against
I ta 1 .1an press con d ucte d a strong press campaign

The only

conditions of an Italian rapprochement was the desire to avoid further alienating

Yugoslavia, whose being displayed a growing pro-German sympathy.

90

86 Quoted in Arnold ~olfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New
York: Norton & Norton, 1966), p. 229.
87 w. S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York:
p. I OJ.

Bantam Books, 1961),

88 RAA Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, ZJ, 79/Pol., September 25, 1934,
--'
p. 646.
'
8

9orm~s,

Eastern Security, p.329.

78
To the problems created by the Austrian crisis, Barthou seemed to find
the following answers:
The idea of the Eastern Pact proved to be impractical.
Austria's interest remained of primary interest to France.
Czechoslovakia was inclined to consider better relations with
Austria.91
The rapprochement with Italy became urgent and seemed feasible,
and there was a chance to find a compromise between Italy and
Yugoslavia.
The League of Nations, with the Soviet Union included in it,
would perhaps become a stronger instrument for France against
Germany, as well as against any other attempt to modify the
status quo.
Barthou did not have time to realize the new system which was a FrenchItalian alliance fortified by the Little Entente and the Rome Protocol, with
a sympathizing Soviet Union against a German-Polish all lance and a hesitating
England.

In the time when he wanted to take his first step toward the real i-

zation of his new designs, he was cut down by an assassin's bullet with his
guest Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, on October 9, 1934.

The assassination

created a new international crisis and put new leaders in the governments of
France and Yugoslavia, who once again had to make a decision concerning the
grand strategy of their respective states in relation to the rest of Europe.
The Problems of France After the Assassination
Doumergue left no doubt in the speech he gave at Barthou's funeral

92

that

he wanted to hold France's foreign pol icy along the al ready striken 1 ines.
The appointment of Pierre Laval as foreign minister was the best manifestation
9 1see p. 61 of this study.
92Le Temps (Paris), October 13, 1934.
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of this desire, because Laval was known in the diplomatic circles as a
and energic pol itician, 11 93 who already during his minister-presidency,

stern

11

94

wanted to create a close cooperation with Mussel ini by personally visiting
. 95
h 1m.

At the same time, he was known as a man who was firmly convinced of

Germany's war guilt, but

11

is not an enemy of the German people. 1196

His first problem was represented by the Yugoslavian reaction to the
regicide of Alexander.

It first of all was so overwhelmingly bitter and ag-

gressive against Hungary, that the French government circles were afraid that
Yugoslavia would send

11

an ultimatum to Hungary following the pattern of the

Austrian-Hungarian ultimatum of 1914. 11 97

Such an ultimatum could have led to

similar developments as those in 1914.
Even more dangerous was the possibility that the Yugoslavian reaction
toward Italy would once again raise the question for France:

which does she

consider to be more precious, the friendship of Yugoslavia or the friendship
of Italy?

France had to avoid this issue because she needed the friendship

of both states.

The best solution seemed to be to refer the problem to the

League of Nations, try to steer the new Yugoslavian leaders toward moderation,98 and secure the continuous friendly attitude of Musso] ini.

This, how-

ever was about all that Laval could do.

p.656.

93RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 83/Pol., October 15, 1934,
94January 26, 1931-February 20, 1932.
95RAA, .!..£.!._£., p. 656.

96oGFP, C, 111, evaluation of Ermansdorff, Berl in, February 14, 1935,
Doc. No. 491.
97RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, 84/Pol ., October 17, 1934, p. 659.
98

Laval attempted to enlist Benes

1

support for that.

RAA,

J.J2..!_~.,

p. 659,
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The new Yugoslavian leaders enjoyed the unanimous support of the popuJation.

This support strengthened their position, and at the same time de-

manded them to re-examine the international situation of Yugoslavia, revise
the successes and failures of Alexander's foreign policy, and select a course
after honestly answering the following questions:
Is it really the interest of Yugoslavia to remain faithful to her
French patron?
Is Germany really the greatest enemy of the status quo?
Is it possible to serve Yugoslavia's interest better, if they
follow a rapprochement pol icy with Italy?
France, not having common frontier with Yugoslavia, and not having vital
economic influence in Yugoslavia could impress her own designs only through
the goodwill of some Yugoslavian politicians and groups.
It was now Yugoslavia's turn to make an important decision, which was to
influence the future of Yugoslavia, as well as the future of the whole existing French foreign political system.

CHAPTER I I I
THE SECOND CRISIS: THE ASSASSINATION
OF KING ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavian Situation Up to 1934
Minorities in Yugoslavia in 1934
When World War
side of the victors.

ended, the little kingdom of Serbia found itself on the
Due to this fact and due to the IJilsonian principles of

self-determination, she was awarded with territories that formerly belonged
to the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
patriots was the creation of a nation-state.

The dream of the Serbian

However, the statistics denied

that the realization of this dream had any realistic basis.

According to the

census taken in .January 1921, the Yugoslavians represented an overwhelming
majority of the population with their 82.8 per cent. 1

Time proved, however,

that these statistics were misleading for the 9,931 ,416 people who were called
11

Yugoslavians, 11 were incorrectly identified.

There was no such national

group known in Central Europe or in the Balkans.
The census of March 1931 realistically acknowledged the differences and
broke down

11

Yugoslavians 11 into their original nationality groupings.

It

1 isted 5,953,000 Serbians; 3,221 ,000 Croatians; l, 134,000 Slovenes; and
2
2,593,000 other non-Slavic minorities.
Yet, these numbers did not reflect
1n.uoted by Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the ''ars, 1918-1941
(New York: Harper Torch Books, 1967), p. 416.
2 1bid.
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the real situation either, because it did not list the numbers of the Macedonian minority, which, although representing the most militant opposition to
Serbian patriotism, was included in the number of Serbians.
All these minority groups joined the ranks of the opposition to the government.

Their numbers were overwhelming--some 7 million people against the

5,900,000 Serbians (if we disregard the Macedonians3).

Even the most skillful

party politician could not rule successfully amidst such conditions without
grave compromises.
Political Refugees
The disregard for national minority interest that prevailed in the Versailles and connected peace treaties produced a great flow of refugees in
Europe.

From the territories of the dissolved Habsburg Empire, great numbers

of Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and Bulgarians migrated, usually to their respective mother countries.

These refugees did not represent any significant

political force, with the exception of the Hungarians and Bulgarians who were
able to convince their governments to adopt a strong revisionist pol icy.
A much greater problem was the case of ethnic groups that did not have an
independent mother country, and thus had no place to migrate to.

At the same

time, their group was large enough to demand at least a certain degree of
autonomy from the states in which they originally lived.
were two such ethnic groups:

In Yugoslavia there

the Macedonians and the Croatians.

Their

3No statistics are available for Macedonians. The official government
position was that 11 there was no such thing as a Macedonian, there were only
Serbs. 11 See: Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 145.
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-Political leaders openly advocated federal ism or even separatism; both of the
solutions would have meant an end to the unified Yugoslavian nation state.
Under these circumstances King Alexander saw no other alternative than to assume the role of a royal dictator4 on February 6, 1929.

The separatist lead-

ers of the Macedonian, as well as of the Croatian minority groups, had to face
the alternatives of imprisonment or

11

voluntary 11 political exile.

The bulk of Macedonians took refuge in Bulgaria, 5 the country which also
held parts of the former Macedonia, but had not pursued a strong nationalistic
policy against the Macedonians.

As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian government

did not even prosecute the members of the most militant Macedonian organization, the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization).

The IMRO was

formed in 1896 as a secret political organization with the purpose of l iberating Macedonia from the Turkish rule.

Up to 1912, the organization "was a

spontaneous expression of the people's irrepressible will for freedom. 116

How-

ever, after 1920 the IMRO directed its main activities against Yugoslavia, and
under the leadership of Ivan Michailoff,7 chief of the IMRO from September 12,
1924, it piled up a long record of terrorism, assassinations, guerilla warfare,
kidnappings and other underground activities.

Beginning in 1931, the Bulgarian

government became more and more dissatisfied with the IMRO involvements in domestic political questions and in the de facto existence of an IMRO state
4

The epithet "absolute king" or 11 enl ightened despot 11 would have fit him
better.
5wolff, Balkans, pp. 87-88.

~

6stoyan Christowe, Heroes and Assassins (New York:
Co., 1935), p. 257.
71bid., p. 267.
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~within Bulgaria.8

In the Spring of 1934 a su.ccessful coup in Bulgaria put a

pro-Yugoslavian government into power.

The new government began at once the

liquidation of the IMRO forces in Bulgaria.9

Michailoff escaped to Turkey,

and others found refuge in Italy or Germany where they continued their activities against the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian governments, though with Jess and
Jess vigor and effectiveness.
The Croatian refugees, being more Western-oriented, looked and found asyJum in almost every country of Europe.
France and Switzerland.JO

Their numbers were the greatest in

They, too, organized an aggressive, militant organi-

zation, the USTASHE, whose members enjoyed the hospitality of Italy and
Hungary--both governments hoping to use them for the promotion of their own
designs concerning Yugoslavia.
As the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement policy restricted the activities of the IMRO, similarly, a secret Hungarian rapprochement with Yugoslavia
meant an end to the USTASHE movement in Hungary.

The steps of this rapproche-

ment were taken in 1933 by Nicholas Horthy, regent of Hungary, through his
military attache in Belgrade.

He hoped that Hungary would come to an under-

• h her sout hern ne1g
• hb or, 11
stan d •1ng wit

I I

h k tote
h l ong common tra d 1t1on
• •
tans

and common fate" of Serbia and Hungary. 12

One obstacle to that understanding

was the fact that Croatian refugees who received political asylum in Hungary

8christowe, Heroes and Assassins, p. 267.
9F. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York:
University Press, 1962), p. 16.
10 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York:
and Winston, 1966), p. 638.
1l

Columbia

Holt, Rinehart,

Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141.

l 2 1nterv1ew
.
. h Gustav Hennyey, Mun1c
. h , J u l y 17 , 1969 .
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very often committed terrorist activities in Yugoslavia before their escape. 13
In the summer of 1933, the Yugoslavians suggested a very unorthodox method of
solving the Croatian refugee problem.

The Yugoslavian chief of staff sug-

gested to the Hungarian military attache that

11

it would do a great service to

Hungary, as well as to the Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement, if you would
close your eyes for a night.

During that night we would cross the border to

Janka Puszta 14 and would solve the Croatian emigrant problem. 11 15
accepting this proposal,
to Lausanne,

16

th~

Instead of

Hungarian government sent the Croatian refugees

where Kvaternik 17 organized their immigration to other European

countries.
13Reguete du Gouvernment Yuqoslave:
relative aux responsabil ities
encoures par Jes i\utorites Hongroises dans l 1 action terroriste dirigee contre
la Yuqoslavie, Beograd, 1935. p. 51 passim. Though these documents certainly
do not prove the preparation of the assassination by the Hungarian government,
it proves the neglect as the Hungarian government handled the Croatian refugee
problem, even though the Yugoslavian government frequently asked for cooperation.
14 Janka Puszta was a farmhouse complex near the Yugoslavian border, owned
and operated by Gustav Percec as an USTASHE refugee camp.
l51nterview with Hennyey.
16 c. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 146. Dr. Tibor Ekhardt, in his
book Regicide at Marseilles (New York: The American-Hungarian Library and
Historical Society, 1964), p. 30 says 11 at my request, the '-lungarian Government
had expelled the USTASHE 1 s . . . from Hungary. 11 Gustav Hennyey describes this
expulsion as fol lows: ; 1Gombos and K~nya agreed that the Croatian refugees
should be sent out of Hungary in one way or other. We looked for feasible
solutions and finally we agreed that we should give Hungarian passports to
about thirty politically prominent Croatian refugees in order to send them away.
It was not a very good solution, but we could not find a better one. We gave
Hungarian passports to two,three Croatian emigrants every month. Tf1ey went
to Lausanne. General Kvaternik th~n collected their passports upon their arrival and sent the passports back to us. Ve sent the first group in September
1933 and the system worked without flaws for a whole year. 11 The fact remains
that the refugees were leaving Hungary.
17Kvaternik was working in the USTASHE organization under the leadership
of Dr. Ante Pavel ic.
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Both the IMRO and the USTASHE lost ground in 1934 due to the skillful
diplomacy of King Alexander.

No wonder that both organizations looked on him

as their most dangerous enemy.

In 1929 both organizations had already agreed

upon joint terrorist actions to 1 iberate Croatia and Macedonia. 18

It was time

for them to again act in cooperation with each other for the assassination of
King Alexander.
Effects of the Assassination
Question of Responsibility
It is not the aim of this study to go into the details of the regicide. 19
However, there are certain events which need to be repeated and explained because they have a decisive effect on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.
The assassination took place on October 9, 1934, at about 4:30 P.M. 1n
Marseilles.

The assassin who killed King Alexander and Barthou was caught by

the pol ice, severely injured, and died the same day.
as Vlado Gheorghieff Tchetnozemsky.

Later, he was identified

Although even the newest publications on

the assassination describe him as an USTASHE, it has been proven beyond a doubt
that he was a member of the Macedonian IMR0 20 and had come into contact with
18Macartney and Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe, p. 276.
19Books describing the assassination:
Allen Roberts,

JJ:!e

T.:i_~!:l-~11~L~~-~11_!__

(New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1970).

Tibor Eckhardt, Regicide at Marseilles (New York:
brary, 1969).

The American-Hungary Li-

Vladeta Mil icevic, Eight for the Croat State (Munich, 1960).
Vladeta Mil icevic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille (Bad Godesberg:
Verlat, 1959).
Claude Eylan, La Vie et la Mort d 1 Alexandre (Paris:

Hochwacht

Bernard, 1935).

20christowe, Heroes, p. 218; Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 29.
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the USTASHE'S only after 1931.21

'

His aides were captured a few days later.

They were Croatians, and probably members of the USTASHE; their names were
Kral and Pospishil.

The French investigation discovered that their Czechoslo-

vakian passports were forgeries.

They traced the men's steps back to Lausanne,

where they found out in the Hotel de 1 1Europe22 that the two men had registered there before with Hungarian passports. 2 3

The first results of the in-

vestigations directed every attention towards Hungary.
The final res0iution of the League of Nations (December 10, 1934) stated
that "certain Hungarian authorities may have assumed at any rate through negligence, certain responsibilities relative to acts ha .fing connection VJith the
1

preparation of the Marseilles crime. 1124

This paragraph referred to the un-

deniable fact that the Hungarian passports of the two Croatian terrorists were
genuine and asked the Hungarian government to take appropriate punitive 11 action
at once against any of its authorities, whose guilt could be established.
2 li 1The Croats actually borrowed the assassin from the Macedonians. 11
terview with Hennyey.

They
In-

22 Hennyey refers to Hotel l 1Europe, while Christowe, Heroes, p. 9 refers
to Hotel des Palmiers. The latest work does not give any references, not even
bibliography; and its statements, generally, are highly questionable.
2 3According to the Hungarian-Kvaternik agreement, the refugees were not
supposed to register with the Hungarian passports. However, Kvaternik arrived
late on this one occasion; Kral and Pospisil became impatient. They registered
in the hotel, left their baggage and went for a sight-seeing walk, returning
only in the evening when they finally met Kvaternik. A week later they participated in the meeting which selected--by drawing lc·ts--two emigrants for
11 an important assignment. 11 Both of them drew the fatal card. They were selected as helpers of the assassin. Interview with Hennyey who learned this
version of the story personally fro~ Kvaternik in 1941.
24 League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1, 1934, pp. 1712-1728.
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were told to report the result and agreed to do so. 11

With this resolution,

the whole passport affair was forgotten and accepted as closed.
however, was a little different.

The truth,

The Hungarian authorities really issued the

passports, not only to Kral and Pospishil, but to some thirty other Croatian
refugees (political), during the period September 1933 to September 1934. 26
Why did the Hungarian government risk such an operation?

The reasons can be

found in the Yugoslavian official and unofficial complaints concerning the
Croatian refugees in Hungary.

The Hungarian government selected a solution

that was no more orthodox than the Yugoslavian solution, yet offered a way out
of the dilemma. 2 7

Although the Hungarian government, and even the I I. section

of the general staff,

28

was innocent in the preparation of the regicide, 2 9 in

such a tense situation the revelation of the Hungarian government 1 s role in
providing the passports could have created an embarrassing situation.
Reaction in Yugoslavia
King Alexander was succeeded to the throne by his son Peter I I, who was a
minor.30 In his name, according to the King 1 s will, a regency was to govern Yul

goslavia until 1941.

The members of the regency were Prince Paul, the cousin of

King Alexander; Stankovic, minister of education; and Ivan Perovic, governor of
2 5Anthony Eden, F~cing the Dictators, 1928-1938 (Boston:
Co., 1962), p. 131.
26

See footnote 16 of this chapter.

271bid.
281ntell igence Department.
291nterview with Hennyey.
30He was only eleven years old.

Houghton-Miff! in
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croatia.31

The most important persons after the regents were General Ziffko-

vie, Prime Minister Uzonovic, and Foreign Minister Yevtic.
General Ziffkovic was an ardent Serbian patriot, and at the beginning of
the royal dictatorship he was prime minister and advisor to King Alexander.

32

Later, he was appointed commander of the Royal Guard and was also chief of the
Serbian secret military organization. 33

He felt that the assassination created

a favorable condition for him to, on the one hand, restore his own importance
against the civilians (especially against Yevtic who followed the moderate,
reconciliatory foreign policy of the late King Alexander), and on the other
hand to direct a mortal blow against the Hungarian revisionist pol icy.

Though

Yugoslavia had plans for the invasion of Hungary, these plans were worked out
only in cooperation with the other Little Entente states.3 4

The time seemed

to be right now, to put that cooperation into effect.35
Prime Minister Uzonovic, an equally ardent Serbian patriot, believed that
the unity of Yugoslavia--created by the assassination--could be further

enemies of Yugoslavia, that is, against Italy and Hungary.

Public opinion

was especially hostile toward Italy, and there were demonstrations in front of
the Italian embassy in Belgrade during the days following the murder.

Uzonovic

31Hoptner, Yugoslavia, p. 25.
32~.

33Montgomery, Hungary, p. 69.
34 1nterview with Hennyey.
35see the statement of the Little Entente ministers on October 19, 1934,
in Belgrade, 11 we would insist with all possible force 11 --wording is clearly a
threat of a possible military showdown. Quoted in Eden, Facing Dictators,
p. 122.
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""'i"ndicated on October 28, 1934, in his first speech as the newly reappointed
prime minister that concerning the Marseilles assassination, he would demand
the complete revelation of the guilty persons, that their responsibilities
would be established, and the "indispensable sanctions applied. 11 36
Foreign Minister Yevtic could be considered the only realistic politician
among them.

While he was a good Yugoslavian patriot, and while he believed in

the undisputed pre-eminency of the Serbians in the leadership of Yugoslavia,
he recognized that the international situation--in case of hasty Yugoslavian

action--could bring grave consequences to his country.

He sought support for

the solution not only from the point of view of the Little Entente and the
Balkan Pact states, but from France as well, and was ready for compromises.
Prince Paul, the regent, seemed not to have too much influence on the
foreign pol icy in these first days of his being in power.

On October 23, 1934,

the newly appointed government had among its members General Ziffkovic.

This

indicated a turn toward strengthening the royal dictatorship, while the release
of Dr. Vladimir Macek--leader of the Croatian (Separatists) Peasant Party, who
had been imprisoned by King Alexander--from the prison, suggested a reconciliatory tendency toward the Croatian minorities.
was still undecided.

Only one thing was certain:

Yugoslavian foreign policy
no matter what direction

the Yugoslavian policy would take, satisfaction had to be found in the punishment of the criminals involved in the regicide.
Facts Behind the League of Nations Sessions
The investigation discovered th~t the assassination was planned by Ante
Pavelic and Kvaternik who both escaped to Italy.

Mussolini refused to

36 The use of the word "sanctions" indicated that he was after guilty nations and not only after guilty persons. This expertise is interesting, because the trial of the criminals did not begin until November. Eckhardt,
Req i c i de, p. 119.
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extradite them because the French had never extradited anyone who had organized
an attempt against the Duce's life. 3 7

More and more signs showed that Italy

might be more involved in the case than Hungary.

A Little Entente press cam-

paign began against Italy and Hungary,38 the Czechoslovakian and Rumanian papers leading them.

However, neither England nor France wanted to endanger the

French-Italian rapprochement,39 which since the assassination of Austrian
chancellor Doll fuss, had reached very hopeful stages.

Even French-Italian

military cooperation against a German attack was worked out on the drafting
boards. 40
thou.

On October 15, 1934, Pierre Laval was appointed successor to Bar-

In his inaugural speech he blamed Hungary, alone, by name, for the

assassination. 41

Unless the Little Entente states (among them Yugoslavia)

wanted to create a breach with their patron, France, they would have to accept
Laval 1 s statement.

The Laval-Yevtic negotiations led to an agreement.

Prime

Minister Doumergue, in his speech on the extraordinary session of the Chamber
of Deputies on November 6, 1934, reported:

"Being aware of the dangers, which

are threatening Europe, it became necessary (for Yugoslavia) to harmonize its
government's actions with the actions of the Government of the (French) repub. Le ro1. est mart.

1 ic

sa

•
•
1142
po 1 •1t1que
continue.

It became clear during

37Hoptner, Crisis, p. 29, lln.
38Eden, Facing Dictators, p. 122.
391bid., p. 123.

4o

la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 256-57; also see Map I I.
~

41Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 120.
42 Journal Officiel, 1934, p. 2201.
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the sessions of the League of Nations that Yugoslavian foreign pol icy was
forced to fall in 1 ine with the French interests. 4 3
There was only one episode which could be considered an independent Yugoslavian action, and that is the deportation and expulsion of thousands of Hungarians from Yugoslavia.

However, it proved to have been done without the

blessing of the Yugoslavian government (an action of General Ziffkovic) and
when Eden expressed his dislike to Jevtic, the expulsions ceased.44
Hungary fought against the charges by every means available, and by revealing to Eden and Laval at a secret meeting the story of the passports as it
really happened. 4 5

However, Benes and Titulescu went so far in their extreme

accusations of Hungary, that the pub! ic revelation of the truth (excluding the
responsibility of Italy) would have mortally damaged their authority and
trustworthiness.

A compromise solution was worked out at the suggestion of

Eden, and the Council adopted the resolution without change.
Yugoslavian Foreign Pol icy
The Foreisn Pol icy of King Alexander
The main principle of the Yugoslavian foreign policy was the maintenance
of the status quo.

This policy determined clearly her enemies and al I ies;

:taly was her strongest enemy.

Up to the Spring of 1934 the king relied on

French support against Italian aims.
gary, Austria, and Bulgaria.

Next in the row of enemies stood Hun-

Hungary was encircled by the Little Entente, she

was weak economically and even weaker militarily.

'

43Montgomery, Hungary, p. 69.
44 Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 127.
451nterview with Hennyey.

It was true that Hungary
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could not have threatened Yugoslavia unless in alliance with Italy, and only
if Czechoslovakia and Rumania would not honor their· obligations determined in
the mutual assistance treaties. 46

However, what the Little Entente feared was

b burg restoration
. 4 7 .1n
not so muc h Hungary I s m1'1.1tary power as a poss1. bl e Has
Austria and Hungary, or even the coronation of any other person as king of
Hungary.

The common tradition of the peoples Jiving in the Danube Basin, the

long, though not always peaceful cooperation of the minority groups of the
Habsburg Empire, the common problems of the economic crisis, and the great
numbers of people I iving in the Little Entente states who secretly cherished
their memories about the

11

good old days 11 made the idea of a Hungarian kingdom

very attractive, even with an empty throne.

With a king on the throne, a

chain reaction could have been triggered which could have led to the dissolution of the successor states.

Hungary and Austria were

dangerou~

not because

of their military might or aggressiveness, but because of their aid and comfort
to the Croatian refugees.

At the same time, the Austrian activities concern-

ing a possible Habsburg restoration were greatly exaggerated in the minds of
·the Little Entente leaders because of the misinformed reports they received
from their ambassadors.48

A rapprochement between Hungary or Austria and

Yugoslavia seemed to be an impractical dream until they refused to modify their
foreign political designs.

Bulgaria, 1 ikewise a revisionist state, had repre-

sented a danger even more vivid than Hungary because of her support of the
Macedonian revisionist and terrorist groups.
f

46

Mutual Assistance Treaties were signed between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on August 14, 1920, and between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia
in April and July 1921. The formal creation of the Little Entente Pact was
signed on February 16, 1933.
4

7Hoptner, Cris is, p. 10.

48

schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 90.
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The fronts were sharply drawn:

Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria

were the enemies; France, the Little Entente, and the Balkan Pact49 nations
were the allies.

It was a simple foreign policy, easily understood by every

Yugoslavian patriot.
In the field of economic interests, however, the international relations
of Yugoslavia could not be directed according to nationalistic principles
alone.

The best buyers of Yugoslavian grain, meat, timber, etc., were Italy,

Austria, Germany, and Hungary.SO

France, with her well-balanced economy, did

not need Yugoslavian raw materials or food products, and among her other al1 ies only Greece (food export) and Rumania (oil export) played any significant
role.

51

Thus developed a basic contradiction between the Yugoslavian pol iti-

cal strategy and the realistic economic interests.
King Alexander realized the precarious position and took the first steps
toward the harmonization of political and economic pol icy.

As far as Italy

was concerned, the king al ready had established secret negotiations with Mussolini in 1932.5 2

However, after two years Musso] ini put an end to these

negotiations by refusing to see Yevtic, who delivered to Rome a secret message
from the king.53

Concerning Bulgaria, the relationship changed with the coups

and with the new Bulgarian government's crackdown on the IMRO, which was
49The Balkan Pact was signed in Athens on February 9, 1934, by Greece,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey; and it aimed to guarantee the Balkan frontiers against a non-Balkan country acting alone: Italy, Hungary, or the
Soviet Union.
50stavrianos, Balkans, p. 638'.
51 see Table I I.
52 Hoptner, Crisis, p. 19; Montgomery, Hungary, pp. 245-261.
53 1bid., p. 20.
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followed by a personal meeting between King Boris of Bulgaria and King Alexander in Sofia in September 1934, and which further promoted a mutual understanding. 54

Communication Jines were also opened secretly with Hungary, though

seemingly without results.55
This rapprochement pol icy of King Alexander was in harmony with French
political designs; France sought a rapprochement with Italy against the growing danger of Germany.56

A rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia could

have eased the tension between Italy and Yugoslavia, as well as promote a better understanding between France and Italy.
slovakia and Rumania suspicious;

This French policy made Czecho-

Prime Ministers Benes and Titulescu were

working against such an understanding and successfully torpedoed Musso] ini 's
Four Power Pact57 to such a degree that the final text of the pact "pledged
rather the maintenance of the status quo than the alteration of it.5 8
In this confusing international situation was fired the shot at Marseilles on October 9, 1934, which killed Barthou and King Alexander, and which
put the Yugoslavian foreign policy at the crossroads.
54 seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 251.
551nterview with Hennyey; Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141.
56see p. 43 of this study.
57 11 Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were to pledge themselves to
collaborate for the maintenance of peace by methods which were to include the
realization by peaceful means, both of parity of armaments, for the ex-enemy
states, and of revision of the peace treaties • • • 11 Macartney and Palmer,
Eastern Europe, p. 307.
58 1bid., p. 308.
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How the Assassination Influenced
Yugoslavia's Foreign Pol icy
The final resolution of the League of Nations and the whole handling of
the assassination question taught Yugoslavia some very bitter lessons.
Their king was murdered, the real criminals--Pavel ic and Kvaternik-escaped punishment, and Italy was not even mentioned among those who bore
responsibility.

The League of Nations proved to be an instrument in the chess

game of the Great Powers.

Yugoslavia's most trusted friend, France, forced

them to close their eyes to the guilt of Italy in order not to disburb the
possibility of a French-Italian rapprochement.

Clearly, French interests were

more important than the Yugoslavian interests and the truth.

The Little En-

tente states, who at the beginning loudly stressed their sympathy and support,
calmed down and were not willing to risk any move against the wish of the
Great Powers.

England and her representative, Eden, played a key role in the

whole affair.

Again, not Yugoslavia, but England's interests proved to be

more important.

Only one conclusion could be drawn:

"Yugoslavia felt iso-

lated both diplomatically and militarily • • • No country was committed by
treaty to aid Yugoslavia in a war against ltaly. 11 59

It became the primary aim

of Yugoslavian diplomacy, then, to break out of this isolation.
From among the alternatives 60 open to Yugoslavia before the assassination,
this bitter experience eliminated the possible adjustment of commercial treaties to the traditional foreign pol icy, and made even more desirable the ad(

justment of the foreign pol icy to the economic interests.
59Hoptner, Crisis, p. 28.
60

See pp. 97-105 of this study.

A rapprochement wit
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Italy, if Yugoslavia wanted to keep the friendship of France (and for the time
being she certainly needed this friendship) became a necessary condition.

A

better relationship with Hungary, for the present, was out of the question;
but it was clear, that in case of an Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement, it
could become a feasible policy.

The Bulgarian-Yugoslavian relationship had

not changed, while a closer relationship with Germany seemed to be a necessary
security step in case France should be willing to sacrifice vital Yugoslavian
interests in order to please Mussolini.
tion had to be found.
League of Nations:

It was clear that a compromise solu-

A new ally presented itself during the sessions of the

.
t h e Sov1et

un1on.
. 61

However, direct help from the Soviet

Union depended on the willingness of Rumania to give permission to the Soviet
troops (in case of war) to cross her territory.

Rumania seemed unwilling to

grant that permission, and therefore, that possible alliance with the Soviet
Union represented only a moral support for Yugoslavia.
Alternatives for Prince Paul
Alexander's will appointed as First Regent, Prince Paul, who was disinterested in politics and who preferred to spend his time with his art col leetion.

He was educated in England and felt more at home in London or Paris

than in Yugoslavia.

Yet, he now had to re-examine the domestic, as well as

the international situation, and design a domestic and foreign pol icy which
would best serve the interest of Yugoslavia and primarily Yugoslavia.
Domestic Pol icy
Yugoslavia seemed to be well unified under the royal dictatorship of
Alexander, but in reality, the country was very much divided.
61 Litvinov vigorously supported the Yugoslavian standpoint.

Yugoslav patriotism remained a phrase: Serbian and Croatian chau- ·
vinism survived; social discontent and political rivalries were
repressed by force but were not removeg
Hatred was only the more
powerful for being driven underground. 2
Prince Paul could continue this pol icy.

It would mean that the conditions

of the country would not improve, that the revisionist foreign powers would be
able to continue to use Croatian discontent to promote their aims, and that it
would make the Croatian emigrees some kind of heroes in the eyes of the Croatians living in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, it would probably secure a

reign without much disturbance and without greater crisis for the time being.
In the long run, the continuation of this pol icy would undoubtedly lead to a
greater alienation of the people, strengthen the opposition, and endanger the
very existence of the Yugoslavian nation-state.
The assassination of King Alexander created an unexpected unified response on the part of every minority group in Yugoslavia.63

The continuation

of the oppressive pol icy would certainly destroy this unity again.

This

unanimous indignation, this unified Yugoslavian outcry offered another alternative for the direction of domestic pol icy--a domestic pol icy which would
promote better understanding between political factions, and which would reconcile the alienated minority groups.

This kind of program would certainly

speed up the progress in the field of social and economic achievement and
would strengthen the Yugoslavian state.
the Croatian minority.

The basic problem was represented by

If they could be reconciled, then the Croatian emi-

grees would lose their influence, the revisionist countries' propaganda efforts
62 seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 231.
6 31bid.
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would become ineffective.

Such a policy would enable the government to pur-

. I aims
.
. h more vigor
.
·
64
.
sue its f ore1gn
po I .1t1ca
wit
an d aggressiveness.

The possible disadvantages of such a reconciliatory pol icy was the demand of the Croatian minority for a greater share in the political 1 ife, even
for autonomy.

Compromise was possible, but even the smallest compromise would

signal to the minorities that Prince Paul was willing to give up the idea of
a Yugoslavian nation-state and was willing to accept the idea of federal ism.
federal ism undoubtedly would weaken the authority of the royal government.
Some extremist groups would probably demand, not only autonomy, but complete
separation, which would endanger the very existence of the Yugoslavian state.
To give a greater voice to the people would possibly mean that Yugoslavia
might have to take into consideration some changes in its traditional foreign
po 1 icy

o

Comparing the advantages and disadvantages, the reconciliatory pol icy had
greater promises, but the pursuit of the pol icy had to be very cautious in
order to avoid the greater dangers.
Foreign Pol icy
Fo 11ow i ng the t rad i t i on a 1 1 i ne of fore i g n po I i c y- - that i s , fr i ends h i p
with France, the Little Entente, and the Balkan Pact states, while maintaining
a strong pro-status quo attitude toward Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Bulgaria-was one of the alternatives that Prince Paul could select.

Though he most

probably did not know about the rapprochement attempts of King Alexander, he
~

had to realize the existing contradiction between the foreign political
64During the funeral of King Alexander, the German delegation, led by
Goering, "noticed the spiritual unity of the people. 11 DGFP, C, 111, Heeren to
Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. Nos. 263-64. ~~
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treaties and the commercial treaties of Yugoslavia.

In case of an interna-

tional crisis or war, the very existence of the Yugoslavian economy depended
on the goodwill of hostile nations.
primary interest of Yugoslavia.

To put an end to this dualism was the

The harmonization of foreign policy with the

economic interests of the country would be pursued by:
adjusting the commercial treaties to the traditional foreign
policy;
adjusting the foreign pol icy to the economic interests; or
finding compromise solutions if a radical solution would be
impractical.
Adjusting the commerical treaties to the traditional foreign pol icy would
be almost an impossible task.
in the friendly countries.

Yugoslavia simply could not find markets enough

To find new markets in at least neutral countries

would take a considerable amount of time.

A hasty action most certainly

would create an economic depression, if not a crisis.

Such a crisis would

sharpen the internal political conflicts, would destroy the unity created by
the indignation over the king's murder, and therefore, would play into the
hands of the enemies of Yugoslavia.

This alternative was completely imprac-

tical for the present situation.
Adjusting the foreign pol icy to the commercial interests would demand a
rapprochement with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany.
Rapprochement with Italy
Rapprochement with Italy would be possible because of the French-Italian
~approchement,

'

already an open aim of France.

Great Powers as friends.

The question was:

to express her goodwill toward Yugoslavia?

It would give Yugoslavia two
what would Italy be willing to do

The primary requirement, on the

part of Yugoslavia, was that Italy denounce her fon;1er revisionist policy <:>nd

l

J0 J

pressure,

and Hungary shouJd do the same.

However, the events preceding the

assassination of King Alexander point to the opposite direction.

According to

the French designs, it was YugosJavia, and not Italy, who was expected to make
sacrifices for a better understanding, sacrifices which Yugoslavia was willing
not to make.66

However, this French action made Yugoslavia skeptical toward

the sincere friendship of France.67

There were further drawbacks of such a

rapprochement--it would create a sharp division of opinion within Yugoslavia.
Italian support given to the USTASHE was an open secret, and Italy was not expected to change this attitude, which meant that the open interference of Mussolini with the Yugoslavian domestic political affairs would continue.

The ad-

vantage of such a pol icy were great, but only if France could convince MussoJini to change his pol icy toward Yugoslavia.

Finally, since the assassins of

King Alexander were identified68 as members of the IMRO and of the USTASHE, it
was probable that the Italian government was involved.

In that case, the Yugo-

slavian public opinion would simply not allow a rapprochement policy.
Rapprochement with Hungary
Rapprochement with Hungary would be an easier matter.

The Hungarian gov-

ernment indicated her willingness to cooperate with Yugoslavia by 1 iquidating
the Croatian refugee organizations during the summer of 1934, but the revisionist pol icy of Hungary did not change.

It was even more discouraging to know

that during Barthou 1 s visit in Belgrade in 1934, he displayed a great amount
65Mussol ini did not cease to demand the Dalmatian Coast promised to Italy
during World War I but given to Yugoslavia in the Peace Treaty of 1919.
66DGFP, C, Ill, p. 93, 5n.
67Hoptner, Crisis, p. 24.
68Eckhart, Regicide, p. 120.
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reserve in replying to a strong anti-Hungarian speech of Minister-President

uzonovic. 6 9

It was evident that France wished to moderate Yugoslavian hos-

tility toward Hungary.

However, even if Hungary would be willing to modify

her revisionist aims, the rapprochement would endanger the friendship of
slavia's natural allies.

Yu~o-

Czechoslovakia and Rumania would reconsider thei.r

policy toward Yugoslavia; both countries were strong militarily and presently
represented real force on Yugoslavia's side.

To exchange their alliance for

the friendship of a militarily weightless70 Hungary would be insane.

Finally,

too, Hungary might have been involved in the assassination of King Alexander.
In that case a rapprochement with Hungary was out of the question.
Rapprochement with Bulgaria
The attitude of the new Bulgarian government was encouraging.

Their

attempted liquidation of the IMRO and the friendly visit of King AI exander of
Yugoslavia7 1 improved the relationship of the two countries even further.
rapprochement did not oppose French interest and

gave

Thi sl

hopes that it would

strengthen the Balkan Pact and would meet the approval of Rumania.
Rapprochement with Germany
During the funeral of King Alexander in Belgrade, the Yugoslavian public
opinion and press displayed an unparalleled sympathy toward Goering and the
German delegation.7 2

This was the second occasion that Yugoslavia openly

69DGFP, C, 111, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, June 27, 1934, Doc. No. 39.
f

70lnterview with Hennyey.
7lDGFP, Ibid., Doc. No. 459.

7 2 ~., Doc. No. 263.
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demonstrated her sympathies toward Nazi Germany.73

Yugoslavia did not have a

common border with Germany; Germany did not have territorial aims; Germany was
the best business partner of Yugoslavia; and Germany did not exploit the Yugoslavian economy.

She charged competitive prices and did not restrict the

types of goods she sold.7 4

Since the signing of the Three Power Declaration

(February 17, 1934) by Britain, France, and Italy, and the signing of the'
Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934) by Italy, Austria, and Hungary, it was clear
that Germany's interests were not the same as those of Italy and Hungary.

In

case of a German-Yugoslavian rapprochement, Germany could become a valuable
ally, putting a break on Italian, as well as Hungarian ambitions--a relationship from which Yugoslavia would benefit greatly.

On the other hand, Germany

was the main enemy of France, and a Yugoslavian rapprochement would certainly
not meet French approval.

I

Therefore, "it would hardly be possible in the near-I

future pro-German sentiments to find expression in practical politics. 11 75

At

I

least not as long as France remained the strongest power of Europe.

!

Rapprochement with Austria
The relationship with Austria was

~uite

cold.

The USTASHE 1 S operated from

Austrian territory, too, and were successful in committing terrorist actions
73After the death of Doll fuss, the Austrian army rounded up the Austrian
Nazi brownshirts and the stormtroopers, with the exception of those who took
their escape route through Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia accepted them as guests and
later sent them by ship to Germany. They were feted as if they were friends
and visitors. Montgomery, Hungary, p. 66.
74stavrianos, op. cit., p. 16;
75oGFP, C, I I I, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. No.
264.

i
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against Yugoslavia,76 though without the knowledge of the Austrian government.
On the other hand, Yugoslavia granted asylum to the Nazi terrorists after the
murder of Doll fuss, an act which created hostility in the Austrian public and
government.

The successor of Dollfuss, Dr. Schuschnigg, was looked upon by

the Little Entente as a person who, because of his pro-Habsburg convictions,
might attempt a restoration and create with it the greatest possible threat
for the integrity of the successor states.

Austria enjoyed the patronage

of Italy, a fact which even multiplied the dangers for Yugoslavia.

A recon-

cil iation seemed impossible.
The Nazi attempt to overthrow the Austrian government proved Hitler's
great interest in the domestic and foreign pol icy of Austria.

With a poss i b 1e

I
I

growth of German influence in Austria, the restoration of the Habsburg Monar- l
chy in Austria would become improbable.

Therefore, the reconciliatory pol icy

was out of the question for the time being, and the help of Germany was
needed for the neutralization of Austria.
In 1 ight of the above investigation, an extreme solution was not advisable.

However, a compromise solution might include the advantages of one

or two of the radical solutions without greater dangers.
The unchangeable facts which could not be altered by Yugoslavian politics
were:
Yugoslavia needed the French patronage, as well as the alliance
of the Little Entente.
Yugoslavia had to make smaller concessions to Italy in order to
preserve the goodwill of France.

76The terrorists planted time bombs in Austria in the wagons of the Intercontinental Express, and the bombs exploded after the train crossed over into
Yugoslavian territory.

II
I

I

I
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Yugoslavia did not have to and could not make concessions to
Hungary because it would cause alienation of the Little Entente,
as well as of the Balkan Pact, and so it would weaken the Yugoslavian position.
Yugoslavia's economic interest demanded a closer, more friendly
relationship with Germany.·
Evaluation of the Yugoslavian Policy
Many historians think that the times, problems, and challenges were too
great for Prince Paul, and he just could not live up to his obligations as a
statesman.77

On pages 99-104 of this study I have discussed the alternatives

for foreign policy.

The comparison of the optimum alternative with the chosen

policy, may give a more objective description of thesequalities as a statesman and a diplomat.
Evaluation of the Domestic Pol icy
The analysis of the alternatives for the domestic policy suggested the
following solution:

a reconciliatory domestic pol icy (loosening of the royal

dictatorship) with great caution in order to avoid the dangers represented by
the autonomist, separatist movements of the minority groups, and especially
of the Croatian.
Prince Paul took the first steps toward reconciliation.

Dr. Macek was

released from prison and expressed his hopes and desires for a better understanding with the government.

In 1935, Yevtic, a strong Serbian chauvinist,

was replaced as prime minister by Milan Stojadinovic, who belonged to the
Radical Party,78 but who held more l~beral views than his predecessor.

They

released 10,000 political prisoners, moderated dictatorial methods and sought
77Hugh Seton-Watson, Robert Lee Wolff, L. S. Stavrianos.
78The Radical Party was the party of the Serbian patriots with a "Great
Serbian" conviction.
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an understanding with the Croatian Peasant Party.79

The main obstacle to com-

plete reconciliation and understanding lay in the Royal Constitution.SO

How-

ever, in this matter, neither Stojanovic nor Prince Paul entertained uny serious plans for dramatic change.Bl
If someone were to judge these steps from a contemporary point of view,
considering the knowledge that Prince Paul and his aides had about the general
situation of Yugoslavia, there can be only one conclusion to make:

in 1935

the regency tried to pursue the most promising and best domestic pol icy for
the benefit of Yugoslavia.
Evaluation of the Foreign Policy
For the foreign pol icy of Yugoslavia, a compromise foreign policy seemed
to be the most feasible.

The regency followed such a policy--she strengthened

her friendship with France and the Little Entente by cooperating with them
during the investigation of the Marseilles crime and did not accuse Italy, and
by this action, leaving a door open for a possible Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement.

The regency made a firm stand against Hungary, thereby forcing

the Hungarian government to tone down the revisionist policy and propaganda,
as well as forcing her to follow a stricter 1 ine concerning the Croatian refugees.

She expressed sympathy to Germany and in this manner paved a way to

better economical relations, as well as political relations, doing so in order
to harmonize her foreign policy with her economic interests.8 2
79stavrianos, Balkans, p. 630~

BOA simple majority won in the popular elections awarded the victorious
party with two-thirds of the seats in the Skuptsina (parliament).
81

stavrianos, Ibid.

82oGFP, C, I I I, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. Nos.
263, 264.
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Those historians who argue against this solution, argue in the knowledge
of the later developments.

However, neither King Alexander, Prince Paul, nor

the Stojadinovic government had a crystal ball to see into the future.

The

actions, or rather inactions of the Western Powers, the failure of the Eastern
Pact, and the French-Italian rapprochement all brought home only one lesson
to Yugoslavia:
and protectors.

her interests were only secondary in the eyes of her allies
With a sane mind, the leaders of Yugoslavia had to look

(which gives them credit) and did look for alternate solutions and selected
the one, which, in their time, seemed to serve best the interests of Yugoslavia.
A small power seldom has a chance to decide her foreign policy independently from the great nations.

Yugoslavia could and did make such a turn

toward Germany, which meant that the interested Great Powers acted completely
against her interests or--as was the case in the Yugoslavian situation--paid
no attention to the developments in Central Europe or the Balkans.
feel that the regency selected the best foreign pol icy for Yugoslavia.
Prince Paul indeed I ived up to the challenges of the contemporary situation
and the historians who condemned him 83 have disregarded the simple fact that
he could not see in advance the developments which followed in the later years
and which are well-known today to every college freshman.
The assassination of King Alexander at Marseilles was a terrible crime.
However, it was more than that from the point of view of Europe.
up the regrouping of the European

~ations;

It speeded

it weakened the confidence of the

small powers in the great champions of the status quo; it opened the hemisphere
8 3seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 232; Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 629.
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for the German economic penetration which naturally led to a growth of German
political influence; it signaled the beginning of a race in Central Europe and
on the Balkans for the goodwill and grace of Germany; and it undermined the
solidarity of the Little Entente and questioned the real value of the mutual
assistance treaties.

These were the consequences from the point of view of

central Europe and the Balkans.

CHAPTER IV
THE THIRD CRISIS:

HUNGARY'S DILEMMA

Hungary Before 1934
There is very I ittle known about the twentieth century history of Hungary, due to the I imited number of scholarly works written in a language other
than Hungarian, and even in Hungarian a thorough, objective history has yet
to be written.

The books available in English, German, or French are mostly

the products of political emigres, most of them having had no profess tonal
historical training, yet all of them possessing a fairly strong political
bias.

In order to understand any period of the post-World War I Hungarian

history, one needs to be familiar with the conditions created by the war, as
well as by the Peace Treaty of Trianon.

For the purpose of this study it is

necessary to describe only the most important consequences.
The Aristocratic Governments, 1919-1932
Domes t i c po I i c y
The Peace Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) and the reaction of the victorious powers, especially of France, to the Socialist revolution and to the
following Communist regime in Hungary marked out the road of future politics.
This reaction helped the aristocracy to regain power in Hungary.

Then, the

aristocratic governments helped themselves to retain this power by introducing
a new election law in 1922, which I imited the suffrage and introduced open
ballots for the rural areas.

This election law ab ovo secured the election for
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the governmental party, which "was not a real political party, but a collection of individuals of proved loyalty and usefulness to the regime. 111
The opposition was made up of three parties.
party represented the medium peasants' interest.

The Independent Smallholder
The Liberal Party's member-

ship came from the ranks of the democratic intellectuals.

The Social Demo-

.f.!atic Party limited its activities to the industrial workers.

Thus, the

landless peasants and agricultural workers had no real representatives in the
parliament.

At the same time, 55-60 per cent of Hungary's population was em-

.
.
l ture. 2
ploye d 1n
agr1cu

With the help of the League of Nations and other foreign loans, the Bethlen government 3 was able to lead the country toward prosperity in the second
half of the 1920's, although the economic crisis of 1929 wiped out these results.

The orthodox financial pol icy described for Hungary by the League of

Nations4 indebted the peasantry and caused high unemployment for the industrial workers.
Foreign pol icy
The main features of Hungarian foreign pol icy following the period of the
Trianon Treaty were revisionism and a hope or fear of a Habsburg restoration
in Hungary or in Austria.
of Hungary.

The Treaty of Trianon shocked the Magyar population

Out of 325,000 kilometers, 2 only 93,000 kilometers 2 were left for

1seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 191.
2
The Cambridge Economic His tort of Europe (6 vols.; Cambridge:
Press, 1965), VI, Part II, 609.

University

3 1stvan, Count Bethlen, prime minister of Hungary.

4C. A. Macartney, Hungary:

A Short History (Chicago:

Aldine Publ. Co.,

1962)' p. 221.

I

,,,..
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them.5

The population of the former 21 million was reduced to 8 mill ion.6

It is true that of the territories incorporated in Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
and Yugoslavia, the Hungarians were in the minority; yet, their number was
considerable (745,431 in Czechoslovakia; 1,463,311 in Rumania; and 467,652
in Yugoslavia?).

This great number of Hungarians Jiving in the successor

states of Central Europe provided a chance for friction within, as well as
between the states.

8

"The number of pure Magyars placed by the treaty under

Czech, Rumanian, and Yugoslavian rule was so large as to cause legitimate
bitterness to any Hungarian."9 This "legitimate bitterness" not only recommended but demanded that every Hungarian government keep revisionism in its
program in order to command the loyalty of the masses. JO

Thus, revisionism

became the first important axiom of contemporary Hungarian foreign policy.
It determined--sometimes openly, sometimes candidly--the role of Hungary on
the stage of international politics.

She sought friendly relations with the

nations opposing the status auo and displayed hostility toward the countries
which were for the status guo.
5seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 414.
61bid.
71bid.
8For further study of the minority questions see Ibid.; C. A. Macartney,
National States and National Minorities (Oxford, 1934);--p;:-oblems of the Danube
~(Cambridge, 1942); Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (Cambridge,
Mass., 1956).
9seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 343.
10

I

'

Adam, Juhasz, and Kerekes, eds., Allianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini (Budapest: Akademia ed., 1966), p. 14 (hereinafter referred to as Allianz) states
that the ruling classes kept the revisionist propaganda alive to turn away the
population's attention from the domestic problems. This statement suits the
requirement of Marxist history writing but distorts the truth. Not only the
government party, but also the opposing parties advocated revisionism in order
not to lose popular support.
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The Habsburg restoration question, instead of uniting Hungary as did revisionism, divided it.

The aristocracy and the Catholic Church wanted a

Habsburg restoration, because they hoped that the monarchial form of government would be their best security to keep their power and privileges.

The

democratic intellectuals, as well as the great majority of the peasantry,
which still respected and admired the Kossuth tradition of 1848, 11 opposed the
Habsburg restoration.

Regent Horthy and his followers opposed it only because

of realistic political reasons, and would have welcomed a restoration if circumstances would have al lowed it.

12

Finally, the young generation of intel-

lectuals who were strongly National is ts, and anti-Communists, and be! ieved in
a strong authoritarian government organized on the example of Musso! ini 's
government, opposed a possible Habsburg restoration because of their social istic ideas, their dislike of aristocracy and their dis I ike of unrestricted
capital ism.
Thus, the question of a Habsburg restoration made the aristocratic government's foreign pol icy friendly toward England, and even toward France in
13
1921.
After that they remained admirers of England, followed a more cautious pol icy toward France, and were very cool toward the Austrian and German
republics.

The desire for revision pushed them toward Italy and sharply

separated them from the Little Entente states.
11 Lajos Kossuth was the president of the first Hungarian Republic during
the freedom fight of 1848-1849.
12 Horthy, Memoirs, p. 116-127.~
l3King Charles IV first return attempt was encouraged by French diplomatic circles.

_________________________________________J
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The G0mbos Government, 1932-1933
Gyula Gombos was appointed as prime minister on October 1, 1932.

Regent

Horthy appointed him with a certain "hesitation," because he could not agree
with some of Gombos' political convictions.
any other choice.

Horthy, however, did not have

The economic crisis and the severe measures introduced to

fight against it produced great dissatisfaction among the small farmers, unemployed civil servants, and jobless university graduates.

14

The discontent

took the form of a Radical Right movement and the leader of that Radical Right
was Captain Gombos.
The ideology of the Radical Right was a mixture of national ism, socialism, anti-Habsburg feeling, anti-semitism, and authoritarianism.

All of these

convictions had a well-founded basis.
National ism was fed by the decisions of the peace treaties and prevailed
in an ardent, aggressive cult of the glorious Hungarian past, as well as in
revisionism.

Its most devoted followers came from the ranks of intellectuals

who fled to Hungary from territories annexed by the other successor states.
Social ism became popular due to economic hardship and was considered as
an alternate solution to the Marxist Social ism attracting the young antiCommunist intel Jectuals, as well as the small peasants.
not accidental.

Hungary was a land of large estates owned by a group of

aristocrats, bankers, rich businessmen and the Church.
.

give

Their devotion was

The statics of 1935

.
I5
us some hints:

14Macartney, Hungary, p. 221-222.
15calculated on the basis of Seton and Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 121.
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Category of holdings

Per cent of total
number of owners

Per cent of
the to ta 1 1and

16
0-5 hold
5-50 hold
50-1,000 hold
1 ,000 and over

72.6
25.7
1. 6
0. 1

10
35.2
24.8
30

These statistics indicate that 72.6 per cent of the peasants did not have
enough land to support their families and had to rent additional land from
the great landowners or had to hire themselves out as laborers.

On the other

hand, 30 per cent of the land was in the possession of the big landlords representing only 0.1 per cent of the whole number of owners.
While Hungary's neighbors introduced land reforms right after the war,
Hungary's land reform plans

17

projected the distribution of only a small par-

tion of the great land estates (7.5 per cent of the total land), and even
this reform had no real benefits for the landless peasants.

It was allotted

in plots of 1.6 hold onto 298,000 peasants out of nearly 3 million. l8
Anti-Habsburgism
Anti-Habsburgism also found its roots in these conditions.

Gombos and

his followers really believed that the Hungarian people were the victims of
the former Habsburg aristocracy, and in order to improve social conditions,
they wanted to destroy the aristocracy's power.
Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism also had some practical reasons.

Under the economic pres-

sures, the Hungarian bourgeoisie c1nd intellectuals became much more interested
16one hold= 1.412 acre.
l7Macartney, Hungary, p. 218.
18

1bid.
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in industrial and commercial 1 ife, as well as in the free professions after
world War I.

Yet, the 54 per cent of the merchants, 48 per cent of the com-

rnercial personnel, 46 per cent of the physicians, 41 per cent of the veterinarians, 41 per cent of the factory owners, and 34 per cent of the newspapermen were Jews. l9

11

The domination of the economic I ife of the nation by an

alien element became a subject of increasing resentment. 1120

The fact that the

overwhelming majority of arrested Communists were Jews 21 gave added impetus to
the anti-Semitism.
Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism and an admiration for it was created by the impression
of Musso I ini 1 s Fascism, as well as Musso! ini's support of Hungary's revisionist aims,

In 1927, Hungary already had signed a friendship treaty with Italy,

directed against Yugoslavia.

22

In order to give strength to that treaty, Mus-

sol ini gave a hand to Hungarian rearmament providing a credit of thirty mil1 ion 1 i ras through the Banca d 1 Italia.

The first shipment of arms (ten car

loads) arrived in Hungary at the beginning of January 1933, but the rest of the
shipment (forty car loads) was discovered in Austria at Hirtenberg creating a
19odon Malnasi, A Magyar Nemzet Oszinte Torte,nete, "The Honest History of
the Hungarian Nation" (MUnchen, Mikes ed., 1969), p. 149.
20

Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 291.

21

·
· '
I
Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, Horthy Miklos Titkos lratai (Hungarian National Archives, 11 The Secret Documents of Nicholas Horthy 11 ) , ed. by M. Szinai
and L. Szi.ics (Budapest: Kossuth Pub I. Co., 1965), Doc. No. 16. The arrests
were made during the Spring of 1931~
2 2rhe interpretations differ on this point. C. A. Macartney accepts on
the basis of evidence that the friendship treaty was directed more against
Germany than against the Slavs (October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 136, footnote 3),
While J. F, Montgomery saw it as an instrument 11 to strengthen Italy's bargaining position toward Yugoslavia. ~d~m, Juh~sz, and Kerekes definitely state
that "This alliance was directed first of all against the common opponent
"Yua'.)slavia. 11 Al I ianz
• 15.
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smaller international crisis.

The friendly gestures of Mussolini naturally

attracted the admiration of Hungarian nationalists.

While having these ideo-

logical considerations, G0mbos, as prime minister, was not able to realize his
plans at once.

He did not have real power to do anything.

Regent Horthy

"censored his list of ministers, and also refused him permission to hold new
elections, so that he had to govern with a parliament mainly composed of
Bethlen's adherents. 11 24
In foreign pol icy, however, Gombos was able to gain command and more contro 1.
The Foreign Pol icy of Gombos
Situation in 1932-1933
As in the other European countries, so too in Hungary the economic crisis
represented the main concern of the government.

Hungary needed markets for

her agricultural products and needed industrial products to satisfy the needs
of the population.

The denunciation of the Trade Treaty by Czechoslovakia

marked the beginning of the end of the prosperity created by the Bethlen government. 25

Czechoslovakia bought 16.8 per cent of Hungary's total export,

while the Czech products represented 21 per cent of the total import in 1930.
These figures fel 1 to 4.2 per cent in export and 9.2 per cent in import in
1931. 26
gary.

On March 31, 1932, Austria denounced her commercial treaty with HunIt was again a heavy blow as Austria carried 30.1 per cent of Hungary's

2 3p~l

Nandori, A Hirtenbergi F~gyversz~ll it~s in Hadt6rt~nelmi K~zlem~
.!JYek, The .l\rmshipment of Hi rtenberg 11 (Budapest: Publications of Mi 1 itary
History, 1968), XV, 636-57.
11

24

Macartney, Hungary, p. 223.

25seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 193.
26

Macartney, October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 90, 5n.
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exports and 15.5 per cent of her imports.
Hitler on April 22, 1933,
situation.

27

In a personal letter written to

.. ,,
Gombos requested Germany's urgent help in that

His expectations were not in vain as Germany's share in Hungary's

exports grew from 11.2 per cent to 22.2 per cent by the next year.

28

As a re-

sult of the German trade, unemployment decreased and industrial production
. l.1ze.
d 29
was rev1ta

At the same time, due to heavy borrowing by the Bethlen and

K~ro1yi

gov-

ernments Hungary was indebted to the League of Nations, as well as to private
banking interests in Britain, France, and the U.S.

It was urgent to give to

these circles some security that Hungary would not initiate Nazism servilely.
Gombos moved swiftly in that direction to the great surprise of the Hungarian
Gombos initiated negotiations 30 with the representatives of the Jewish

Right.
Neolog
11

31

community and concluded an agreement on which the Jewish leaders

recognized and approved Gombos' progressive policy, 11 while Gombos announced

that he had

11

revised his views on the Jewish question. 32

We may conclude that at the end of 1933, G6mbBs had a relatively united
country behind him as far as his domestic policy was concerned.

His economic

policy, on the other hand, tied Hungary closer to Germany, but kept the U.S.
and England friendly.
27

With the declining external and internal pressures at

wilhelmstrasse, Schnurte to Neurath, Budapest, February 12, 1935, Doc.

No. 31.
28Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 141.
2 9.!.£.l.£., p. 142.

30 Ibid. , p. 112.
3lrhe Hungarian Jews had two Churches: the modernized Neologs and the
traditional Orthodox group. The Neologs were the more numerous.
32Macartney, Octbber Fifteenth, p. 112.
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the turn of the year, he was relatively free to select the foreign political
moves which would serve Hungary's interest the best.
Alternatives Open for Hungarian Foreign
Policy at the End of 1933
Gombos' basic political convictions partially promoted and partially opposed the foreign pol icy of the preceding aristocratic governments.

He enthu-

siastically accepted the revisionist program, but rejected the possibility of
a Habsburg restoration not only for the time being, but forever.

These two

principles already put some limitations on his choices for alternative solutions on the field of foreign pol icy.
Equally important was the influence of Regent Horthy
• •
KIa 1man
I
KIanya.
m1n1ster,

33

and his foreign

Regent Horthy never lost his admiration for the seas

and considered the great naval powers as unchallengeable.

He openly expressed

this conviction several times to Montgomery, U.S. ambassador in Budapest (1933
1941).

11

¥/hat was true in the last war is no less true this time, namely that

sea power will win the war. 11

Not only in government circles, but also in

the wide public opinion of Hungary, it was well known that Horthy
Anglophile.

JS

an

Though legally he had no authority3f.+tointerfere with the foreign

pol icy of Hungary, his position gave him the chance to influence the mind and
decision of Gombos to at least display a certain caution not to alienate England.
I

f

'

Kalman Kanya was the ambassador of Hungary in Berl in from 1925 until his
appointment by

~6mb6s

(February 4, 1933) to the post of

f~reign

minister.

33Montgomery, Hungary, p. 47.
34According to the laws, the regent was actually a figure head. He
could not make any foreign political decisions. The real power was in the
hands of the prime minister and foreign ministers who acted upon the approval
of the Crown Council.
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"He knew exactly what he wanted for Hungary, which was all the revision he
could get for her. 11 35

Because he was free from the influence of any ideology,

he had no scruples concerning diplomatic morality of loyalty.

11

lnfinitely

circumspect and profoundly cynical, Kanya trusted no man further than he could
see. 11 36

His basic aim was to secure for Hungary a free hand, that is, not to

ally Hungary with the victors.

His aggressive character impressed even Gombos

and moderated his enthusiasm for Hitler, as well as for Mussolini.
Taking into consideration the discussed factors (revisionism, antirestorationism, Horthy's Anglophile sympathies and Gombos' own authoritarian
admirations), one may see the following alternatives open for foreign policy
at the end of 1933:
Continuation of Bethlen 1 s foreign policy, i.e. toning down the revisionist claims, becoming firm allies with Italy, and trying to
find a modus vivendi with the other European countries, including
the Little Entente;
Start a more aggressive foreign policy creating political and mil itary all lances with the other revisionist states (Italy, Germany,
Poland, Austrian, and Bulgaria) and trying to realize revision by
force if necessary;
Accept the status quo, give up rev1s1onism and drift into the camp
of France and the Little Entente; and
Reject every rigid line of foreign pol icy and pursue revisionism
whenever the conditions favor it.
Continuation of Bethlen 1 s Foreign Pol icy
Developments in Germany, as well as the effects of the economic crisis
(cancellation of the Czech and Austrian trade agreements) made this 1 ine of
foreign pol icy obsolete.

Before 1933 Germany had accepted the Versailles

35rhe best, most sympathetic characterization of K~nya is written by
Macartney, October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 108-110.
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Treaty at least as far as her western borders were concerned in the Locarno
Treaty, October 16, 1925.

She had been a member of the League of Nations,

was economically weak, had been cooperative and peaceful in international
politics, and was insignificant militarily. By 1933, however, Germany 1 s pol icy had become aggressive and openly revisionist.

She began to play a more

important role from the military point of view, and economically she was a
desirable trading partner for every nation, and especially for the countries
of Central Europe and of the Balkan.
These changes in Germany's conditions made the Little Entente, especially
Czechoslovakia, nervous; and it gradually turned the attention of France
toward the problems of Central Europe.

To discount the role of Germany would

have been impractical from the Hungarian point of view, especially since the
economic well-being of Hungary to a great degree depended upon her trade relations with Germany.

The alliance with Italy, however, remained just as im-

portant as before and needed to be incorporated in other diplomatic designs.
The Start of a More Aggressive Foreign Policy
This would create a political and military alliance with the other revisionist states, that is, with Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria, and Bulgaria.
Here again the events already cancelled out some of the realistic possibil ities:

Bulgaria gave up her loud revisionist pol icy and began to cooperate

with the pro-status guo Balkan states.
from Germany

beca~se

37

Austria was completely alienated

of the German supported anti-government propaganda in
~

37The Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was set up at Istanbul in
1931, the Oriental Tobacco Office was set up in 1933, and the Balkan Entente
was well under negotiations at the end of 1933 (signed in Februarv 1934) with
Bulgarian participation. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 373.
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Austria, as we11 as because of Gennany 1 s financial pressure tactics.3
and hard diplomatic

negotiations~were

Long

needed to stop Do11fuss from continuing

a rapprochement with the French sponsored group.39

Italy was not Jess deter-

mined at that time to stop the growing German influence in Austria, and Mussolini openly expressed his displeasure over Gombos• visit to Hitler.40

The

only improvement of relations within the anti-status quo camp was achieved by
the German-Polish rapprochement.
Also in Hungary there existed a great dislike of the idea of a closer
cooperation with Germany.

First, the public opinion, especially the univer-

sity students, were utterly disappointed because of Hitler 1 s demands concerning the rights and privileges of the German minority group in Hungary4l and
organized demonstrations against Germany.4 2

The majority of the Hungarian

press attacked not only Germany, but also Gombos because of his visit to Hitler.

They commented on the visit as an unfortunate step

many was going to be completely isolated. 11 43

11

in a time when Ger-

A too radical and open pro-

German policy could have created a problem, even a government crisis since
38Kurt Schuschnigg, Im Kampf gegen Hitler (Wien, Fritz Molden Verlag,
I 969) , p. l 42-14 3.

39wilhelmstrasse, Conversation of Kopke with Mazirevich, Berl in, July 14,
1933, Doc. No. 10.
40

~., Hassel to Neurath, Roma, June 30, 1933, Doc. No. 9.
took place June 17-19, 1933.

The visit

41 1bid., Doc. Nos. 4, 8, 13. Also see: Gombos• conversation with Hitler,
Budapest:"June 16, 1933, Allianz, Doc. No. 3.
421bid., Bleyer to Schoen, Budapest, August ll, 1933, Doc. No. 13.
431bid., Schoen to Neurath, Budapest, June 21, 1933, Doc. No. 8.
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Gombos' followers were in a minority within the government party,

and he did

not possess the unconditional support of Horthy.
From the economic point of view,a closer cooperation with Germany was
certainly a requirement.

Germany was to carry 20.35 per cent of Hungary's
45 .
total foreign trade in 1934.
The friendly or hostile attitude of Germany

would have made Hungary economically more dependent on friendly or hostile
nations.

If Germany was friendly, Hungary's trade was to depend on friendly

countries for 54.22 per cent and only for 13.77 per cent on the hostile countries.

A hostile Germany would have forced Hungary to depend for only 33.87
46
and for 34.12 per cent on hostile
per cent of its trade on friendly nations
nations.
The pol icy to ally Hungary with the block of anti-status quo nations for
the time being lacked all realism since no such block existed.

However, if

such a block were to be created in the future, economic, as well as revisionist political considerations recommended that Gombos join the block.
Rejection of Revisionism and Joining with the
Camp of the Pro-Status Quo States
This was Oaladier's suggestion to Kanya, when he visited the French capital between September 15-18, 1933.

Oaladier noted that France would welcome a

more friendly attitude on Hungary's part concerning the proposals of Benes. 4 7
44Nandor A. F. Dreisziger, Hungary's \.Jay to World War
garian Helicon Society, 1968), p. 34.

11

(Toronto:

Hun-

4 5Germany made the trade agreement with Hungary on the basis of a quota
system on July 22, 1933. Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 141.
4 6see Table IV.
4 7Benes held out the prospect of trade benefits for Hungary in return for
the renunciation of revisionism. Wilhelrnstrasse, Doc. No. 14.

r
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K~nya

1

s

answer was that "any Hungarian government would fall at once if it

would accept such suggestions. 1148

Was Kanya right in his reply? 4 9

Already

the aristocratic governments accepted revisionism as their political platform
in order to gain popular support.

Even the leaders of the opposing parties

agreed with the government on that point.

Tibor Eckhardt, leader of the

smallholder Party, the stongest opposing party, was no less revisionist than
Gombos himseJf 50 and, was the vice-president of the "Hungarian League for
Rev i s ion. 1151

I

Pal Auer, one of the strongest opponents of unrestricted Hun-

garian national ism and of Gomb6's felt it necessary, during his private conversations with Benes, to emph?size the disadvantages of the annexation of
Hungarians by Czechoslovakia, and recommended to him a peaceful revision of
borders fol lowing the ethnic 1 ines.5 2
Hungarian school education, as well as the parental education did not
cease to nurture revisic~ist sentiments in the younger generations and in that
way secured a continuous mass-support for revisionism throughout the decades
43vlilhelmstras;e, Doc. No. 14.
49The offici.'il historical interpretation of rev1s1onism is accepted by
every present-day Hungarian historian 1 iving in Hungary without argument.
It prevails in tr"~ following stereotype sentence: 11 The Hungarian ruling
classes did not .1ant the diminution of differences, but rather the continuation of them b~cause by these means they could turn the bitterness of a great
majority of the population against the dictates of Trianon and against the
neighboring states. Their bitterness was actually caused by their misery."
Allianz, p., ..
50 seton-\·Jatson, Eastern Europe, p. 189.
51 Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 96. ~

~'-Pal Auer, Fel evsz~zad, "Half a Century" (\vashington:
Press, 1971), p. 111.

Occidental

l
l
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between the two wars.

K~nya was right in asserting this fact, and Oaladier,

himself, understood that the realization of anti-revisionist policy was an
impossible task.

54

This policy was not feasible from the Hungarian point of

view, nor was it feasible from the foreign political point of view either.
The £!l!y advantage that Daladier had offered to Kanya for Hungary 1 s renunciation of revisionism was a support of Hungary 1 s rearmament demands in the Littie Entente states.

What Hungary had needed at that time was, first of all,

a helping hand in her economic situation.

However, no such offer was made,

because France herself was not in a position economically to help Hungary.
A renunciation of revisionist pol icy could have resulted in loss of trade with
Germany and Italy.

Without French guarantees for the replacement of that loss

the acceptance of such an offer would have been a naive, unrealistic pol icy.
Rejection of All Rigid Lines of Foreign
Pol icy and Pursuit of Revisionism
Under Favorable Conditions
This policy had to take into consideration all possibilities, such as:
Revision through war;
Revision through the League of Nations and review of the peace
treaties (Article XIX of the Covenant);
Revision through agreements reached with the Little Entente;
Revision through agreements reached with the individual successor
states;
Revision forced upon the individual successor states through the
decision of the Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy).

531 was born in 11 Trianon 11 -Hungary, but learned the meaning of that expression from my uncle and his children of my age living in Czechoslovakia
while we visited each other once or twice a year. In the whole public school
I do not remember a student who would not react emotionally to the questions
connected with the Trianon Treaty.
54\'1ilhelmstrasse, Koster to Neurath, Paris, September 18, 1933, Doc.
No. 14.
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We may dismiss at once this first alternative.

Hungary's military-

geographic position excluded any chance for success in case of an armed conflict with any of the Little Entente states.

It would have been different if

their Entente were to be dissolved, for then Hungary could have pursued a more
aggressive pol icy against these states, and even then only against one of
them.

The aim of such a pol icy for the time being ought to have been directed,

therefore, against the unity of the Little Entente, as well as against the
understanding between France and the Little Entente.
Revision through the League of Nations
This alternative promised even less success.

France and the Little En-

tente states were able to block not only the attempts directed toward the revision of the treaty in the League, but were successful in preventing the
League from fulfilling its obi igation as guardian of the minority rights.SS
However, for the sake of international pub] icity and for propaganda purposes,
it seemed to be wise to seize every opportunity in the League of Nations to
stress Hungary's grievances.
A revision through agreements with the Little Entente had depended upon
the possibility of finding at least one acceptable basis to start more friend-

1
ly diplomatic relations.

This basis was created by the attitude of the Little

Entente states toward the Habsburg restoration problem.

King Alexander of

Yugoslavia had said that he would have preferred a German-Austrian custom
union to a possible Austrian-Hungarian-Italian one.S

6

Benes expressed his

~

views in the following words:

11

1 prefer an Anschluss to an Austrian-Hungarian

S5Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 58-59; also Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 143
S6 oGFP, C, I, Albert Dufour to the Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, June 1,
1933, D0Z:-No. 279.
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union. 11 57

Benes felt that a restoration would endanger the security of

Czechoslovakia, but he was not afraid of the Germans, with whom the Czechs
had had a cordial neighbor relationship for centuries.SB

Also, Titulescu had

no objections against a possible Anschluss, but he remarked that

11

in case of

an Austrian-Hungarian unification, Rumania will order mobilization. 11 59
The Little Entente and France approached Hungary already in 1932 to take
part in the Tardieu Plan, 60 which envisioned the establishment of tariffs on
the basis of the most favored national principles among the Danubian states
(Austria, Hungary, and the Little Entente), and then the creation of an economic block, a kind of custom union under French tutelage.

The plan failed,

not because of the Hungarian, but because of the German, Italian, and British
opposition to it.

61

The plan, however, was also unacceptable from the Hun-

garian point of view because it would have demanded as a pre-condition the
62
renunciation of Hungary's revisionism.
Unless Hungary was ready to denounce revisionism, there was no hope to
find any solution for reconciliation with the Little Entente states as a
block.
Hungary was not ready to and could not take such a step.

The Hungarian

political leaders in the government, as well as in the opposing camp could
57DBFP, Second Series, V, Doc. No. 273.
S8Auer

Also, interview with P~l Auer.

' Half a Century, p. 100.

59DGFP, Memorandum by Neurath~ London, June 21, 1933, Doc. No. 328.
60 A. Basch, The Danube Basin in the German Economic Sphere (Nevi York:
Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 160.
6 ID re1sz1ger,
. .
Hungary I s
p. 53.

I~..Jay,

p. 61 ; Mag da, Hungary an d th e L.1tt 1e Entente,

6 2wilhelmstrasse, Negotiations of K~nya and Goring, Budapest, October 11,
1936, Doc. No. 14.

,..
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work only on some kind of alternative compromise.

The idea was to renounce

at least part of the revisionist demands against one country, but keep the
demands intact against the other countries.
Reconcil iat.ion with Yugoslavia
In Horthy's judgment the country that was the best choice for a friend~hip

was Yugoslavia.

He had frequent private contact with King Alexander

through Admiral Prika, with whom Horthy served in the KUK Navy, and who was
now the adjutant-general of the Yugoslavian king.63

It was even more impor-

tant that the Yugoslavian minister of foreign affairs, Yevtic, shared Horthy's
views concerning the necessity of rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
He said to Hennyey, the Hungarian military attache, during the presentation of
his credentials:

11

1 am convinced that you will have a good time in our

country, because there are no real differences between the two people. 1164
Not only sentimental and personal emotions suggested a rapprochement with
Yugoslavia, but also realistic considerations.

Yugoslavia had the smallest

group of Hungarians,65 and the political refugees escaping from Yugoslavia to
Hungary were mainly Croatians and not Hungarians.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia and

Hungary had mutually important trade relations. 66

There were signs of mutual

goodwill on both parts.

For example, early in 1933 the chief of staff of the

Yugoslavian army objected to the presence of Croatian refugees in Janka Puszta.
Hungary began to send away the Croatian refugees, not only from Janka Puszta,
631nterview with Hennyey.
641bid.
65382,000 according to the census of 1921.
p.343.
66see Table IV.

Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe,
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but also from Hungary.

The private information that Horthy had received gave

him "every reason to believe that King Alexander would, as soon as circumstances permitted, accept the proffered hand of friendship. 11 67 This friendly
hand was offered as early as the first days of May 1933.

Dudic, the Yugosla-

I

vian ambassador in Budapest, paid a visit to Kanya and expressed the friendly
feeling of Yugoslavia toward Hungary, and he suggested the creation of an
Italian-Hungarian-Yugoslavian alliance against the threat of an Anschluss.68
At the same time, the pub I icly known relationship of the two countries seemed
to be hopelessly hostile, and this hostility prevailed not only in newspaper
articles, 69 but also in actions, which the two countries had taken in form of
complaints at the League of Nations. 70
ever, did not play too important a role.

These actions and press attacks, howIn Yugoslavia, the press was firmly

under the government 1 s control, and it could change the tone of articles from
one day to another.

In Hungary, only the government press published extreme

revisionist articles, while the opposing press followed a more liberal line
and advocated a pro-French and pro-reconciliatory pol icy.7 1 So there was also
·no problem, and if the stopping of the press campaign was in the interest of
the governments, both could have done so with ease.
Reconciliation with Czechoslovakia
On September 27, 1933, President Masaryk made his interesting remarks
about the possibility of a Czech-Austrian-Hungarian union, but he added the
67Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141.
68wilhelmstrasse, Schoen to Neurath, Budapest, May 9, 1933, Doc. No. 5.
69lnterview with Hennyey.

70Ad~m, Hungary and the Little Entente, pp. 62-63.
711nterview with P~l Auer, Paris, June 25, 1971.
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condition to it that
come to their senses.

11

The probability is very small that the Hungarians will
If Hungary would follow a realistic policy we could

discuss--no doubt with positive results--some kind of border revisions. 11 72
(italics mine)

The wording of this proposal certainly was not apt to awaken

Hungarian sympathies.

The substance of it even less:

it projected a coal i-

tion of the three states who were the members of the former Habsburg Monarchy,
in which Hungary for centuries (before the compromise of 1867) played second
fiddle to the other two.

The proposal reminded Gombos of the possibility of

a Habsburg restoration, and that alone was enough to elicit his opposition to
the plan.

The attitude of the Czech government toward the Hungarian minorities

also did not promote a possible better understanding. 11 There were the usual
complaints, often justified, about insufficient educational facilities, the
impossibility of entering the civil service, and the tactless behaviour of
officials in the majority nation in purely Magyar districts. 11 73

It was natural

for the population living in such districts to turn to the Hungarian government for protection; and this provided a constant chance for hostility between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Reconciliation with Rumania
This seemed to be the least desired and least possible alternative because Rumania held the greatest part of former Hungarian territories with the
greatest Hungarian population:

l ,354,000 according to the Rumanian census and

1,900,000 according to the Hungarian census. 74

'

The greatest number of politi-

cal refugees I iving in Trianon-Hungary were represented by those escaping from
7 2Quoted in Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 58.
73seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 344.
741bid., p. 343.
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Transylvania.

These refugees were politically the most active and influential

(Bethlen, himself, was a Transylvanian), working for revision.

Titulescu, the

Rumanian foreign minister, on the other hand, was one of the strongest antirevisionist statesmen, whose activities were instrumental in the torpedoing of
the Four Power Pact,75 as well as in the preparations of the anti-revisionist
Balkan Entente. 76
The success of any of these alternatives depended entirely on the consent
of Italy and Germany.

Hungary could not afford to loose Italian sympathies

what with Mussolini being the only statesman who openly supported Hungary's revisionist aims.77

Also, Hungary could not afford to loose Hitler's goodwill,

the Hungarian foreign trade being greatly dependent upon the export-import
business with Germany.

It was important to learn their attitude and harmonize

Hungary's foreign pol icy with them.
Gombo's learned about the convictions of Germany and Italy during his visits.

In Berl in (June 17-19, 1933) he learned from Hitler that Germany could

not support the Hungarian revisionist requests directed against Rumania and
.
•
. 78 b ut he cou 1d count on Germany I s cooperation
Yugos 1av1a,
against

kia. 79

czec hos 1ova-

Furthermore, Hitler expressed his dissatisfaction with Dol ]fuss.

Gorn-

bos had asked Hitler if a more moderate pol icy would not be possible visa vis
75see Macartney and Palmer, Eastern Europe, p. 308.
76

stavrianos, The Balkans, pp.738-739.

77since 1928, Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 347.
78 1bid., p. 59.

'

79Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 58.
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Austria,tlO but the reply was disappointing.~ 1

The Hungarian leadership, how-

ever, sympathized with Hitler's conceptions and did not want to get involved
in that "fratricidal struggle. 11 82

Nobody could have expected Hungary

II

w1•th a
I

sane mind to take the side of Germany in the Anschluss question,'' wrote Kanya
.
. . 83
a f ter t he Ber 1 1n v1s1t.
A revision with the help of all the Great Powers did not seem to be feasible after the experiences with the Four Power Pact and after the K~r1ya-Daladier
negotiations. 84
hope.

Yet, the attitude of England created some slight reasons for

With the enlistment of Lord Rothermere to support the Hungarian revi-

sionist aims, at least the Hungarian public was led to believe that the support
of the English pub I ic opinion could be secured.
Therefore, Hungarian revisionist propaganda was strengthened in the \-Jestern world, and especially in Britain and France, but it created greater response in Central Europe.

The Little Entente feared that Hungary might con-

vince the Great Powers that they were very unjust to Hungary during the peace
negotiations. 8 5

As a result, Benes and Titulescu nipped in the bud every

French idea of a possible revision and led in their respective press a continuous anti-revisionist propaganda campaign, which proved to be more successful
than the Hungarian one.86
80All ianz, negotiations of Gombos with Hitler, Budapest, June J6, 1933,
Doc. No. 3.
81 Ibid., Gombos to Musso! ini, Budapest, June 24, 1933, Doc. No. 4.

8 2 W1. 1h e I mstrasse, Schoen to Neurath,
'
Budapest, June 21, 1933, Doc. No. 8 •
83Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 240.
84 see p. 124 of this study.
8 S1nterview with Hennyey.
86seton-Watson, Eastern Europe.

p. 347.
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During the last months of 1933, as well as in January 1934 there were

.

8

rumors about the possibility of a German-Little Entente Non-Aggres~ion Pact• 7
Gombos asked Germany for clarification, and finally he wrote a letter to Hitle~
himself, but after a while Germany decided not to give any reply.88

These ac-

tions of Germany were just as disturbing as Hitler's attitude toward the German
minorities question in Hungary, 8 9 all of which recommended to Gombos a cautious
rapprochement with Germany.
Gombos learned about Mussolini •s designs during his visit in Rome (July
25-28, 1933); Mussolini repeated to Gombos his formerly explained designs90
concerning Central Europe.

The kernel of this plan was a ''tight cooperatior1

I

between Austria and Hungary, 11 9 1 which should be realized on the commercial, as

1

well as on the political fields.

1

At the same time, Musso] ini assured Gombos

j

that Italy remained "in strong opposition to a Habsburg restoration.1192

In the f

!

second state of this pol icy the Austrian-Hungarian agreement, strongly sup-

I
I

ported by Italy, should be extended to the neighboring states, and first of
all to the Little Entente. and to Germany.93
8

7oGFP, C, I I, memorandum by Kopke, Berl in, December I, 1933, Doc. No. 95;
memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, January JI, I 934, Doc. No. I 75; ~ernorandum by Neurath, Berl in, January 18, 1934, Doc. No. 192; memorandum by Bulow, Berl in
'
January 24, 1934, Doc. No. 216.
881bid., Gombos to Hitler, Budapest, February 14, 1934, Doc. No. 252; Dr·
Lammers~Neurath, Berl in, February 28, 1934, Doc. No. 288; Dr. Lammers to
Neurath, Berl in, March 29, 1934, Doc. No. 371.
89wilhelmstrasse, Doc. Nos. 16, 18, 19, 20.
90see Mussolini's letter to Goihbos on July l, 1933, Allianz,
91 Ibid.
9 2 rbid.

93rbid.

Doc. No.

5.
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The effects of Hitler's and Mussolini's plans on all the alternatives of
the Hungarian foreign pol icy were disastrous.
and Italy opposed it.

Gennany wanted an Anschluss,

Germany wanted a close cooperation with Hungary for the

dissolution of the Little Entente and the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and
Musso] ini wanted a reorganization of the whole Danube Basin through reconcil iation and understanding with France.
Habsburg restoration.

Both Germany and Italy opposed a possible

None of the mentioned alternatives was feasible without

alienating one or another Great Power.

Consequently there remained only one

remotechance to promote the Hungarian foreign political aims--the creation in
the future of an understanding between Hit] er and Musso] ini.
only one road was left open for Hungary:

Until that time

to try to retain her freedom of ac-

tion without offending either of the two powers.
The preceding analysis hopefully proved what the Communist-controlled Hungarian writers of history were not allowed to say before 1968-1969,9 4 but was
accepted as "historical fact" by many prominent experts in the free world as
early as 1945; 95 that is that Gombos did not bind Hungary to unconditionally
~

I

·follow the Italian, or German political lines·

Gombos and Kanya saved Hunga ry 1s

freedom of action to follow a pol icy which would serve Hungary's interest the
best.

As we shall see in the following chapter, they kept this point of view

throughout 1934 and were ready to play the twO powers against each other if
they believed that such an immoral, blackmailing, double-crossing pol icy would
benefit Hungary.
94 The first new interpretations' may be found in ~d~m, Hungary and the Little Entente; also Ormos, Eastern Security.
95seton-Watson, Eastern Europe; also Macartney and Palmer, Eastern Europe.
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Events of 1934
The German-Polish Non-Aggression
Pact (January 26, 1934)
The official relationship of Hungary and Poland was correct, but very cool
following World War I.

Though the two countries had friendly connections for

centuries before the war, and the two peoples mutually cherished the memories
of old times,9 6 the peace treaties placed the two countries into opposing
camps.

Poland 1 s rebirth was the work of the Versailles Treaties, while the

Trianon Treaty mutilated Hungary.97

The result of this was that the old

friendly relations were manifested only in negative actions:

Poland had not

ratified the Trianon Treaty and did not participate in any designs of the
French or Little Entente diplomacies, which were directed against Hungary.
Hungary, on the other hand, did not see any practical value of a closer PolishHungarian cooperation in such

og

circumstances.~

These circumstances began to

change with the increasing Polish-German tensions in 1931-1932, and the tensions created by German revisionist aims and propaganda concerning the Danzig
corridor.99

Musso! ini indicated in his conversation with Avenal, the secre-

tary of the League of Nations, that he would welcome an eastward shift in German expansion, because this direction would be the least threatening for
Italy. JOO

The Four Power Pact earned the unconditional opposition of Poland

96A detailed description of Polish-Hungarian relations is out of the frame
of this study. I intend to describe them in my planned book in a separate
chapter.
'
97Andras Hbry, A Kul issz~k Mogi::itt, ''Behind the Scenes" (Wien:
edition, 1965), p. 15.
98rbid.
99Lipski Papers, p, 64.
64 •
•

l0'.) 1' b"d
I •

author 1 s
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~and could have strengthened her relations with the Little Entente. 101

During

his visit to Prague, Beck discovered, however, that the smaller states of Central Europe with their "ultra-submissiveness to the Great Powers 11 102 represented
an obstacle to the formation of a solid anti-Four Power Pact front.

Pilsudsky

believed that the only alternative left for Poland under such circumstances
was direct negotiation with Germany as early as April 1933.103

This negotia-

tion led to the successful closing of the Non-Aggression Pact.
Parallel with these negotiations, Beck tried to establish personal contact with the Hungarian government,104 but his visit was cancelled because of
the protest of the Yugoslavian government. l05

The Czech government was alarmed,

too, and began to look at Poland with suspicious eyes.

After the signing of

the Non-Aggression Pact the Czech general staff considered Poland as one of her
,nain enemies. 106

From the Hungarian point of view the Non-Aggression Pact could

have meant one more ally against Czechoslovakia. 10 7
ernment sent a committee to l.:Jd:-saw

11

Therefore, the Gombos gov-;

to renew the friendly relations, 11 108 but

the visit did not promote political negotiations and Polish-Hungarian relations
remained unchanged.

Marshall Pilsudsky rejected the idea of a Hungarian-Polish

l 01 Lipski Papers, p. 64-65.
I 021 bid. , p. 66
l031bid., p. 71.
I04lEJ._£., p. 66. Hory mistakenly writes that the initiation fo~ the revival of Polish-Hungarian friendship came on the part of Hungary. Hory, Behind
the Scenes, p. 15.
l05Lipski Papers, p. 66.
l061nterview with General Fl ipo.
107Poland claimed the territory of Teschen from Czechoslovakia since the
creation of the two states after World War I.
I 08

I
Hory,

•

~.,

p. 15.
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alliance, but he promised "never to make war on Hungary, and to do his best to
restrain Rumania. 11 109

Polish policy did not influence Hungarian foreign policy

during the course of 1934.

However, from that time on Hungary looked upon Po-

]and as a probable ally against Czechoslovakia.
The Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934)
The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact created a certain degree of alarm
in France, and the new government was anxious to show a united front of Great
Powers against the possible renewal of German aggressiveness in Austria.

This

anxiety produced the Three-Power declaration regarding Austrian independence
on February 17, 1934, signed by Britain, France, and Italy.

With this declara-

tion the mood changed, and France turned its attention toward the planned Eastern Pact.

Italy seemed to have firm control over Austria and Hungary, es-

pecially since the three states planned to further regulate their relationship
in a formal treaty. 110
Yet, there were certain signs which indicated that the supposed Italian
influence was not so strong in Hungary as in Austria.

Hungary signed a new

German-Hungarian commercial treaty on February 21, 1934.

This treaty put Hun-

gary, from the economic point of view, into the German orbit, lll the latter
holding 20.35 per cent of Hungary's foreign trade.

However, Gombos did not

Feel that this would mean that because of that he would sink to an inferior
position.

On February 14, 1934, he thanked Hitler in a personal letter 112 for

l09Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 144.
llOThe preliminary negotiations of the Rome Protocols had al ready begun
in January.
111 see Table V.
11 2wilhelmstrasse, Doc. No. 19.
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the "attention" of the German trade delegation, but at the same time he reasserted his own po 1itica1 independence.

Wh i 1e stressing the common revision-

ist interest of Germany and Hungary, he asked Hitler to order the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia to cooperate with the Hungarian minorities and not to take, under any circumstances an anti-revisionist
position.

He had demanded also the discontinuance of the German Nazi propa-

ganda and financial ''support of the German minority groups in Hungary.11113
(italics mine)

The German reaction to this letter may be best seen in the mirI

ror of the negotiations between Kanya and Hans Georg von Mackensen, the German
minister in Hungary.

K~nya told him that while Hungary would not participate

in any agreement directed against Germany, the Hungarian government would watch
with great concern the alienation of Germany and Italy because of the Austrian
question. 114

Kanya also added that if because of the Austrian-German problem

an open conflict would break out between Germany and

ltaly,'~he

Hungarian gov-

!
ernment would be forced to follow a brutal Hungarian pol icy}'ll5 (italics mine)
This expression is certainly vague.
had hoped for:

However, it made the impression Kanya

the German ambassador understood it as a possible threat, l l6 a

Hungarian-Italian cooperation against Germany.

Though there is no reason to

suppose that Mussel ini did not have any knowledge about this German-Hungarian
ll3wilhelmstrasse, Doc. No. 19.
1141bid., Mackensen to Neurath, Budapest, February 26, 1934, Doc. No. 20.
ll51bid.
ll61bid., Mackensen to Neurath, Budapest, February 28, 1934, Doc. No. 21.

II.
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negotiation,117 Mussolini felt it necessary to send his political director,
Fulvio Suvich, to Hungary.118
bodings.

Suvich found reassuring and disheartening fore-

Hungary followed Mussolini's recommendation and Gombos, against the

advice of Horthy, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 1 l9
Hungary was ready to fully cooperate with Austria and Italy on the field of
trade, but she expressed her desire to keep out of an anti-German formation.1 20
K£nya seemed to be unmoved by Suvich 1 s statements about the growing nervousness
of Mussolini.1 2 1

These controversial actions indicated that Gombos, though

trying to maintain Mussolini's goodwill, started a new, more independent foreign pol icy.

What was exactly the main idea of that new foreign pol icy was

explained by Gombos, himself, for while accepting the invitation of Mussolini,
the two statesmen held an eye-to-eye conversation in the closing negotiations
of the Rome Protocols. 122

Doll fuss, while present at the signing of the pro-

tocols was not invited into that conversation. 12 3
During that meeting Gombos explained to Musso! ini the. fol lowing basic
axiom of his foreign pol icy:

11

Hungary feels her cal I ing is to practice a par-

ticular policy, relying on Italy for the area south of the Danube and on
117sorrowfully enough, the Hungarian-Italian documents were not available,
tom:, but it can be safely concluded by knowing the personal friendship of
Mussolini and Gomb6s that Gomb6s informed him just as wel 1 as he had informed
Hitler about the state of affairs of Hungary with Italy.
1 l8The visit took place on February 21-23, 1934.
119wilhelmstrasse, p. 73, sn.
120 1bid., Mackensen to Neurath~ Budapest, February 26, 1934, Doc. No. 20.
121 Ibid.
122A11 anz, p. 115 , gn •
'1

1231bid.
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Germany for the area north of the Danube.1il24 (italics mine)
left Mussolini speechless.

This statement

It sounded like a declaration of independence,

and truly that is what it was!

Then Gombos expressed his doupts concerning

the trustworthiness of Doll fuss, who wanted to keeP the door open for an understanding with France and the Little Entente, a~d wanted to k eep ''h.IS connections with us only apparent. 11 125

Gombos did not hide his dissatisfaction

over Doll fuss• Habsburg policy, 12 6 and remained doubtful even when the Duce
expressed his opinion that the restoration was not timely for the present.

127

Gombos stressed that Hungary was happy with the present situa~ion and a restoration in Austria would find the Hungarian government stron9 enough "to
defend its position. 11 128

Mussolini argued that even the Hunggirian interest

demands the preservation of an independent Austria.

Gombos agreed, but stated

. 129
that Hungary needed Germany's cooperation against czechoslova~1a.

h
For t at

reason, he asked the Duce to keep the Rome Protocol an open treaty, allowing
l 24AJ J 1• anz, Gombos
··
·
1934, Doc. No. 6.

1

note f·::r negotiations with Musso 1 in i, Rome, Ma re h l 3 '

12 51bid. Gombos stated that he had received this information from Theodore Hornbostel, who was the political secretary-general of the fed~ral ch~n
cellery of Austria. Hornbostel explained that "Austria was disappointed with
the Rom~ Protocols because they did not include any statement ~: guarantee
concerning the inviolability of Austria's territorial sovereig~ity. Doll fuss,
keeping the door open to France, wanted to pressure Italy and 1 '~ngary to. inc~ude such a statement in the Protocols, but could not succeed·
Interview
with Theodore Hornbostel, Vienna, July 12, 1971.
126 Dollfuss, though he, himself, was not a monarchist favc::::>red. the Austrian
legitimists, because "they were for sure anti-Nazis .. '' lntervi&w with Hornbos te 1.
12 7AJ1ianz, Ibid.
128

1bid.

12 91bid.
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for other powers to join it.130

Mussolini agreed, and Kanya (on March 20,

1933) hurriedly instructed the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin to call the attention of the German government to that article of the Rome Protocols.

He

hoped that Hitler would agree and the protocols would be transformed to a wider
cooperation of Austria, Italy, H~ngary, and Germany. l3l
Gombos' foreign political conceptions were triumphant and created a new,
more advantageous position for Hungary.

In this position Hungary continuously

enjoyed the support of Italy against Yugoslavia and Rumania, while being permitted to cooperate with Hitler against Czechoslovakia.

At the same time,

Gombos worked himself up to the position of mediator between Italy and Germany.
The revisionist pol icy had no realistic chances before as the militarypolitical evaluation of the Hungarian chief of staff stated on June 10, 1933,
11 Hunga ry was unab I e to wage a war against the Litt I e Entente to rea 1 i ze her
revisionist aims. 111 32

In the League of Nations Hungary had the legal right,

according to Article 19, to ask for the revision.

However, the reconsideration

of the treaties could come only through the unanimous decision of the assembly, l33 which meant never.

However, G~mbos had created a situation, which

hopefully could lead to some kind of revision, because now Hungary enjoyed the
support of both Italy and Germany.

While securing this support, Gombos was

able to avoid any committments which could have alienated one or both of them,
130All ianz, Gombos• note for negotiations with Mussolini, Rome, March 13,
1934, Doc. No. 6.
l3l Ibid., negotiations of K~nyi and Coloma, Budapest, February 21, 1933,
Doc, No.~
132Tibor Het~s and Mrs. Tamas Morvai, Csak Szolg~lati Hasznalatra, 11 Strict
ly Confidential 11 (Budapest: Zringi Military Book ed., 1968), Doc, No. 76,
133Auer, Half a Century, p. 68,

l

14 l
or could have secured the right for them to interfere in the domestic affairs
of Hungary.
As far as the Habsburg problem was concerned, Gombos received assurance
from Mussolini that a restoration was "not timely," and thus provided an opportunity to reach a better Austrian-Hungarian understanding.
Gombos• triumphant feeling disappeared during the summer.

The Hitler-

Mussolini meeting (June 14-15, 1934), instead of creating a favorable atmosphere for the promotion of a Rome-Berl in-Budapest-Vienna understanding, brought
disaster.

While Mussolini sympathized with Hitler's revisionist policy, he

firmly asserted his opposition to an Anschluss, l3 4 at the same time Hitler expressed his views that an Austrian-German reconciliation could not take place
until Doll fuss held power in Austria. l35
The fatal blow to Gombos• designs was given by consequences of murder of
Doll fuss.
Nazi Putsch in Vienna (July 25, 1934)
Gombos• anxiety grew during the summer, because of conditions in Austria.
All the European papers reported the frequent Nazi terror actions and their
effects on the Austrian politics.

Doll fuss sought a reconciliation with the

. I democrats to strengt hen h.1s own pos1t1on
· .
·
· 13 6
mo derate soc1a
against
t he Nazis.
There were violent disagreements within the government over the possibility of
including legitimists in the government, 137 and finally news circulated in the
134DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neurath, Rome, June 21, 1934, Doc. No. 26.
1351bid., circular of Neurath, Berl in, June 16, 1934, Doc. No. 10.

__

l 36DGFP , C, 111, Doc. No. 17; also Joseph Buttinger, Am Beispiel Osterre i chs (Kol n: Verlag f~r Pol itik und Wi rtschaft, 1953), pp. 206-07.
l37DGFP, C, 111, memorandum of Ritter, Berl in, June 16, 1?34, Doc. No. 9.
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most diverse circles of Austria about the possibility of a government crisis.
G0mbos also learned about a coup d 1 e'tat in preparation against Oollfuss 139 and

tried to warn him about the danger, 140 but without success.
In Gombos' judgment, the Nazi Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss represented a severe setback to his political designs.

The vehement reaction of

Mussolini and the hostile press campaign in Italy; 141 the bellicose mood in
Yugoslavia, 142 which ran parallel with the fact that the Yugoslavians opened
their borders for the Nazi escapees; 143 and the resurgence of anti-German feeling in Yungary 144 --all of these phenomena signalled the collapse of his plan
concerning an Italian-German-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation.

From Hungary 1 s

point of view, the danger could come from two directions--from the powerful
Germany, as next door neighbor, or from Italy, in the form of a new French
rapprochement policy.

The threat of a strong Germany was eliminated by the

swift actions of Mussolini.
idea of an Anschluss.

Hitler, at least for the time being, gave up the

Yet, an Italian-French detente seemed to be closer than

ever before.
138DGFP, C, 111, memorandum of Ritter, Berl in, June 16, 1934, Doc. No. 9
l391bid.
140 E. R. Stahramberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1942), pp.
114-15; also Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 146, ~
141DGFP, Hassel to Neurath, Berl in, October 25, 1934, Doc. No. 132.
142 1bid.
143see p. 74 of this study.
144

'

rhe Hungarian newspapers between July 27-August l, 1934, strongly
hinted the German involvement in Austria.

143
Mussolini had already indicated in the summer of 1933 that he would 1 ike
to see a reconci 1 iation with France.

Gombo's did not believe that this recon-

cil iation was possible on the part of Italy without giving up the support of
Hungarian revisionism, while Mussolini believed that he could convince France
to give up the support of the Little Entente and win her consent to some kind
. .
145
of rev1s1on.
Barthou 1 s visit in Rumania and Yugoslavia in June 1934, his speeches in
the two capitals, and his final declaration upon his arrival in Paris proved,
in Gombos• eyes, that a French-Italian rapprochement would mean the end.of Hun
garian revisionist hopes.

Barthou said:

My travel has underlined the importance of the Little Entente,
which is more united and stronger than ever before. Benes,
Titulescu, and Yevtic demonstrated their solidarity with us, with
the League of Nations, and with the peace. The respect for the
existing treaties seems for all of us to be the right precondition of
peace. The revisionist pol icy is not only unjust and contrary to
the desires of peoples, but also magnifies the danger and carries
the germs of war.146
The French papers celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the Versailles
Treaty in long editorials and stressed that though the treaty was denounced
by Germany, nevertheless is served the European peace in the last 15 years.
Both manifestations gave the impression that France and the Little Entente were strongly united and Mussolini 1 s designs were in need of realistic
foundations.
Then, on July 6, 1934, Barthou contradicted himself by stating that revision was possible according to Article 19 of the Charter of the League of
~

14

5ormos, Eastern Security, p. 242.
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Le Temps (Paris), June 29, 1934.

Nations, and if the international conditions were right, "France is ready to
coopera t e.

.. 147

Then came the Austrian crisis.

Yugoslavia openly turned against France's

will, and Czechoslovakia and Rumania supported her.

The chief of staff of

the Hungarian army, General Vilmos Roder, evaluated the situation for the government and stressed that in case of an Anschluss, the Little Entente would
not follow the French leadership. 148

Czechoslovakia mademilitary preparations

against Hungary instead of against Germany.149

I/

Roder supposed that in case of

aggressive German action in Austria, the Little Entente would act in harmony
against Hungary according to their military plans 150 and would not follow the
French advice concerning moderation.

From the military-political point of

view the Hungarian general staff demanded the diplomatic preparationl51 of a
Hungarian military action in case of an Anschluss--for the reoccupation of
Burgenland. 15 2

As far as the direction of the Hungarian foreign policy was

concerned, the general staff recommended a much closer cooperation with
l47ormos, Eastern Security, p. 312.
148

Het~s and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78.

l491bid.
15011 1 had a chance to see these strategic plans in detail. They were prepared for only a coordinated action. None of the Little Entente states considered an attack on Hungary alone. 11 (italics mine) Interview with Hennyey.
15 1To gain the consent of the Little Entente. The general staff did not
expect any German objection and did not feel it necessary to receive Germany's
consent. Hete's and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78.
~

152surgenland, a Hungarian territory, was given to Austria according to
the resolution of the Trianon Treaty.
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Italy. 153

To make this cooperation possible, Roder ordered his military at-

tache in Rome to make the following statements· 154
Hungary will never use the arms received from Italy against Italy.
The Hungarian army will never communicate military information received from Italy to Germany or to any other state.
Hungary will never participate in an anti-Italian, German block.
A misunderstanding of German pol icy on the part of Italy may push
Germany into the "arms of the Little Entente." Therefore, Hungary
recommends negotiations to create a mutual understanding.
In conclusion, the general staff recom~ended that Gombos reassure Musso1ini 1 s support, and at the same time keep the door open for a German-Hungarian
understanding, because instead of the fast political retreat of Germany, l55
the Austrian question had not yet been closed.
Gombos, who was a former professional army officer, accepted this evaluation.

The Italian friendship was already secured and it did not suffer any

setbacks during the Austrian crisis, but the German situation became very
delicate.

While G~mb6s did not want to see a great Germany as his next door

neighbor, there were other signs which suggested a better understanding with
Hitler.

These signs, ironically enough, came from Yugoslavia.

During Bar-

thou 1 s visit, KinJ Alexander revealed to Barthou that he preferred a GermanYugoslavian rapprochement in order to secure his country against Italy, to a
Italian-Yugoslavian reconciliation, as Barthou suggested to him. 156 The
153Hetes and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78.
154 1bid., No.

79.

1551bid., No. 78; also seep. 65 of this study.
156ormos, Eastern Security, p. 313.
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negotiations ended in a deadlock concerning Barthou's desire to gain the diplomatic recognition of King Alexander for the Soviet Union. l57
A German-Yugoslavian understanding would have meant a diminution of
chances for revision against Yugoslavia.

However, the same effect would have

been created by an Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement.

The Hungarian foreign

pol icy, therefore, decided to demonstrate to Italy the importance of Hungary
over Yugoslavia 158and did the same concerning the German-Yugoslavian rapprochementJ59 K~nya went so far as to demand Hitler's gratitude for Hungary's opposition to the Danubian Pact} 60 At the same time he strove to convince Hitler
to give up his plans directed against Austria.161 To this Hitler gave contraversial replies.

While he stressed that "his friendship with Mussolini did

indeed matter more to him than the whole of the Austrian state. 11162

On the

other hand, he could not "see eye to eye with Austria where foreign pol icy ,,1as
concerned. 11163

Among such circumstances, a stronger pro-German policy would

have been unwise to follow.
Concluding the effects of the Austrian crisis, we may safely say that
while Gombos did not give up his hopes for the realization of an ItalianGerman-Austrian-Hungarian block, he became more cautious and strengthened his
l57ormos, Eastern Security, p. 313.
158 Hetes and Morva, Strictly Confidential, p. 342.
l59wilhelmstrasse, conversation of K~nya and Hitler, Berlin, August 6,
1934, Doc. No. 25.
160 1bid.
l 6 l 1bid.
162DGFP, C, Lammers to Neurath, Berl in, August 7, 1934, Doc. No. 150.
16 31bid.
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relations with Italy.

He still pursued an independent policy, but he stood

much closer then to Mussolini than before the Austrian crisis. 164
Assassination at Marseilles
Threads of the investigation led toward Italy, Germany, and Hungary.

To

finish the investigation with the result that Italy, and particul iarly Mussolini was guilty, ran contrary to the interest of France, even if Mussolini was
gui I ty. 165

. t t he .interest of not
To f.1n d Germany to be gu1. 1 t y 166 was aga1ns

only Germany, but also Yugoslavia because of economic relations, as well as
because of political considerations.

However, the uproar of the Yugoslavian

press and pub I ic opinion made it clear to everyone that nobody could hush up
the question of responsibility, and if they could not name the real criminals,
they would have to find a convenient scapegoat.

This scapegoat was found, on

the basis of superficial evidence, in Hungary.

The manifestations of the dif-

ferent governments no doubt influenced Gombos• foreign pol icy to a great degree.
France openly took the side of the Little Entente and Yugoslavia, and
. d to mo derate t h e Yugos 1avian
.
.
167
Lava 1 secret I y tr1e
aggressiveness.

164The reaffirmation of the Three Power Declaration of February 17 on
September 27, 1934, undoubtedly also influenced Hungary to take a more pro1 ta 1 i an pos i ti on.
16 5vladeta von Mil icevic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille (Bad Godesberg:
Hochwacht Verlag, 1959), pp. 24-26.
166Germany 1 s involvement is discussed in Ibid., pp. 43-46; also in Adam,
Hungary and the Little Entente, p. ts.
1671 nterv1ew
.
. h Hennyey.
wit
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Germany unconditionally took the side of Yugoslavia, and the German press
•
168
hinte d at Hungary I s respons1• b ·11 1ty.

Goring's declarations concerning the

German attitude toward Hungarian revisionism 16 9 disappointed the Hungarians;
and when Gombos had learned that the German government judged an antirevisionist political rapprochement feasible with Rumania,170 he sent his ambassador to the German foreign minister, Constantin von Neurath, with a real
ultimatum.

"If Germany did not abandon her friendly relations with Yugoslavia

soon, Hungary, together with Czechoslovakia and Austria, would form a Danubian
confederation and close the Danube Basin to us. 111 71 The German reply was
brusque:

the Hungarians could do what they wanted, but Neurath did not want

to discuss these matters any further. 172

Gombos, not being able to do any-

thing else, retaliated by delaying the realization of his promises concerning
the schooling of German minorities in Hungary. 173
Italy, on the other hand, stood firmly behind Gombos during the whole Marseil Jes crisis.

Musso] ini assured Gombos during their meeting on October 7,

1934, in Rome that if the Yugoslavians were to invade Hungary, he would mobiliz
16 8oGFP, C, 11 l, memorandum of Neurath, Berl in, October 25, 1934, Doc.
No. 269.
169

1bid., Doc. No. 305.

170~., Doc. No. 284.

l7IDGFP, Ibid., November 17, 1934, Doc. No. 336.
172 1bid.
173wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen t~ Stieve, Budapest, November 30, 1934, Doc.
No. 29. The original promises held out the prospects for the 11 B11 type schools
for the German minorities. In the "B" type schools geography, history, civil
rights and duties, writing and reading, mathematics, and physical education
Were instructed in the mother tongue and in Hungarian, while the foreign language, ecology, chemistry, home economics, drawing, and handiwork were instructed only in the mother tongue.
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the whole Italian nation and would cross the Yugoslavian border with his
11174
troops.
Suvich very actively mediated between Laval and Eckhardt, 175 and
Mussolini without hesitation offered political asylum to the one remaining
Croat refugee in Hungary to save Hungary from further embarrassment. 176
It was good to know that Italy protected Hungary with such fervor.

Yet,

it was disquieting to see that France and Italy became such close friends.

It

was also discouraging to learn that Yugoslavia again returned to the French
side and servilely followed Laval's advice.

Finally, Eden's friendly atti-

tudel77 suggested to Gombos a possible regrouping of the Great Powers, unifying Britain, France, and Italy on the one hand and isolating Germany.

The

circumstances and interests clearly demanded Hungary's siding with this group
and

Go~bos

failed.

followed this alternative.

His neutral, independent policy had

He had ended up where he had begun:

Hungary's only friend was Italy

and the realization of the revisionist demands seemed to be farther away than
ever since he had taken office.

Yet, Gombos did not give up hope and patient-

ly waited for the opportunity to again promote his favored dream, that is, the
creation of a Berl in-Rome friendship, which would benefit Hungarian revisionism.

Those were trying days for Gombos.

Laval took the initiative and sur-

'Jrised the world by announcing his visit to Rome in the beginning of January
1935.

This visit could have led to a possible French-Italian rapprochement,
174

.
Quoted in Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 68, 137n.

175 Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 21 l; also interview with Hennyey.

'

l7 6The last refugee was transported by airplane. The pilot lost radio
contact in the stormy weather over the Karst Mountains, and it was feared
that he would mistakenly go to Yugoslavia. After a long, sleepless night, the
Hungarian foreign ministry had learned that the pilot had made a crash landing
in Italy. Both the refugee and the pilot escaped harm. Interview with Baron
Anton Radva'nszky, Paris, August 10, 1971.
1771nterview with Hennyey.
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which again posed the question to G0mbos:

which is most in the interest of

Hungary?--to promote or to sabotage that rapprochement.
on the results of the Laval-Mussolini meeting.

His attitude depended

CHAPTER V
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER LAVAL
Laval Takes the Initiative
The assassination at Marseilles created a domestic political crisis in
France, and the Doumergue government resigned.

The new government of Pierre

Etienne Flandin obtained the confidence of the Chamber on November 13, 1934,
although the Right accused his cabinet of "murdering the national unity, 111 and
the Left believed that his cabinet was 11 too far on the Right. 112

The government

could only rely on the majority of those deputies who believed that the new
ministers were the "defenders of the strict republican orthodoxy.''3
The most important change concerning personalities occured in the post of
the war minister, in which General Maurin replaced "Old Marshal" Petain.
Pierre Laval, the successor to Barthou in the Doumergue government, retained
his post within the new cabinet.
The Flandin government began its activities successfully.

The new mil i-

tary budget submitted by General Maurin received unanimous approval 4 (a phenomena which had been absent in the Chamber for a long time) on November 24, 1934,
and Laval's foreign political expose was accepted on November 30, 1934.5
1Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Pol
" itigue de la Troisieme
'
;
Republ
igue (6

vols.; Paris:
2 1bid.

Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), V, 304.

31bid.
41 bid. ' p. 308.
5RAA, Moel lwald to Waldeneqq, Paris. ZI, 96/Pol •. December 2
151

lG14. o. 687.
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The government, as we 11 as Lava 1, himself, stressed its conviction that in
the field of foreign pol icy, they would continue the work of Ba rthou. 6

They

expressed their hope that "France and I ta 1y, with England in reserve 11 7 would be
able to solve many of Europe's problems with mutual agreement.

However, this

statement, alone, proved that they did not completely share Barthou's political
views, or at least not in the judgment of priorities.

Barthou had worked anx-

iously to keep the friendship of the Little Entente, to convince England of the
necessity of a more active participation in continental affairs, to enlist the
support of the Soviet Union against the growing German menace, and tb secure
the cooperation of Mussolini.
important for success.

It was this last aim that Laval considered most

By arranging this list of priorities, ·he proved to be

a more realistic diplomat than his predecessor.

He was anxious to avoid hurt-

ing France's relationship with the Little Entente by emphasizing that his projected negotiations with Italy "would not correspond with the spirit of his
aims, if it would not guarantee, at the same time, a rapprochement between
Italy and the Little Entente, especially Yugoslavia. 118

The assassination of

King Alexander, however, created such a public uproar in Yugoslavia that this
goal was hardly satisfactorily attainable for both Italy and Yugoslavia.

Laval

valued the Italian friendship more, and with the help of Eden, settled the
problem without offending Italy, while at the same time leaving the door open
for a Yugoslavian reconciliation.
Laval used a more moderate approach toward Germany by assuring Hitler that
~

"contrary to the lately published interpretations, the French-Soviet preliminary
6RAA, Moel lwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 94/Pol., November 18, 1934, p. 683.
71bid.
81bid., 96/Pol., December 2, 1934, p. 687.
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agreement for mutual assistance is not intended to be a two-sided

agreement,"~

and he expressed his hopes that Germany would find ·it possible to join the
Eastern Pact "as one among equals. 111

° Concerning the expected outcome of the

Saar plebiscite, Laval declared that "France wi11 recognize the result of the
plebiscite as binding and unalt~rable. 1111
He commented very favorably on Baldwin's speech,

12

which had expressed the

British disapproval over German rearmament plans and had concluded that

11

now

the English government agrees with France in the principles of preservation of
peace in Europe. 111 3
Everything seemed to work in Laval's favor.

His declarations and activi-

ties even impressed the Germans, and Hitler, himself, found some signs in
Laval's activities pointing toward a detente in the German-French relations. 14
Members of the Polish government thought that 11 they went too far with Germany!•
because France, in spite of her difficulties, 11 is and will remain a military
and financial factor which should not be underestimated. 11 15
Laval went ahead now with ful I speed, to realize the rapprochement with
Italy.

On December 14, 1934, he learned that Mussolini was anxious to see him

11 as soon as possible. 1116

Four days later in a speech in the French Senate, he

9RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 96/Pol., 1934, Doc. No. 2, p. 69U
I01bid.
11 , bid.
121n the House of Commons on November 28, 1934.
l3RAA, 1934, p. 690.
14DGFP, C, I I I, unsigned memorandum, Berl in, without date (November?),
Doc. No. 358.
15RAA, Paris, ZI, 94/Pol., November 18, 1934, p. 684.
16 RAA, Paris, ZI, 100/Pol., December 14, 1934, p. 699.
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expressed his confidence in the success of the upcoming negotiations with
ltaly, 17 and almost at the same time, he learned that Germany disliked his designs concerning Italy and the Eastern Pact. 18

It was natural to expect that

Germany would try to thwart a French-Italian rapprochement, and it was natural
for Laval to visit Mussolini before the Germans could succeed.

The visit to

Rome was announced on January 2, 1935, and took place on January 4-8, 1935.
In order to appreciate fully the importance of the Laval-Mussolini meeting, it is necessary to analyze the advantages Laval hoped for and the risks
involved.
Advantages and Risks on the Part of France
The basis for the negotiations was given by the common interest of France
and Italy in the preservation of Austria's independence.

However, the Austrian

crisis had already proved that a bilateral agreement between France and Italy
could not be respected by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and they were not
willing to "accept a factual protectorate of Italy in Austria. 1 .19

Thus, the

differences existing between Italy and France played a secondary role.

Laval 1 s

primary concern was the preservation of the goodwill of her client states,
while reaching an agreement with Musso! ini.

However, it would have demanded

concessions only on the part of Italy, and why should she give such concessions?

Mussolini had his own problems with Austria and Hungary.

Schuschnigg

flatly rejected the idea of having foreign troops on Austrian soil in defense
of Austria.

Since the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary had feared the realization of
~

17Journal Officiel, 1934, pp. 1396-98.
18 oGF~

C, I I I, memorandum by K~pke, Berlin, December 20, 1934, Doc. No. 3

19RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 94/Pol., November 18, 1934,p. 693.
201nterview with Theodore Hornbostel.
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Benes' dream concerning the creation of a corridor on Austrian or Hungarian
territory in order to make direct communication possible between Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia, 21 even though Yugoslavia's participation in the guarantee of
Austria's independence could have led to that very situation.

To disregard

completely the sensitivity of Austria and Hungary would have meant the loss of
influence in Central Europe for Mussolini.

Laval had to offer a very alluring

compensation in order to gain his approval for such a design.
On many occasions in history it has happened that statesmen and diplomats,
obsessed by their own designs and plans, have misinterpreted the real interests
of their respective nations.

In the case of Laval and Mussolini, we shall see

in the following analysis that both statesmen evaluated the interests of their
countries very objectively.

Therefore, it was clear from the beginning that

both Laval and Mussolini were ready for compromises only on points not involving their own national interest.

If we keep this principle in mind, the

solution of the problem is more easily discerned.
France's interest was to gain the friendship of Mussel ini, not only for
the sake of Austria's independence, but also for France's own interest!

The

French Army Council had already concluded in May 1933 that the French army
could not face the German and Italian forces without grave risks. 22

A rap-

prochement with Italy would secure France's rear in case of a conflict with
Germany, and though the French

arm~·

had great shortcomings, it still contained

577,000 men. 2 3 Adding this number to the tremendous defensive strength of the
Maginot 1 ine, it was more than a mafch for the German army, which was in a
2 1 Interview with Theodore Hornbostel.
22 1a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 255.
2 3Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 148.
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stage of transformation, projecting the strength of its army in 300,000 men. 2
from the strategic point of view, the rapprochement with Italy was a question
of primary importance for France.

It is interesting to note that the critics

of Laval's foreign policy, as well as his defenders 25 failed to point out what
perhaps is the most important aspect of the French-Italian rapprochement.
In my judgment the security of France was worth the risk involved, that
is, the further alienation of Yugoslavia.

However, this alienation of Yugosla-

via was risked only if Laval were to give in to the revisionist demands of
Mussolini.

The recognition of the righteousness of revisionism would have led

to the alienation of not only Yugoslavia, but the whole Little Entente; but
even that would not have been too high a price to pay for the security of
Laval, however, skillfully avoided that danger. 26

France.

Laval's visit was, according to my judgment, an immense success for the
French diplomacy.

The agreements comprised of a general declaration, worded in

such-a way that it could not offend anybody; a proces verbal concerning Austria 1 s independence, which projected consultations in case of a new Austrian
crisis; a protocol concerning disarmament, which condemned unilateral rearmament; a treaty on Africa concerning territorial revisions and special rights
secured for both parties in Tunisia; and, an exchange of letters about Abys. . 27
s1n1a.

__

24DGFP , C, I I I, memorandum by Neurath, Berl in, November 27, 1934, Doc.
No. 356.
2 5For a very good bibliography 'of works written about Pierre Laval see:
Hubert Cole, Laval: a Biography (New Y·ork: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963),
pp. 301-304.

__

26 DGFP , C, Ill, Hassel toNeurath, Rome,January2, 1935, Doc. No. 405.
27For the official French text see:
<Jlso DGFP, C,

111, Hass2l

to :~eura::h,

Le Te0_'.P2_ (Paris), January 13, 1935;
Ja11uar·y 8, 1935, Doc. No. 417 . .

Ro1:1e,
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The most important results of the Rome Agreements were:
the harmonization of French, Italian, Yugoslavian, and Czech stand
points concerning the independence of Austria; and
the secret military clause which secured for France not only the
chance to strengthen her German frontier, but also the cooperatio2
of the Italian army and air force in case of war against Germany. 8
The details of this military cooperation were worked out not only between
France and Italy, but also between these two Great Powers and the Little Entente.29

This military plan represented a sharp deviation from the existing

French strategic principles of strictly defensive operations.

It renewed the

old conception of the cooperation of French-Italian-Czech forces against Germany, known as the Foch Plan, at the time of the Versailles peace negotiation.30

However, the changed political situation made several alterations

necessary.

These alterations did not change the basic idea, but made the exe-

cution of the plan more difficult. 31
To avoid a possible clash between the Italian and Yugoslavian forces, it
became necessary to insert between them a French army corps.

The objective

of the Yugoslavian, French, and Italian right flank was the occupation of
Vienna in cooperation with the Czech forces. 32
28G ame 1.1n, Servi r,

I I , 168-69.

291bid.; also see Map I I.
301a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 166-68.
3l I have learned the following details from a French authority who prefers
to remain anonymous until the respective French documents are open for research.
32Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 169, as well as my anonymous source clearly stated
the projected participation of the Czech army, while General Flipo denied the
existence of any Czech offensive plans.
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This simple change in the original Foch plan created numerous difficulties:

it delayed a swift reaction to German aggression because of the long

transportation route involved (cca. 350 miles from the French border); and
since the French army was not motorized, the march-up was planned by using the
railroads.

The French military trains would have crossed.the transportation

1 ines of the Italian army, causing many possible chances for delays and confusion.

The supplying of the French army corps with ammunition, should the oper-

ations have dragged on, would have represented new problems.

Transportation

from France was difficult, while supplies in Yugoslavia were not at hand in
satisfactory amounts.

Supplies from Italy were not feasible because of the

differences of weapons.
The march-up of the Italian army corps to the right flank of the French
army projected much fewer difficulties since their routes did not cross the
French transportation 1 ines, and since the army corps was mainly comprised of
air force units with the assignment to operate over the territories of southern
Germany.
The plan seems to be too complicated and difficult.

Yet, it was feasible

in 1935, since Germany was not satisfactorily armed even at the time of the
Rhineland occupation in 1936.

The plan was good in its conception, but its

success depended on future political decisions that the two governments might
possibly make.
With these political and military agreements, France again became the
commanding power of Europe.
success?

What co~cession had Laval given for such a great

As Mussolini put it, "nothing but a desert in Africa."33

hand given to Mussolini in Abyssinia cost even less.
33Cole, Laval, p. 60.

The free

France had no essential
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interest in that country,

11

and Mussolini agreed with Laval to expand by

peacefu 1 means.' i35
The French public opinion, as well as the Chamber and the Senate, was
pleased with the results.3 6

The success of the Rome Agreement concerning Cen-

tral Europe, however, depended to a great degree on the approval of other
states, such as Germany, Hungary, and the Little Entente.

They expressed cer-

tain scepticism, as we shall see, but Laval and Mussolini hoped that their objections would be overcome in the Danubian Pact.37
34Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 172.
35 Cole, Laval, p. 6O.
36 Le Temps (Paris), January 13-14, 1935.
37 RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 18/Pol., February 6, 1935, p. 52 •

•
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Reaction in Europe to the Rome Agreements
The announcement of the Laval-Mussolini meeting created nervous reaction
in Central Europe.

Neither Hungary, Czechoslovakia, nor Yugoslavia had uncon-

ditional confidence in their own patrons.
The Hungarian Budapesti Hirlap published a comment which, without doubt,
wanted to calm down the nervousness of the revisionists.

It stated, "The Hun-

garian revisionist aims will not suffer any setback in Rome because the mutual
non-interference treaty will guarantee only the independence of the states, but
not their borders. 1138

Yugoslavia, having expressed her confidence in Laval,

expected that "Mussolini will try to further reduce the role of the Little Entente in Central Europe. 11 39

Titulescu felt it necessary to call an extraor-

dinary meeting of the Little Entente Counci1.

4

°

Czechoslovakia proved to be

the most optimistic, as the diplomatic circles in Prague expected Italy to
realize that the support of Hungarian revisionism would harm her own interest.
"If Italy would sign this agreement, she would notice that instead of loosing
something, she would gain a great deal in the future through a friendly cooperation with the Little Entente.

The agreement would furthermore promote a rap-

prochement of the Danubian states. 1141
38 Budapesti Hirlap, "Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), January l, 1935.
39 Le Temps {Paris), January l, 1935.
40 1bid., January 3, 1935.
41 Ibid., January 5, 1935.
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It is noteworthy to compare these expectations of the Danubian states
with the aims of France and Italy.

Both states wanted to secure the indepen-

dence of Austria, France wanted to strengthen her mi1itary-strategic position
against Germany,

42

and Italy wanted to gain a free hand concerning Abyssinia. 4 3

What the Danubian states feJt important remained to be unimportant in the eyes
of Laval and Musso) ini.

Yet, an agreement depended on the approva1 of these

sma11 states, unless Laval or Mussolini or both were wi11ing to give up their
inf1uence in the Danubian Basin.

It seems that Lava) was the more faithful

patron, as he constantly consulted the three Litt1e Entente states, "whilst
Italy had merely kept Hungary informed in general terms without consulting
her. 1144

Gombos sent warnings to Musso] ini:

"If the Laval-Musso) ini agreement

would guarantee the present borders in Central Europe, and this kind of guarantee would be against Article 19 of the League of Nations charter, Hungary would
be forced to change her pol icy and place her confidence in the future in Germany instead cf ltaly. 1145

At the same time, Czechoslovakia expressed great

satisfaction that "Italy will not be the enemy of the Little Entente in Central
European affairs anymore. 1146
The official text 47 was pub I ished on January 13, 1935, and was celebrated
by the French press as a great victory for Laval.

Without question, it was his

victory, for the official text included not only the guarantee of independence
42G ame 1 ·1n, Servi r I I,
43DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neur•th, Rome, January 8, 1935, Doc. No. 417.
441bid., January 2, 1935, Doc. No. 405.
45Le Temps (Paris), January 9, 1935.
461bid.
471E..l_i., January 13, 1935.
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of the Danubian states, but also recommended a Danubian Pact in which the participating states would have accepted the mutual obligation to respect each
other's national frontiers. 48
The upcoming Saar plebiscite49 from that time on held the attention of
Western Europe, and very few statesmen paid attention to the conments of the
Hungarian semi-official paper:

11

The success of the Danubian Pact depends on

the joining of Germany and Hungary, but that is guestionable. 11 50

(italics mine)

The Danubian Pact
The Italian-French communication of January 6, 1935, recommended to

11

the

States which are most interested, 11 5 1 the conclusion of a non-interference
treaty.

The participants were to obi ige themselves not to interfere in the

domestic affairs of other countries and

11

not to stir up or support any action

which was directed against the territorial integrity or against the political
and social order of any of the contracting countries. 11 52

This agreement was

to be concluded between all the neighbors of Austria (with the exception of
Switzerland) and Austria, herself, and also left the door open for France, Poland, and Rumania to join.
48

Le Temps (Paris), January 13, 1935.

49rhe Saar plebiscite was held in January 1935 according to the conditions
of the Versail Jes Treaty. The result was a great victory for Germany: 2, 124
votes were cast in favor of ~emaining with French and 477,000 in favor of rejoining Germany. Bonnet, Quai d 1 0rsay, p. 119.
50Budapesti Hirlap,

11

Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), January 14, 1935.
~

5IRAA, Moel lwald to Waldene.gg, Paris, ZI, 4/Pol., January 11, 1935.
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The treaty was to provide future consultations among the participating
states "in case Austria's independence and integrity should be menaced. 11 53
The Danubian Pact was to be based on the cooperation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia.
that these states would join in a single pact.

It was strange to expect

It was wishful thinking on the

part of Laval, as well as Musso! ini, to hope that it would work.

However, that

cooperation was to them the most feasible solution to satisfy the demands of
particul iar French and Italian interests.
On France's part it was an attempt to create an alternative plan for some
of her allies, namely Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, who bitterly opposed
the Eastern Pact.

Their opposition was directed against those articles of the

Eastern Pact that wanted to secure the right for the Soviet troops to pass
through their territories.

The Danubian Pact left out the Soviet Union and

thereby eliminated the reasons for that opposition.
was made easier for Germany to join.

By this very same act it

Yet, the projected non-interference

the support of revisionist propaganda among the Hungarian minorities of the
Little Entente states.

In other words, the Danubian Pact was an alternate plan

to secure the status guo in the Danube Basin.

Italy's participation in it

created the impression that France gave up her claims of influence in that re~ion;

but in reality, the pact assured for her the preservation of this influ-

ence indirectly--through the cooperation and consent of Italy.

It was even

more important from the military pbint of view that the reorganized French

arml Li

5~AA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, ZI, 4/Pol., January 11, 1935.
54 1t began in December 1934 with the vote of credits for annaments, aviation pro9:·ai:1, a ne11 0/1,Jsc o~' n31;,Jl C'.Jn<rruction:;, dfr::i "_::·;•~,,,
«L~i,__ :-,
;h1
Maginot I ine. See Flandin s speech in Lyon on March 6, 1935 in Le Ter;10s.
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could have launched an attack on Germany with hope of success, if the bulk of
the German army was to be engaged with the Italian troops.55
Italy
Italy was hoping that the Danubian Pact would secure the independence of
Austria even better than the Three Power Declaration by eliminating Yugoslavia 1 s jealousy and creating an atmosphere of cooperation within the Danube
Basin.

Mussolini still very strongly opposed a possible Anschluss, and on

February 13, 1935, he wrote a long article in the Popolo d 1 Italia, in which he
analyzed the history of Austria and concluded that Austrian independence was
a

11

particular Italian problem, but not exclusively Italian, for it is also a

European

problem. 1 ~ 6

The Danubian Pact, in Musso! ini 1 s mind, was the best

solution for Austria, and certainly a better solution than his alternative
plan; that is, if the European powers would not be willing to limit Hitler's
expansionist schemes, then the German expansion should be directed toward Po-

I
I

i

I

land instead of toward Austria.57

Receiving the green light from Laval for thef

j
11

peaceful solution 11 of the Abyssinian confl ict,58 the Danubian Pact seemed to

!'
j

secure Italy's influence in Central Europe, even if Italy were to turn her fu I 11
attention toward Africa.

1

Britain
On February 1-3, 1935, shortly after the Rome Agreement was made, Laval
visited London to inform the British government about the agreement and to
55Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 165.
56Quoted in full by Zara de Philippe, Mussolini Contre Hitler (Paris:
Fernand Sarlot, 1938), pp. 111-115.
57Lipsky P.Jpers, ~., p. 64.

j

58 cole, Laval, p. 60.

I
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harmonize its reply concerning the probable continuation of an aggressive German policy.

The British government cordially greeted the Rome declaration and

congratulated the conclusions of the Rome accord concerning Central Europe.59
For Western Europe, they had suggested an air agreement with Britain, France,
Italy, Germany, and Belgium

11

to act in harmony against an aggressor of any of

these nations. 1160
Germany
Germany received the Danubian Pact plan with less hostility than she received the Eastern Pact.

Hitler thought that

11

a settlement could be reached in

spite of considerable difficulties with the problem of the definition of intervention.1161

What made Hitler more conciliatory toward the Danubian Pact was

the absence of the Soviet Union,6 2 because under no circumstances was he willing to sign a treaty of mutual assistance in relation to Russia.63

On the

other hand, the preservation of the status guo and the principle of noninterference was still unacceptable to Germany.

Hitler had not flatly re-

jected the Danubian Pact; he only expressed his reservations and demanded further clarifications. 64

These demands were phrased in general terms, yet they

clearly expressed that Germany was not enthusiastic about the following points
59Le Temps (Paris), February 5, 1935, published the offical text of the
French-dritish negotiations.
60

RAA, Moel lwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 18/Pol. February 6, 1935,

p. 53.

61 Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck, Berl in, March 16, 1935, Doc. No. 38.

6Z~dam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 70.
63Lipski Papers, ~·
64:)GFP, C, 111, memorandum by Bulo1r1, Berl in, January 4, 1935, Doc. No. 4Jo,;
enclosure

I

o
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of the Danubian Pact: 5

the strengthening of ties of Austria with other

states, especially with Italy; and the creation of sort of a Italian-French
protectorate over Austria.

The required clarifications, such as the inclusion

of Switzerland and Britain, the precise definition of the idea of nonintervention, and finally the clarification as to whether or not the pact would
be concluded within the framework of the League of Nations66 hardly camouflaged
Hitler's desire to make the Danubian Pact prove to be abortive.
The Soviet Union
The Soviet Union naturally saw in the Danubian Pact an attempt to exclude
her from the European affairs.

The Russians realized that they would become

dispensable from the French point of view if the Danubian Pact were to be a
success.

However, it was a delicate situation.

Potemkin67 and Litvinov had

to frustrate the French plans in order to gain the closer cooperation of France
Very ski I I fully they did not openly oppose the Danubian Pact, but only expressed scepticism.

Potemkin thought that

11

the Rome accords had only relative

values, and that the Little Entente would not join the Danubian Pact without
11 68 H
. I at1ons.
.
. I e Entente wou I d deman d t he connection
.
st1pu
e guesse d t hat t he L1tt

of the Rome Agreement with the Eastern Pact and with the Balkan Pact.69

Fur-

thermore, he did not see any possibility for the realization of the Danubian
Pact because of the unstable political conditions of Yugoslavia, where General
6 5Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck, Berlin, February 5, 1935, No. 35.
66Germany had not been a memb;r since October 14, 1933.
67soviet ambassador to France.
68

RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 6/Pol., January 15, 1935, p. 23.

691bid.
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Ziffkovic seemed to have much greater influence within the.government than
Yevtic, himself.

If this was true, then there was no hope for a Hungarian-

Yugoslavian reconciliation.
At the same time, both Litvinov and Potemkin pushed for a separate French·
Soviet mutual assistance agreement, and they concluded their negotiations with
Laval on May 2, 1935.

It was stated:

In the event of France or the U.S.S.R • • • . being the object, in
spite of the genuinely peaceful intentions of both countries, of
an unprovoked attack on the part of a European state, the U.S.S.R.,
and.recipro76lly France shall ilTlll]ediately give each other aid and
assistance.
With this French-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, the French diplomacy overplayed its hand for security.

It exchanged the Eastern Pact for the Danubian

Pact; that is, it exchanged Soviet cooperation for Italian cooperation, and
then after securing the friendship of Musso! ini, Laval returned to the old
formula, alienating Mussel ini and completely confusing the small Central European states.
The Little Entente
The Little Entente states made clear their attitude concerning the Danubian Pact in a common declaration agreed upon at their Laibach Conference.

The

basic tone of the declaration was not the same as before, that is, only comp! iments for France,71

On the contrary, they stated their conditions7 2 1 ike an

ultimatum before they would join the Danubian Pact.

They demanded the exemp-

tion of the question of Habsburg restoration from the general operation of the
70Quoted in Desmond Donnelly, The Cold War, 1917-1965 (New York:
tin's Press, 1965).

__

St. Mar-

7IRAA , Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 6/Pol., January 15 1935
'
'
p. 23.
72Adam, Hunqarv and the Little Entente, p. 72.
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non-intervention principles; they were more anxious to keep the status quo
concerning Hungary.

They demanded the renunciation of revisionism by the Hun-

garian government as a price of recognition of Hungary's right to rearm; they
demanded the Hungarian government to give up its protection of Magyar minorities on their territories; they wanted the firm pledge of Hungary against a
possible Habsburg restoration; and finally they wanted Hungary to sign with
them, not only a non-aggression, but a mutual assistance treaty.73

Perhaps the

strongest opposition of the Little Entente was expressed in their desire to
see France promote the Eastern Pact over the Danubian Pact.
was Yevtic.

The most desperate

He demanded the connection of the Danubian Pact, not only with the

Eastern Pact, but also with the Balkan Pact.

Vevtic remarked that "France

forces Yugoslavia to fol low her own interest 1 ike Poland does. 1 .7

4

At the same

time, Yevtic also presented Mussolini with conditions that were rejected.
However, Musso! ini was thinking of making some kind of gesture of peace toward
. .

Yugoslavia to overcome tat
oppos1t1on.
h

75

The success of the Danubian Pact

was doomed by the naive belief of Laval that the Little Entente would unconditionally follow the demand of France.
Austria
Schuschnigg protested against the exclusion of Austria from the French.
. .
76
I ta 11an negot1at1ons.

He rejected the consultation article of the pro-

jected Danubian Pact and desired to see a more positive mutual assistance
treaty.

In February 1935, however, Schuschnigg decided to act according to

7

~d~m, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 72 quotes these demands from
Russian sources.
74Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 348.
75o::;FP, C, 111, H0ssel to Neurath, Rome, January JI, 1935, Doc, No. L;23.
76 J rmos I b i d •
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the resolutions .of the Rome Agreement.
existence as an independent state. 11 77

He visited France ''to save Austria's
Schuschnigg described the visit as

friendly, and he received the impression that Laval understood the Austrian
position.

Yet, in the Danubian Pact question Laval was not willing to force

his allies further for the benefit of Austria, while Schuschnigg was not willing to give a formal pledge that Austria would not restore the Habsburgs to
the throne.7 8

The outcome of his visit to London was not much better.

Sir

John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary (1931-1935), assured him that "England's attitude concerning Austria's independence had not changed and would
never change. 11 79

Simon asked him about the possibility of a plebiscite con-

cerning the Anschluss problem, after having abandoned the democratic form of
government.

Schuschnigg found the plebiscite idea, as well as the abandonment

of the Austrian-type Fascist government impractical.

As it happened in France,

so in England positive support was not available for Austria because of ideological differences.
The envisaged Danubian Pact of Laval and Musso! ini disregarded the economic considerations.

Due to the German trade activities, the influx of German

products grew from 20.3 per cent in 1934 to 22.2 per cent in 1935, while the
German market of Central European products grew from 18.3 per cent to 24.7
per cent. 80

The analysis of the individual states prevails the fol lowing

77schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 124.
78 schuschnigg,

.!EJ..i.,

p. 133.

79schuschnigg,

.!EJ..i.,

p. 140.

Bo Johann

··
Wuescht,
Yugoslawien und das Dritte Reich
Verlag, 1969), p. 83.

(Stuttgart:

Seewald
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conditions:

Germany became the first best trading partner of Yugoslavia,~ 1

Czechoslovakia,

82

and Rumania, 8 3 and the second best trading partner of Hun-

gary. 84
The percentage of German participation in the trade of these countries
was so high85 that the smallest economic pressure or restrictions on their
trade on the part of Germany would have produced catastrophic consequences.
These trade relations, on the other hand, were so insignificant with Italy and
with France that these two countries could not extort any political concessions
using economic pressure.86
Pact of Barthou:

France faced the same problem as did the Eastern

her allies were much more independent that France thought,

and they would follow the French political designs, only if they believed that
these designs would also serve their own interests.
Hungary
The official text of the Rome Agreement very much disappointed the Gombos
government.

Instead of a hard defense of the Hungarian revisionist aims, Italy

conceded to the demands of Laval and the Little Entente and undersigned the
text which guaranteed not only the integrity of the Danubian states, but also
their national frontiers.
of further trouble.

The plans for the Danubian Pact signaled the coming

The demands to cease revisionist propaganda, the

81Morini-Comby, Les Echanges, p. 54.
82 1bid., p. 25.
~
"
83
,,
Haas Ernst, Die Aussenhandelspol itik der Ehemal igen Republ ik Osterreich
Wahrend der Weltwirtschaftkrise bis zum Anschluss (\vurzburg-Aumuhle: Konrad
Triltsch Verlag, 1939).

84Morini-Comby, Ibid., p. 30.
85rhe lowest in Rumania, 7 per cent; the highest in Yugoslavia, 18.7 per
cent.
86see Table II.
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non-intervention treaty, and the opposition of Germany to the Danubian Pact
indicated that Italy and Germany were once again on a coll is ion course.
dream about the Ital

ian~German-Austrian-Hungarian

from reality than before.

Gombos'

block seemed to be farther

Hungary once again had to examine her own realistic

interests before joining or opposing the Danubian Pact.
On the field of domestic policy, the Gombos government gained respect and
popularity because of the successful maneuvers during the Marseilles affair.
In the second half of January 1935 the R~kosi 8 7 trial began.
Co~munist

It created a

scare and further strengthened the population's support, as well as

the position of the Rightist, anti-Communist-Revisionist forces.

At the same

time, the outcome of the Saar plebiscite raised the hopes for the realization
of Hungarian revisionism.
These successes encouraged Gombos to dissolve the Parliament on March 6,
1935, and declare the holding of new parliamentary elections.88

The elections

were held in April and gave further indication to Gombos which of the foreign
political alternatives was the most popular in Hungary.

The Gombos party, with

a strong Revisionist program, gained an overwhelming majority. 8 9

Not only the

districts with open ballots, but also the districts with secret ballots gave
their unconditional support to his pol icy.90

The government press emphasized

8 71'1athias Rakosi was People's Commissar in Hungary during the 1919 Communist regime. After the fall of the regime he escaped to the Soviet Union.
In the Fall of 1934 at Stal in 1 s orders, he returned to Hungary to organize an
underground Communist Party. In Hungary he was promptly arrested for his
crimes committed in 1919, as well as for his illegal entry, and was put on
trial in 1935.
f
88Budapesti Hirlap,

11

Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), March 7, 1935.

8 9Mussol ini requested Hungary to stop emphasizing the necessity of revision. Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 71.
90audaoesti Hi rlao, Ibid.
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as an important success the setback suffered by the Legitimist (Habsburg restorationist) Party.9 1
Gambos then had to select the course of the foreign pol icy of Hungary fr
the following alternatives:
give up revisionism and unconditionally join the Danubian Pact;
moderate revisionist aims and while relying on Italy, continue to
1 ive day by day hoping for the best;
change Mussolini's support for the possible support of Hitler;
try again to bring about a reconciliation of Italy and Germany
and make the old dream come true, that is, Hungary's dominating
Central Europe in cooperation with Germany north of the Danube
and with Italy south of the Danube.
The results of the elections cancel Jed out the feasibility of the unconditional acceptance of the Danubian Pact. 92
The reliance on Mussolini 1 s so]e support seemed to be a dangerous course.
It would have demanded Hungary 1 s adherence to the Danubian Pact.
projected Danubian Pact contradicted Hungary 1 s desires.

However, the

The whole Laval-

Mussolini cooperation indicated to Gombos that Mussolini was willing to bargain, not only with Laval, but also with the Little Entente to secure the independence of Austria, and during this bargaining he was susceptible to forgetting the Hungarian interests. 93

Equally im?ortant from his point of view

was learning that Musso! ini 1 s attention concerning Central Europe as a whole
was declining, and the Italian-French agreement

11

was an important

pro~lem,

which could not have been postponed any longer • • • because of ltaly 1 s

9 1 sud§!.nestj_H_L!:.I~,

11

Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), April 10, 1935.

921bi~., April 9, 1935.
93~nowing Gcimb~s 1 political conviction, we may safely sa1 that G~rnb~s
would not have chosen this alternative anyway because of his own political convictions.
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interests in Abyssinia. 11 9

Neither Horthy. nor G0mbos saw the Italian friend-

ship as an eternal one and judged it as only a necessity created by circumstances.95
Hungary needed and welcomed Italy's support during the Marseilles affair,
but soon the danger was over.

In order to continue the Hungarian foreign

policy of revisionism, Gombos needed the support of a Great Power.

If Italy

was not available anymore, he would have to turn again to the other revisionist power--Germany.
Ganbos tried to keep the door open to a renewal of German-Hungarian
friendship.

He began to change his tough attitude9 6 and to use a reconcil ia-

tory tone as early as January, and he ordered his Berl in ambassador to call
the attention of the Germans to

11

the fact that the (Rome) agreements were ob-

viously directed against Germany, and therefore the Hungarian government has
the gravest doubts about them. 11 97

(italics mine)

However, this rapprochement

of Gombos was not received with great enthusiasm in Germany.

The Germans tried

to gain special privileges for the German minorities in Hungary, which G·ombos
refused to grant them.

98

The German minority of Hungary entered its own candi-

dates in the Hungarian parliamentary election opposing Gombos• program, and
Gombos practiced the same

11

terror 11 against them that he used against the other

94wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen to Stieve, Budapest, April 6, 1935.
95Report of the Hungarian ambassador in Rome (Baron Frigyes Villani)
quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 351.
~

9 6..>ee p. 130 of this study.
97DGFP, C, 111, memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, January 4, 1935, Doc. No. 4 10.
9SWilhemlstrasse, Ibid.
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opposing candidates.

Hungary sharply protested against maps drawn by pro-

Hitler. youth groups in Hungary, on which the German borders were marked just
north of Lake Balaton.JOO Hitler still did not answer Gombos• friendly letter
sent a year before 101 and found G0mbos 1 plan to visit Germany "untimely. 11 102 The
greatest obstacle to a German-Hungarian rapprochement was the German-Yugoslavian
rapprochement, 103 which tended to curtail not only Hungary's revisionist aims,
but--in case of a German-Yugoslavian all iance--threatened Hungary with the possibil ity of being sandwiched in between two unfriendly nations.

To servilely

follow the German 1 ine was clearly against the interest of Hungary.

To gain

Germany's goodwill was necessary to make revisionism feasible against Czechoslovakia.

The old dilemma had not changed as Hungary clearly needed the sup-

port of Mussolini, as well as of Hitler.
The success of G§mbos 1 conception concerning the role of Hungary in Central Europe 104 depended on a rapprochement between Italy and Germany.
stacle to this cooperation was the Austrian question.

The ob-

The differences between

Germany and Italy were even more exaggerated by the Danubian Pact.

As Gombos

recognized, in order to bring about any rapprochement, it was necessary to
99wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen to Stieve, Budapest, April 5, 1934, Doc. No. 33.
lOOwilhelmstrasse, Ibid.; also see Map I.
10llbid., February 14, 1934, Doc. No. 19.
1021bid., Neurath 1 s note, Budapest, January 12, 1935, Doc. No. 30.
1031t began with Goring's vis~t to Belgrade for the funeral of King Alexander. Already at that time Germany had begun to play the role of Yugoslavia's
protector against Hungarian revisionism. DGFP, C, 111, memorandum by Neurath,
Berl in, October 26, 1934, Doc. No. 273; Snurre to Kopke, Budapest, November 6,
1934, Doc. No. 305; memorandum of Neurath, Berlin, November 17, 1934, Doc.
No. 336; memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, November 23, 1934, Doc. No. 349.
104_,ee the last alternative on p. 172 of this study.
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torpedo the pact without openly offending Mussolini.
dealing.

G0mbos then began double-

He tried to prove to Mussolini that Hungary was willing to accept

Musso) ini 's suggestion concerning the need of only a peaceful revision, l05
while he began to asseverate to Hitler that Hungary was a more worthy ally than
. 106
Yugos 1av1a.
These were the considerations that made Gombos state the demands that were
looked upon by Hungary as preconditions of her joining the Danubian Pact:
the closing of the Marseilles affair; l07
recognition of Hungary's right to rearmament;
securities for the bettering of the Hungarian minorities' conditions in the Little Entente states;
• t ance trea t.1es; 108 an d
.
.
o f t h e mutua 1 ass1s
t he rejection

the adherence of Germany to the Danubian Pact. 10 9
Evaluatron of Gombos' Foreign Pol icy
Mussel ini wanted

11

to secure calmness in Central Europe, for the period of

"possible military operations" in Abyssinia 110 with the help of the Danubian
Pact.

This desire of Mussolini made him touchy concerning the Hungarian de-

mands.

"The Hungarians forget, 11 he complained, "that they cannot count on Ger-

many for support of their revisionist pol icy.
105

They also forget that Hungary

DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neutrath, Rome, January 11, 1935, Doc. No. 423.

106

Gembos 1 speech in Budapesti Hirlap, "Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), January 25, 1935.
l07The League of Nations' invJstigation ended with the December 10, 1934,
resolution, but the criminal procedure continued in the French courts until
February 12, 1936. Milicevic, Konigsmord, p. 81.
108AdJm, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 75.
10 9ormos, Eastern Security, p. 349.
llOQuoted in Ormes, Ibid., p. 363.
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needs Italy and there is no way around it. 11

Yet, slowly he gave in to the

Hungarian demands, especially when he experienced the same rigidity on the part
of the Little Entente.11 2

G0mbos 1 foreign political plans worked successfully

vis a vis Mussolini.
Hitler step by step realized his plans without serious objection on the
part of the pro-status quo powers. 11 3

At the same time, he loosened his grip

on Austria and welcomed Schuschnigg 1 s opinion that "there are strong possibilities for an Austrian-German cooperation • 11 1l4
Britain
After expressing her approval of the Danubian Pact, Britain published the
White Paper on Defense, 115 and then tried to learn the convictions of the Great
Powers through the visits of Simon and Eden to Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague.

The

Stresa Conference (April 11-14, 1935) impressed the world with the unity of
England, France, and Italy; and shortly after, the Anglo German Naval Accord
(June 18, 1935) demonstrated the disunity of the same powers. The publication
116
of the Oxford Peace Ballot
forced the British government to be even more
compromising than before.
lllQuoted in Ormos, Ibid., p. 362.
11 2sudapesti Hirlap, 1iPester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), June 13, 1935 reported that
according to Musso] ini, nothing more could be expected from the Danubian Pact.
113Reintroduction of conscription and abrogation of Part V of the Versai l le Treaty.
114sudapesti Hirlap, Ibid., J~nuary 12, 1935.
1151t justified increased military expenditures in Britain on the plea of
German rearmament. Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, p. 478.
116The Oxford Union passed a resolution saying, "that this House will under no circumstances, fight for its king and country. 11 The ballots were taken
on February 9, 1933, and were publicized on June 27, 1935. The votes were:
275 for and 133 against. Albrecht-Carrie, Ibid., p. 482, 28n.
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France
After the original success of her new Italian policy, France bitterly
recognized that her hands were tied because of the resoluteness of her allies.
She vaccilated between the oldll1 and the new

118

foreign political I ine, and

finally gave up the hope to realize the Danubian Pact

11

9 after the September

30, 1935, resolution of the Little Entente.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union
on May 16, 1935, and though at the beginning openly supported Laval's Danubian
plans, soon began to withdraw and sided more strongly with her Little Entente
partners. 120
Rumania
Rumania continued her traditional policy of by-passing the existing obI igations concerning France, the

~ittle

Entente, and the Balkan Entente and

tried to establish direct contacts with Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.

121

Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia openly opposed the Danubian Pact and drew closer to Germany
because of her fear of Italy; and though she officially opposed the Anschluss,
s he

11

•
j j y ha d no objections aga1ns
• t •1t. 11 122
emot1ona

l17French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed on May 2, 1935.
IJ8The new French-Italian pro~osals for the Danubian Pact were pub! ished
in July 1935.
11 9Adam, Hungary and the Litt)e Entente, p. 74.
120ormos, Eastern Security, p• 359.
121~., p. 358.

122 1bid-
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Hungary
Hungary could look back to her diplomatic activities with satisfaction.
Gombos had successfully preserved his freedom to continue the revisionist
policy, he had successfully moderated the dispute between Austria and Germany,
and had prevented the complete alienation of Hitler and Musso! ini.

He was able

to keep the goodwill of Mussolini "south of the Danube" and. obtained Hitler's
cooperation "north of the Danube."
too.

However, there were defeats on the balance,

The Yugoslavian-German, and Yugoslavian-Italian rapprochements were cer-

tainly not in Hungary's interest, but nothing irrevocable happened •.
Gombos was equally successful to curtail German influence in Hungary, and
using his anti-German resistance as a propaganda weapon, he was able to keep
the sympathy of Britain, 12 3 as well as the U.S. 124
The only Power with which Hungary could not make and wished not to make
closer relationships was France because of her strong support of the Little
Entente's anti-revisionist attitude.
less and less important.

This French support of Hungary looked

France's international authority declined, and even

the French alliance system existed only on paper, as the events of 1935 had
demonstrated. 12 5
Gombos' foreign pol icy served Hungary's interests well.

This foreign

pol icy enjoyed the support of the masses and secured a unique position for Hungary among the small states of Central Europe.

She remained uncommitted and

could continue to change her pol icy as the realistic interests demanded.
~

123audapesti Hirlap,''Pester Lloyd'' (Budapest), .l\pril 10, 1935
and May 16, 1935.

12~ontgomery, Hungary, p. 77; also Ibid., June 2, 1935.
l25ormos, Eastern Security, p. 359.

May 2, 1935
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
In my introduction I wr,ote that the purpose of this study is to explain
the reasons behind the diplomatic decisions of the three small states,

By this

method I hoped to shed light not only on the history of these Central European
states, but also to answer the crucial question of who was really responsible
for not checking the growing danger that Germany presented, and who was responsible for allowing the unchallenged German domination of Europe to come about.
Looking back on my investigations, one may clearly see two distinct periods.
From 1920 to 1934 the French alliance system controlled Europe without
challenge.

However, in 1920 the French leadership was accepted on the basis of

superior strength not only ideologically and economically, but also militarily.
The Versailles Treaty and other connected treaties were signed with the supposition that France would always remain strong enough to preserve the new status
quo in Europe.

Conditions, however, destroyed this French superiority.

French

political leaders quarreled endlessly over the question of priority of whether
the resources of France should be used to improve the domestic conditions, and
economic and social situation, or whether they should be used to sustain the
military strength, and through it the international position?

Sorrowfully

enough, the French leaders did not ~ealize that the posing of this question in
an

11

either-or" form was already a mistake.

When economic and social conditions

deteriorate, then, too, the military capacity declines.

Also, on the stage of

international politics, no nation, even with the most progressive economic and
social system, can stand up if its military strenqth is not readv to defend
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that system against outside aggressions.

The bitter struggle over "either-or"

hindered the development of both social-economic and military strength, and put
France in an inferior position well before 1934.
found the second reason for the disappearance of the French leadership
in Europe in the abusement of democracy.

Until this democracy stood alone, in

Europe as the form of government of the strongest European country, every nation respected it and more or less accepted it as the most workable political
system.

Up until 1933 the existing two totalitarian systems (the Soviet Union

and Italy) did not command the admiration of other countries.

Even the Yugo-

slavian royal dictatorship of King Alexander was regarded only as a temporary
emergency measure.

However, in 1934 the situation changed.

The unrestricted

number of political parties in France made even the coal it ion governments unproductive, and the political arena of

11

free democracy" tragically performed

a show that more resembled a demagoguery anarchy, than democracy.

Even the

British and American two-party systems seemed to be restricted political organizations compared to the happy French democracy.

However, the great masses

within, as well as outside of France, did not value or condemn the political
systems by the degree of political freedom alone!

They also passed their

judgment by considering the number of unemployed, the rising prices, and the
deteriorating wages.

As a result, in the minds of mill ions of common men in

Europe, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union began to appear as
better political systems.
The resultant force of the abdve-mentioned three factors were speeded up
by the world-wide economic crisis, which reached its peak in 1934 when not onl
France herself, but also her allies and all of Europe recognized her weakness.
Of course, France did not completely adjust her foreign political aims to
the changed conditions.

What she could not Ion er do alone she tried to do
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with the help of new allies.

The whole Eastern Pact, as well as the Danubian

Pact negotiations, were aimed at securing the political status quo, although
the economic, social, and military situations were against it.

The French de-

signs of the Eastern and Danubian Pacts revealed to allies and foes, as well as
to the uncommitted nations that France sunk from being a leader to a position
where she could no longer command without a strong ally.
Looking for an ally, the ideologically determined French policy found the
solution first in the Eastern Pact through the help of the Soviet Union.

It

never occured to France that the aid of the Soviet Union was militarily useless, and that Stalin might follow realistic considerations more than ideological sympathy.
In 1935, with Laval as foreign minister, France tried a more realistic
I ine.

The buying of Musso! ini 1 s cooperation with a

questionably a great French diplomatic success.

11

piece of desert 11 was un-

The projected Danubian Pact

would have created such a strong Central Europe that Hitler WOJld not have
dared to risk any further aggressive actions, being dependent on Central Europ
for food, oil, and other important raw materials (such as aluminum).

However,

this beautiful French design lacked realistic foundations as it did not take
into consideration the changed economic condition or the national interests of
the Little Entente or of the enemies.

This neglect and ignorance of the French

diplomacy actually paved the way for Hitler's future successes.
Austria
Among the three states analyzed, Austria was the weakest, but yet was
seemingly the center of the political interest of every nation.

Dollfuss and

Schuschnigg both realized that their country was unable to withstand the pressure of the Great Powers.

The opportunities of joining Germany, and later Hun-

gary or Czechoslovakia were missed before 1934 due to the objections of France,
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England, and Italy.

In 1934 the interests .of these Great Powers s·ti11 demanded

an independent Austria, and she was saved for the time being.

With the decline

of this interest in 1934 and further decline in 1936, Austria found herself
deserted.

It is a credit to the Austrian statesmanship, and especially to

Schuschnigg, that he realized the situation and tried to do his best to secure
Austria's independence using some means other than subservient obedience.
In January 1936 Schuschnigg visited Czechoslovakia to discuss economic
problems

1

concerning the two countries, but at the same time the Austrian for-

eign minister, Baron Berger-Waldenegg, hoped for a possible friendship treaty
with Czechoslovakia. 2

This latter possibility caused great anxiety in the Hun-

garian government circles.3

The new Czech prime minister, Hodza, received

Schuschnigg with real friendliness and fulfilled as much of the economic requests of Austria as he could. 4

However, even he could not overcome the deep

hostility of the Czech population toward Austria, and his friendly gesture of
presenting Schuschnigg with the statue of Field Marshall Radetzky {kept in a
basement since 1919) failed because of the opposition of the City Council of
Prague {which was the legal owner of the statue).5
bring positive political results.

Thus, his visit did not

The repercussions of the visit in Hungary,

Italy, and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, created alienation and hostility.
1schuschnigg, Austria Reguiem, p. 143.
2Hdry to K~nya, Warsaw, January 16, 1936, in Diplom£ciai lratok Maqyarorsz~q Kulpol itik~j~hoz, 1936-1945 (Diplomatic Documents to the Foreign Pol icy of
Hungary, 1936-1945), (4 vols.; Budapest: Akad~mia Pub I., 1962), I, Doc. No. 6.
3DFPH, I, reports of the Hungarian ambassadors from Prague, Belgrade, and
Vienna~nuary 16-25, 1936, Doc.Nos. 6, 7, 9, 13, 15.
4schuschnigg, Ibid., p. 146.
51nterview with Schwarzenberg.
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The German diplomacy used this visit very skillfully.

Mackensen, German am-

bassador to Budapest, warned Foreign Minister K~nya that Schuschnigg had mad
unfriendly remarks to Benes about the Hungarian revisionist aims.

6

Hungary,

whlJe still regarding Austrian independence in the interest of Hungary, 7 began
to diplomatically prevent the realization of an Austrian-Czech rapprochement.

8

Prince Paul of Yugoslavia expressed his opinion that the independence of Austria was not the vital interest of his country.9
When Musso! ini expressed his views that he did not think it was time for
him to interfere as mediator 11 in the Austrian-German disagreement, Schuschnigg
and the Austrian government felt it necessary to explain their position concerning their policy toward the Little Entente, and to regain the goodwill of
Italy by stating that Austria would not seek closer connections with the Little
Entente without the consent of Italy and Hungary. 12
Thus, Schuschnigg's efforts to try a new, broader foreign pol icy than that
of Dollfuss' had failed.

Austria remained completely dependent on Italy and

when the Ethiopian War weakened Mussolini's influence in Central Europe,
6DFPH, I, conversation of K~nya and Mackensen, Budapest, February 12,
1936, Doc. No. 31.
7DFPH, I, Kanya to Szt6jay, February 27, 1936, Doc. No. 53.
8DFPH, I, conversation of K~nya with Macke~sen, Budapest, February 25,
1930.
9DFPH, I, Al th to K~nya, Belgrade, February 16, 1936.

__
--·
--·

.

10DFPH , I, Ullein-Reviczky to Kanya, Zagreb, February 19, 1936.
l !DFPH
1936.

12DFPH

I, conversation of K~nya and Neustadter-St~rmer, Budapest, March 9,
I

I, Wettstein to Kanya, Prague, March 16, 1936.
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Austria 1 s only chance for remaining independent lay in the goodwill of Hitler.
As we know today, the appeasement policy also failed.
If we want to draw any worthy conclusions concerning the causes of the
failure, we would have to analyze the possible errors in Schuschnigg 1 s diplomacy.

If he wanted to continue along Doll fuss• line of thinking, rather than

in the field of domestic pol icy, Schuschnigg had to follow the course that he
did:

strengthen the government forces, and fight against Nazism, as well as

against the Social Democrats.

However, this domestic pol icy I imited his for-

eign political alternatives to the Rome Protocol.

The independence of Austria

was based on the theory that the Italian-German misunderstanding would never be
resolved. !3
If Schuschnigg wanted to be consistent, he should not have considered the
Italian-German differences to be eternal either.

Rather, a sharp turn in Aus-

trian foreign pol icy from the Rome Protocols to the Western democracies and to
the Little Entente would have had great consequences, not only internationally,
but also domestically in July 1934.
In 1934 the situation was different.

Britain, France, and even Czechoslo-

vakia displayed a great understanding for Austria's domestic problems. 14

The

reoccuring obstacles for a better understanding with these countries were two(a) Schuschnigg 1 s stubborn refusal to renounce the possibility of a

fold:

Habsburg restoration; and (b) his unwillingness to participate in any combination of states directed against Nazi Germany.
131t is interesting to see that at the same time he considered it to be
too risky to base his country's independence on the French-German misunderstanding. Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 131.
14

czechoslovakia, for example, stopped the Socialist emigree's activity in
Brno and moved them to Paris. Schuschnigg, ..!EJ.£., p. 146.
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Both

11

questions of principle, 11 as he put it, created great difficulties

for Austria's foreign policy and finally left her no other alternative than
the one she followed to the end.
Schuschnigg emphasized many times that he did not consider a Habsburg
restoration timely.

It was poss.ible that even the leaders of the Little En-

tente states did not consider it as an imminent danger, 15 although it was one
reason for their fear and suspicion.

The Yugoslavians, on the other hand,

took this danger so seriously that they considered it necessary to prepare a
possible German-Yugoslavian military cooperation in case of a Habsburg restoration attempt~ 16

It is known today that by October 1936 the Seventh German

Army Corps received orders, that in case of a Habsburg restoration, they
should invade Austria while the Yugoslavian entered from the south. l7

Instead

of comforting the Little Entente states concerning the question of the Habsburg restoration, Schuschnigg tried to en! ist the support of the Vaticanl8 to
explain his pol icy to the Little Entente, but they were shamed away·from this
assignment.

The Habsburg question had to be postponed because of the con-

certed protest of France, England, and the Little Entente.

It, however, was

not renounced, and thus it represented an equally important obstacle to the
1511 0nce I asked Jan Masaryk about the Habsburg restoration. He said that
somehow the government of Czechoslovakia was not so much afraid of it as Rumania. However, if one asked the Rumanians, it was supposedly Benes who was
afraid of it. 11 Interview with Schwerzenberg.
J6Eichstadt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler, p. 87.
171bid.

18 I b i d. , p. 88.
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Danubian Pact, as did the Hungarian revisionism. 9

The reason for it certain-

1y cannot be found in practical political considerations.
The rejection of participation in anti-German combinations was based more
on the pangerman and pro-Nazi sympathies of a great number of Austrians than
on the romantic, German nationalist and loyalist sympathies of Schuschnigg.
This pangerman sentiment grew day by day and had no real opposition, since the
Socialists were driven underground.

Though every statesmen of Europe showed

some understanding toward this problem, it probably hurt Austria's chances as
much as the question of the Habsburg restoration, especially after Schuschnigg
began his appeasement policy toward Hitler.
It is outside of the task of a historian to speculate what would have
happened if

Therefore, we must be satisfied with the fact that

Schuschnigg had a chance to eliminate the disturbing question of the Habsburg
restoration and the pro-German loyalty, although he did not.
we may draw, therefore, must be something 1 ike this:

The conclusion

while Schuschnigg cer-

tainly was a good Austrian and tried to serve the interest of his country as
·well as he could, because of his personal convictions and prejudices, he
failed to explore all the possibilities that were open for Austrian foreign
policy 1n the years 1934-1936.
We tend to dismiss the importance of such failures, because we know what
happened during the years following 1936.

However, my conclusion remains valid

against this argument, simply because nobody knew for sure in 1936 what would
happen in 1938 or later.
19oFPH, I, conversation of K~nya and Mackensen, Budapest, February 25,
1931, oOC:-No. 49.
Dollfuss successfully blocked both movements and commanded the loyalty
of the Austrian people.
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Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia's problems came into the center: of European diplomatic interest
only with the assassination of King Alexander.

Yet, this very same problem of

the fear of Italy, and to a lesser degree, Hungary and Bulgaria, existed well
before that time.

King Alexander and, after his death, Prince Paul tried to

eliminate the greater menace of Italy.

The modus vivendi created with Bul-

garia and the rapprochement attempts with Mussolini are examples of the good
judgment of Yugoslavian statesmanship.
What made Yugoslavian pol icy pro-German?
tion we may safely answer that it was due to:

In the 1 ight of our investigaeconomic interests, for Yugo-

slavia depended on German trade much more than on any other trade; political
interests, because she found in Germany a more effective patron against Hungary
than France ever was; and ideological interests, because her fear of Communism
and the Eastern Pact would have forced her into closer cooperation with the
Soviet Union.
After the assassination, Yugoslavia made an attempt to straighten up her
relationship with France--willy-nilly, but (and only the results are important)
she agreed not to accuse Italy in the affair.
France did not realize the importance of this gesture, just as she did not
realize the anxiety of Yugoslavia during the Danubian Pact negotiations.

Right

before the Danubian negotiation, the German-Yugoslavian trade treaty and diplomatic rapprochement opened up the

~econd

get rid of the selfish French patronage.
of Laval,

choice for Yugoslavia, that is, to
In response to the demanding voice

the Yugoslavian statesmen answered with a selection of better op-

portunities.

What is important to realize is that they saw this better oppor!

tunity while France did not.

Even if she had, Laval believed that Yugoslavia 1 sl
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loyalty and gratitude would force them to see the Nazi danger from the French
side, forgetting the Yugoslavian side.

Hypnotized by the spectacular actions

of Hitler, France concentrated her attention entirely on Western Europe, later
on Ethiopia and on Spain.

She failed to reassure her smaller allies and

neglected them, trying to find a stronger ally against the rising danger of
Germany.

Finding an ally in the Soviet Union, France actually alienated Yugo-

slavia even more.
If

Franc~

had even tried to understand the Yugoslavian interests during

the latest Danubian Pact negotiations, France would have reassured Yugoslavia
that she would not abandon Yugoslavia and would restrain Mussolini from aggressive action.

She could have used her tacit agreement with Mussolini over

Abyssinia as a convincing argument to regain Yugoslavia's confidence.
she did not.

However,

The Yugoslavian statesmen followed a realistic foreign policy

that promised the most advantages for their country.
Hungary
In regards to Hungary the French pol icy was based on the assumption that
Hungary was an anti-democratic state, but at the same time, so weak that she
would never play any important role in international politics.

The complete

neglect of geographical conditions allowed France to believe in the validity
of this last assumption.

Due to the geographic location, it was naive on the

part of any power to believe that a strong Central European block could be
created without the participation of Hungary.

•

This geographic location made

Hungary much more important than her military strength suggested.

The Hun-

garian statesmen realized this and played skillfully to secure for their nation
the most benefits.
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It is true that the Hungarian politicians were short-sightedly revisionist.

However, their revisionism was well-founded and justified even in the

eyes of many prominent Little Entente statesmen.

In the 1920 1 s, France would

have been strong enough to lay down the sol id basis for a Central European
cooperation by using the League of Nations charter to prosecute a revision
according to the ethnographic borders.

Yet, France did not feel it necessary

to even analyze the consequences of such a move.
great effects on Hungary.

Such a revision would have

Fulfilling this Hungarian demand, France would have

been able to take away the mass support from those very much resented authoritarian

11

Fascis.t 11 politicians.

The pressing economic and social problems would

have dominated Hungary's political life and the solutions to these prcblems
would have created the bases for an unsuspecting, close cooperation of all the
successor states in the Danube Basin.
After the rise of Hitler and the appointment of Gombos, the French diplomacy made only one weak attempt to lure Hungary into the French camp.
attempts might or might not have produced results.

Such

The pro-French groups in

·Hungary were so strong in the first half of 1934 that Gombos openly complained
against them and criticized their activity, although at that time, France was
no longer in a position to force even the smallest concessions for revision on
her al 1 ies.

A deeper evaluation of Hungary's pol icy could have only produced

the conclusion that the Gombos government was not a servile and obedient ally
of Italy; and while Gombos praised German Nazism, he was not hesitant to react most aggressively toward the Qterman attempts to spread Nazism in Hungary.
During the Danubian Pact negotiations, the French diplomacy looked upon
Hungary as an Italian satellite and made no direct contacts with the Gombos
government.

Yet, Mussolini 1 s handling of Gombos opened an opportunity for
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France to not only gain Hungary's confidence, but also to prevent her rapprochement with Germany.

France, however, missed this opportunity.

Under such circumstances, the selected policy of Gombos seemed to be the
most beneficial for Hungary.
In conclusion, the above analysis put the question of responsibility on
the shoulders of France.

She was not able to create a mood of reconciliation,

nor was she able to enforce a loyal pro-French policy.

She realized that she

could not eliminate the revisionist forces, and yet she did not realize that
without solving the Danubian problem, she could not count on her allies' support against Nazi Germany.

With this misunderstanding of the individual aims

of the different Central European states, she left the door open for the German penetration.
Germany thus gained an uni imited amount of food supplies, as well as raw
materials.

Without these resources, Hitler could not have so easily realized

his rearmament program; could not have grown strong enough to challenge France
and Britain openly; could not have destroyed Czechoslovakia without firing a
shot; and could not have enslaved, in the first years of the war, almost all of
Europe.
All this happened in the years 1934-1935.

They were crucial years, in-

deed, not only for the three small states discussed here, but also for all of
mankind.

With better diplomacy, France could have prevented World War I I dur-

ing these years.
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TABLE 11
RANKS AS TRADING PARTNERS IN 1934

Rank as Trading Partner
Trader
Germany

France

Italy

Austria

1

10

less than 10

Czechoslovakia

1

5

less than 10

Hungary

2

5

3

Rumania

1

less than 10

less than 10

Yugoslavia

1

·-

Note:

8

2

Assembled on the basis of Morini-Comby, Les Echanges,
'
pp. 13, 25, 36, 46, 61.

............
TABLE

I I I

PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN IMPORT 1

Hungary

Poland

U.S.

Switzerland

Yugoslavia

Rumania

13.29

11 • 30

6.45

5.20

3.69

8.75

4.46

3. 11

4.33

2.8

16.94

17.45

13. 63

11. 03

6.20

5.28

3.88

8.36

5.55

4. 38

4.23

3.2

16.81

17.00

12.7

9~4

6.3

6.o

6.7

7.0

4.4

5.0

3. 1

19. 1

1 r:4

- -·
9.3

6. 1

8.o

4.4

4.7

3.7

20. 1

Year

CzechoGermany slovakia

1933

19.68

1934
1935
1936

17. 1

..

..

6.2

5.9

' 3.3
~--.

-

England

Italy

France Others2

.

3. 1
I

PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN EXPORT3
1933

15.7

7. y,

10.6

7.0

9.9

7.9

5.6

6.4

4.3

3.9

2.3

18.7

1934

16.3

7.7

10.4

6. 1

11. 3

7.3

6. 1

4.o

5.4

3.8

1 .5

20. 1

1935

16.0

7.3

14. l

5.9

10.6

5.6

6.2

4.2

4.3

3.6

1.9

20.3

1936

16.3

7.3

13 .4

5. 1

9.8

4.8

6.9

5.0

5.5

4.5

2.4

19.0

lAs quoted in Ernst Haas, Die Aussenhandels ol itik der Ehemal i en Re ublik nsterreich Wharend der Weltwirtschafts
Krise bis zum Anschluss (W~rzburg, Konrad Triltsch ed., 1933), Table 11,'Statistik des Aussenhandels sterreichs,''
Volumes: 1933, p. 12; 1934, p. 12; 1935, p. 12; 1936, p. 12.
2split among different countries in insignificant small amounts.
3Haas, Ibid., Volumes:

1933, p. 13; 1934, p. 13; 1935, p. 13; 1936, p. 13.

TABLE

IV

PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN 1933-1934

CzechoHungary slovakia

1933

Germany

Italy

Import

19.68

4.33

11. 30

Export

15.7

3.9

10.6

Rumania

Yugoslavia

13.29

4.46

8075

7.7

6.4

5.6

Friendly Nations Total

Hostile Nations Total

35. 31
...
30.2

26.50

Import
Export

'

Poland

U.S.

Switzerland

England

France

6.45

5.20

3.69

3. 11

2.8

16'. 94

7.0

9.9

7.9

4.3

2.3

18.7

Neutral Nations Total

38. 19

19.7

50. 1

:··

..

'.

1934

Hungary

Others

.

-

'"

...-..

-

•

'

Italy

Germany

Czechoslovakia

France
-

Rumania

Yugoslavia

Poland

U.S.

5.28

Switzerland
England Others

·--

Import

11 .03

4.23

17.45

3.2

13.63

5.55

8.36

6.2

Export

10.4

3.8

16.3

1.5

7,7

4.o

6.1

6. 1

11. 3

5.4

7.3
----~-

---

-·

---

.-

F.riendlt
Na t 1 on s To a 1

Hostile Nations Total

Import

15.26

54.39

30.35

Export

14.2

41. 7

44. 1

N~tral

16.81

4.38

3.88

---

20. 1
--

~

Nations Total

---·--

~--·

TABLE V
HUNGARY'S TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE IN 1934

;1

·Mi 11 ion
Pengos
"

%

%

Note:

Austria

I ta 1y

179.406

74.764

152.891

23.91

9.96

20.35

Germany

Yugoslavia

France

England

· 'Switzerland

50.313

25.167

24. 158

49.438

27.660

6.7

3.35

3.72

6.59

3.68

Rumania

Others

Total

166.296 750.093
21.74

Friendly Nations Total

Hostile Nations Total

Neutral Nations Total

54. 22

13. 77

32.01

100

100.00

Data for Ge~an trade calculated on the basis of Macartney, October Fifteenth~ Part I, p. 141.
Data for Austrian and Italian trade calculated on the basis of Ibid., p. 145.
Data for other countries calculated on the basis of Morini-Comby:-""les E~hanges, p. 30.
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List of Important Personalities
Alexander I. King of Yugoslavia. He succeeded the throne in August 1921, and
established his royal dictatorship in 1927. He was a great supporter of
Serbian nationalism and oppressed the Croatian and Macedonian separatist
movement. He made several unsuccessful attempts to find a modus vivendi
with Mussolini. He was assassinated at Marseilles on October 9, 1934.
Alth, Waldemar.

Hungarian Ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Baldwin, Stanley • ..Leader of the British Conservative Party and Lord President
of the Council in the National Government from November 10, 1931; Prime
Minister, June 7, 1935-May 28, 1937.
Barthou, Louis. Chairman of L'Union Democratigue et Radicale in the French
Senate, and Foreign Minister in the Doumergue government, February 9, 19
October 9, 1934.
Beck, Colonel Josef.

Polish Foreign Minister.

Benes, Edouard. Czech Foreign Minister, 1918-1935, and President of the Repub1 ic, December 18, 1935-0ctober 5, 1938.
Bethlen, Count lstv~n.

Hungarian Prime Minister, 1921-1931.

Bleyer, Jakab. University Professor; Vice-President of the Cultural Association of Germans in Hungary.
Blum, Leon. Leader of the French Social is ts, and Prime Minister of the Popular
Front, June 4, 1936-June 22, 1937.
Bulow, Bernhard.
1936.

Political Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1934-

Campbell, Sir Eric.

British Charge d'Affaire in Paris, 1934-1935.

Chlapowski, Alfred.

Polish Ambassador to France.

Clemenceau, Georges Benjamin.
Colonna, Ascanio.
1936.

French Prime Minister, 1917-1920.

Italian Ambassador to Hungary, October 6, 1932-December 21,

Cot, Pierre. French Air Minister who visited the U.S.S.R. with a French air
squadron during the days of French-Russian rapprochement in July 1933.
Daladier, Edouard. Leader of the French Radical Socialists; Prime Minister
and Minister of Defense, January I, 1933-0ctober 23, 1933: Minister of
Defense, October 26, 1933-January 27, 1934; and Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 30, 1934-February 7, 1934.
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Doll fuss, Engelbert. Austrian Federal Chancellor from May 1932 to.his assassination on July 25, 1934. In 1933 he founded the Fatherland Front to embrace all Austrian political parties supporting·his government. He introduced a Fascist-type system in Austria based on the ideas of the papal
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.
Doumergue, Gaston. President of the French Republic; French Prime Minister in
the "Government of National .Union, 11 February 9-November 8, 1934. In his
radio addresses he tried to gain public support for his pol icy against
the opposftion in the Chamber of Deputies.
Eden, Anthony. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
the National Government, November 10, 1931-December 31, 1933; Lord Privy
Seal without Cabinet rank, January I, 1934; Rapporteur of the Marseilles
affair in the league of Nations, October-December 1934.
Ermansdorff, Otto.
Ministry.

Deputy Director of Department I I of the German Fa.reign

Fabry, Colonel Jean. Minister of Defense in Laval 1 s government. He was
strongly anti-Communist, and as such, an opponent of the Soviet-French
rapprochement.
Flandin, Pierre Etienne. Chairman of the Republ leans de la Gauche, and Minister of Public Works in the Doumergue government.
Gamelin, General Maurice. Military advisor of Barthou and Laval; Chief of
Staff of the French army from January 1935.
Gombos, Gyula. Hungarian Minister of Defense, October 10, 1929-September 21,
1932; Prime Minister, September 30, 1932-0ctober 6, 1936; and one of the
prominent leaders· of the Nationalist and Revisionist leagues.
Goring, Hermann Wilhelm. Minister President and Minister of Interior of Prussia; Air Minister from Apri I 1933.
Habsburg, Otto von. Son of Charles, the last emperor of Austria and King of
Hungary. His succession to the throne was blocked by the resolution of
the peace treaties. He had many supporters in both countries who wanted
him to restore the monarchial form of government and reunite the old lands
of the Habsburg monarcy.
Hassel, Ulrich.

German Ambassador to Italy, 1932-1938.

Heeren, Victor von.

German

Ambass~dor

to Yugoslavia, 1934.

Herriot, Edouard. Leader of French Radical Socialist Party; Minister of State
without Portfolio in the Doumergue and Flandin governments, February 9,
1934-May 30, 1935.
Hodza, Milan.
1938.

Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, November 6, 1935-September
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Hornbostel, Theodore von. Political Secretary-General in the Foreign Office
of the Federal Chacellery of Austria.
Horthy, Miklos (de Nagyb~nya).
I

Regent of Hungary.

I

Hory, Andras. Hungarian Ambassador to Italy, 1927-1934; Under-Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, 1934-1935; Ambassador to Poland, 1935-1940.
Jeanneney, Jules.
I

I

I

Kanya, Kalman.

President of the French Senate.

Hungarian Foreign Minister, February 4, 1933-November 28, 1938.

Kopke, Gerhard.

Director of Department I I of the German Foreign Ministry.

Koster, Roland.

German Ambassador to France, 1932-1935.

Kvaternik, Eugen. Assistant leader of the USTASHE organization. He became
Minister of Pol ice in the Nazi-satel 1 ite Croatian state in 1942.
Lammers, Hans Heinrich.
Laroche, John.

Di rector of the Reich Chancery.

French Ambassador to Poland

Laval, Pierre. Member of numerous French governments from 1925; Minister of
Colonies in the Doumergue government, February 9-0ctober 13, 1934; succeeded Barthou as Foreign Minister, October 13-November 9, 1934, in the
Flandin cabinet until May 30, 1935.
Lipski, Josef.
1939.

Polish Ambassador to Germany, November 15, 1934-September l,

Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich.
Macek, Vladimir.

Leader of the Croatian National Peasant Party.

Mackensen, Hans George von.
Marek, Ferdinand.

German Ambassador to Hungary, 1933-1937.

Austrian Ambassador to Prague.

Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue.
Mazirevich, Szilard.
Michailov, Ivan.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1930-1939.

President of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935.

Hungarian Ambassador to Germany, 1933-1936.

Assistant leader of the IMRO.

Muff, General Wolfgang.
Neurath, Constantin von.
Neusstadter-Sturmer, Odo.
1932-1933.

'

German Military Attache to Austria.
German Foreign Minister, 1933-1938.
Labor Secretary in the first Dollfuss government,
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Papen, Franz. Vice-Chancellor of the Reich and Saar Plenipotentiary until
July 26, 1934. He was a Minister in Austria on a special mission direct)~
responsible to Hitler.
Paul-Boncour, Joseph. French .Prime Minister, December 14, 1932-January 29,
1933. He represented the Yugoslavian royal family at the Marseilles
t ri a 1 •
Pavelich, Ante.

Leader of the Croatian USTASHE movement.

Petain, Marshal Philippe.
Pilsudsky, Josef.
the Anny.

Marshal of Poland; Minister of War; and Inspector General of

Potemkin, Vladimir.

Soviet Ambassador to France.

I

Radvanszky, Baron Albert.
Parliament.

'
Rakosi,
Mathias.
gary.
Ritter, Karl.
try.

Minister of War in the Doumergue cabinet.

Vice-President of the Upper House of the Hungarian

People's Commissar in the Kun Communist government in Hun-

Director of the Economic Department of the German Foreign Minis-

R8der, Vil mos. Hungarian General; Minister of Defense, October 12, 1936May 13, 1938.
Schnurre, Karl.
Schoen, Hans.

Councillor of the German Embassy in Hungary, 1934-1936.
German Ambassador to Hungary, 1926-1933.

Schuschnigg, Kurt van.
1938.
Simon, Sir John.

Austrian Federal Chancellor, July 29, 1934-March 11,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931-1935.

Stieve, Friedrich. Director of the Cultural-Political Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Stojadinovich, Milan. Yugoslavian Prime
23, 1935-February 4, 1939.
Suvich, Fulvio.

Ministe~

and Foreign Minister, June

Under-Secretary ' of State in the Italian Foreign Ministry.

I

Tardieu, Andre. French Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister with short interruption between 1928-1932.
Titulescu, Nicolae.

Rumanian Foreign Minister, 1932-1936.

Ullein-Reviczky, Antal.
Foreign Ministry.

Director of the Press Department in the Hungarian
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Wettstein, Janos.

Hungarian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1935-1939.•

Yevtic, Bogoljub. Yugoslavian Foreign Minister until December 4, 1934, when
he became Minister President and Foreign Minister.
Ziffkovich, General Pero. Prime Minister during the Royal dictatorship of
King Alexander, 1927-1931; Advisor to King Alexander of Yugoslavia.
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